

REMARKS
ON THE
HISTORY
OF
ENGLAND.

From the Minutes of
HUMPHRY OLDCASTLE, Esq.

K

12 D



L O N D O N :
Printed for R. FRANKLIN, in *Russel-Street*,
Covent-Garden. M,DCC,XLIII.

REMARKS

ON THE

HISTORY



Printed by J. Smith, London

TO
A Certain LORD.

My LORD,
OF the whole Legion once in your
Pay, perhaps not one Writer con-
tinues in your Service; as they
follow'd you for the Loaves and Fishes only,
their Zeal fail'd with their Appointments,
and they found it necessary to take up some
other Trade.

BUT though, like them, my Lord, I
attended your Meridian, I shall not like
them forsake you at your Decline; on the
contrary, I am still as much at your De-
votion as ever, and it is notorious you
have

have now, as much to bestow as I expected then.

AS therefore I make my Approaches, with the same Sincerity, I depend on the same Reception ; more especially when I farther assure you, that, if I happen to be the longest Liver, I will be as just to your Memory, as I have been to your Administration.

WERE I in the same Way of Thinking with that *Roman* Tyrant, who wish'd his Reign might be distinguish'd to Posterity by some Plague, Famine, Earthquake, or other dreadful Visitation, I should take a Pride in boasting that * * * * * the Great, was my Cotemporary. But my Ambition is check'd by my Humanity, and, as I am, I can only glory that, as long as the *British* Annals shall be read, our Names, like the Poison and the Antidote, will be coupled together.

YOUR Lordship will, I hope, excuse this little Sacrifice to Vanity. Every Man is fond

DEDICATION.

of an Opportunity to throw an advantageous Light upon himself ; and though I professedly spread the Canvass for your Portrait, I could not help edging in a slight Sketch of my own.

I shall not, however, forget that your Lordship is to be the principal Figure, nor that I ought to be content with an obscure Corner of the Piece, like your Equerry, holding your Stirrup, or presenting that Head-Piece, which none but you would presume to put on ; or rather as your Squire, assisting to *disarm* you ; or helping you out of your Saddle, &c.

MY Lord, Dedications to great Men, like the Pictures of fine Women, must present nothing but Charms and Graces : Do not blush therefore — But why do I caution you against a Weakness, you are in no Danger of falling into ? Should I out-do *Pliny* in Panegyric, should I out-do an Address in Complaisance, you have received an Hundred other Dedications, which have done

DEDICATION.

the same; and as you ever paid for all they contain'd, all was but your Due.

BUT it is not my Design to tread the beaten Track, and compare you either to *Fabius* or *Cicero*. To insinuate you ever had a Type or Parallel, is to injure you. No, you are Yourself; an Original; a *Non-such*; nor is it likely Posterity should ever produce such another. It is enough for me to give you your own; I aspire to no more; and That I dare not attempt but by Figure only.

THE Serpent, we are told, was, by Creation, the subtlest Beast of the Field, and therefore became a proper Tool for the Devil. Where any Thing was to be got, he could find a Way to wriggle himself in; when any Misfortune threaten'd him, he could find a Way to wriggle himself out. Once a Year he threw off his Slough, and appear'd to be a new Creature. Golden Pippins were his favourite Fruit, or rather the *Sodom-Apple*, fair without, but rotten at the Core. Life he promised,

DEDICATION

mis'd, Death he devised, and Corruption he entail'd from Generation to Generation. Out of Paradise, it is true, he was driven; but though his Head was threaten'd, we do not find that the Sentence hath as yet taken Place; on the contrary, he no longer grovels on his Belly, or licks the Dust, but hath put forth Wings, claims a Place among the Powers of the Air, and exactly resembles the Dragon in the Revelations.

THE old Jingle of *Honores mutant Mores* you have the Glory, my Lord, to be an illustrious Exception to; however enlarged with Stile and Title, you continue to be within the very same; and thereby shew the eminent Insignificancy of such Vanities.

THAT you condescended to accept of them, will ever to some be Matter of Wonder; that you condescended to solicit them, will never perhaps be believed. Why should a Man, who despised the Essence, be fond of the Name? And that you always had the Mag-

DEDICATION.

unanimity to be above Opinion, is manifest by every Action of your Life.

BUT what Labyrinth is there so intricate, that if you follow the Thread, may not be explor'd? A Peerage was only the Means, a Quietus was the End: You had perform'd your Voyage, your Bark was crazy; the Storm was up, and the first Port welcome. While the Helm was worth holding, you held it; when only an Encumbrance, you resign'd it; equally pleased with your own Escape, that your Enemies succeeded to the Danger, and that your own Crew continued to navigate the Vessel as before.

THUS far, my Lord, I have done as, on this Occasion, I ought; touch'd both on your peerless Qualities, and peerless Success, with the delicate Hand of a Dedicator; without the least Reflection, whether the Portico, and the Building are of a Piece; and when I was on the Point of concluding, the following remarkable Passage stared me in the Face.

* The

DEDICATION.

* *The Laws must be destroy'd, before they
can suffer, or you escape.*

A tremendous Prophecy, my Lord, and
what you can never be out of the Reach of,
till you are in your Grave !

THAT no Man ought to be esteem'd
happy till he is dead, is the Saying of *Solon*.
Whether or not, therefore, the Stream of your
good Fortune is to flow on without Interrup-
tion, whether you are to be cut or drop from
the Tree, I am afraid to pronounce. —

On the Stage, indeed, when a Master-Poet
exerts his Power over the Passions, his Victim
at the End of the fourth Act is frequently
made to sing a Requiem to his Cares and
Sorrows, as if for ever done away. — But
alas ! his Catastrophe is then at Hand, and
Fate ready to drop the Curtain.

THUS much shall serve for what I had
to address personally to your Lordship ; and
as to the Work, which, though not dignify'd

DEDICATION.

with your Name, is now to be made Partaker of your Immortality; what I have to add on that Head, will, perhaps, make its Appearance with more Propriety in a Preface to the courteous Reader.

LEST, however, your Lordship should hold me without Excuse, for thus solemnly devoting it to you, know that I have done it for the same Reason, that Pilots desire to plant Buoys upon the *Goodwin*.

I am, as ever,

My LORD,

Your devoted,

humble Servant,

CALEB D'ANVERS.

PRE-



P R E F A C E.

LOOSE Papers resemble the *Sybil's* Leaves ; however oraculous their Contents, Time, almost with a single Breath, sunders them for ever ; a Fate which, perhaps, most modern Productions deserve, but what few Authors can bear !

THE Letters that follow were, however, neither made publick at first, nor collected now, as a Trap for Reputation ; if they had, no Doubt the Writer would have put in his Claim, as soon as the Voice of the Nation had declared in his Favour. It is rather to be supposed they were occasion'd by a more extensive and less pleasing View, arising from a Survey of the dangerous Designs of those above, and the calamitous Situation of those below.

HAD

HAD they had their full Effect ; had they taught one Side that they could no otherwise disarm Opposition, than by approving themselves in Deed the Friends and Servants of the Publick ; or the other that their Strength consisted in their Unanimity, and their Importance in their Integrity ; perhaps the Author might have exclaim'd with old SIMEON, *Lord, now let thy Servant depart in Peace — for mine Eyes have seen thy Salvation ;* and put a Period to his Labours.

BUT as neither of these necessary Ends seems as yet to have been fully obtain'd ; as the Vessel of our Iniquities is not yet full ; as Power is still warp'd to the Prejudice of those it was ordain'd to serve, and Opposition is like to continue as violent as ever ; what was first fired, occasionally, as a Beacon to give the Alarm, must now be kept continually alight, that the Danger may be always visible, and that no Direction may be wanting to those, who would throw themselves into the Breach, with a firm Resolution to die, or to subdue it.

IF ever a Test for the Tryal of Spirits can be necessary, it is now ; if ever those of Liberty and Faction ought to be distinguish'd from each other,

other, it is now; if ever it is incumbent on the People to know what Truth is, and to follow it, it is now.

HITHERTO, perhaps, Liberty, like Oil, hath only cover'd the Surface, while the Vinegar of Faction hath corroded the Constitution underneath, though Good hath resulted from both; for even Faction must be at first popular; and Popularity cannot be acquired without the Evidence of some good Deeds, which, like *Abraham's* Faith, may hold the Place of Righteousness.

THERE is a Time when Factions, by the Vehemence of their own Fermentation, stun and disable one another; and this is the Time, when plain Sense, and downright Honesty, have the only Chance to get uppermost, and introduce Reformation.

PERHAPS that Time is now; Perhaps Party-Leaders of all Kinds are equally in Disgrace; and the Publick may be grown wise enough to judge of the Tree by its Fruits.

THE Republication of these *Papers* is therefore, at this Time, most especially, seasonable. If we do not take Advantage of the standing Water
of

of Faction, the Tide will soon turn one Way or the other, and carry all before it ; and This can be effected no Way so happily, as by siding with such, while such are to be found, who appear to have been really inspired with the genuine Spirit of Liberty ; who have purged themselves from the very Suspicion of sinister Views, by refusing, at any Price, to forego the noble Cause they had espoused, or give a Sanction to the Ruin of their Country.

LET but one great, brave, disinterested, active Man arise, and he will be received, follow'd, and almost adored, as the Guardian-Genius of these Kingdoms. Without a Foundation of solid Virtue, and publick Spirit, the noblest Accomplishments lose their Importance ; with it, Common-Sense grows venerable, and the Dove triumphs over the Serpent.

IF, then, there is any one Man of sufficient Eminence among us, who, upon a thorough Self-Examination, feels himself to be within this Description, let him stand forth ; and, by a solemn, open, and explicit Renunciation of all Power, Places, Pensions, and every other Species of Court-Merchandise, lay the Ground-Work for obtaining the Confidence of the People ; and, as far as Honour and Infamy can bind,
give

P R E F A C E.

give Security for the religious Observance of his Engagement.

BUT if Modesty should hinder what publick Necessity makes a Duty, let this one Man endeavour to inspire a few more with the same generous Sentiments, and let them divide both the Service and the Glory.

GLORY, which, however decry'd and discountenanced of late, is the only Thing worth the Ambition of the Great, and what the Voice of the People only can bestow !

Lately publish'd,

A DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES. Dedicated to the Right Hon. Sir *Robert Walpole*. The Fifth Edition. (Price Four Shillings.)




the security for the religious observance of
his engagement

BUT if modesty should hinder what public
Necessity makes a Duty, let this one Man en-
deavour to inspire a few more with the same
generous Sentiments, and let them divide both
the Service and the Glory

GLORY, which, however desired, and
discountenanced of late, is the only thing worth
the Ambition of the Great, and what the Voice
of the People only can bestow!

Lately published,
A DISSENTATION UPON HONOUR. Dedicated to the
Rev. and Right Worshipful, the Lord Bishop of Exeter.
(London: Printed by J. D. 1724.)



LETTER I.

S I R,

SINCE the busy Scene of the Year is over at home, and we may perhaps wait several Months before the successful Negotiations of *France* furnish us with new Hopes of a general Pacification, and give you Occasion to carry your Speculations forward, it may be proper enough for you to cast your Eyes backwards; to reflect on your own Conduct; and to call yourself to Account before your own Tribunal.

I am so much persuaded of the Integrity of your Intentions, that I do not in the least suspect you will think my Advice impertinent; and therefore I shall attempt to lead your Thoughts on this Subject, by giving you an Account of some Parts of a Conversation, at which I happen'd to be present very lately.

Several of your Papers and several of Those, which have been written against you, lay before a Company, which often meets, rather

B

to

to live than to drink together ; according to that Distinction, which *Tully* makes to the Advantage of his own Nation over the *Greeks*. They dispute without Strife, and examine as dispassionately the Events and the Characters of the present Age, as they reason about Those, which are found in History. When I came in, a *Gentleman* was saying, that your Victories had been cheaply bought ; and that he had not seen one Champion, able to break a Launce, enter the Lists against you ; upon which some were ready to observe the Inconsistencies of human Nature, and how hard it often proves to hire Men to avow and defend even That, which they are hired to act. Others were willing to hope that *Corruption* had not spread very wide, nor taken Root very deep amongst us. All agreed, that if your Papers could be suspected to be written in Opposition to the *present Ministers*, the feeble and low Opposition you have met with would deserve to be look'd upon as a very melancholy Symptom for them ; since it would denote that their Cause was deem'd universally bad ; or that their Persons were grown universally odious among Men of Sense, Ingenuity and Knowledge. It would denote their *Guilt*, or their *Misfortune* ; perhaps both.

Here one of the *Company* interposed, by observing very prudently, ' that any Thing so ' void of Probability, as not to fall even under ' Suspicion, was unworthy of farther Consideration.

'ration. But, said he, whatever particular
 'Views Mr. *D'Anvers* may have had, one
 'general Effect, which I cannot approve, has
 'follow'd from his *Writings*. We must re-
 'member that when he began to publish his
 'weekly *Lucubrations*, universal Quiet pre-
 'vail'd, if not universal Satisfaction; for in
 'what Place, or at what Time was the last
 'ever found? Few People enquired; fewer
 'grumbled; none clamour'd; all acquiesced.
 'Now the Humour of the Nation is alter'd.
 'Every Man inquires with Eagerness and ex-
 'amines with Freedom. All Orders of Men
 'are more intent than I ever observed them
 'to be on the Course of publick Affairs; and
 'deliver their Judgments with less Reserve
 'upon the most important. From this Al-
 'teration, for which the *Craftman* is chiefly
 'answerable, no good Consequence can, I
 'think, proceed; and it is visible that several
 'Inconveniencies may.'

To This many of us could by no Means
 assent. We apprehended that in a Country,
 circumstanced like ours, and under a Govern-
 ment constituted like ours, the People had a
 Right to be inform'd and to reason about pub-
 lick Affairs; that when wise and honest Mea-
 sures are pursued, and the Nation reaps the
 Advantage of them, the Exercise of this Right
 will always be agreeable to the Men in Power;
 that, indeed, if weak and wicked Measures
 are pursued, the Men in Power might find
 the Exercise of this Right disagreeable, in-

convenient and sometimes dangerous to them; but that, even in this Case, there would be no Pretence for attempting to deprive the People of this Right, or for discouraging the Exercise of it; and that to forbid Men to complain, when they suffer, would be an Instance of Tyranny but one Degree below That, which the *Triumvirs* gave, during the Slaughter and Terror of the *Proscriptions*; when by Edict they commanded all Men *to be merry upon Pain of Death*.

The *Person*, from whom we differ'd, brought us back to the particular Case of your Writings, Mr. *D'Anvers*. He endeavour'd to support what he had said against them in this Manner;

' There was no good Reason for raising
' this *Spirit*, which I dislike, in the Nation,
' when the *Craftsman* began to write, or there
' was such a Reason. If there was none, why
' has he given so much Alarm? If there was
' one, how has it come to pass that so great
' an Alarm has produced so little Effect? Will
' you say that he had very good Reason to
' rouse this *Spirit*, but that it has hitherto had
' no Opportunity of exerting itself? Or will
' you say that his Reasons were good and the
' Opportunity fair, but that the Minds of Men,
' which have been convinced by the former,
' have not yet been determined to improve
' the latter? I observe on all these Alternatives,
' that if there was no good, and even pressing
' Reason to raise such a *Spirit* in the Nation

as

' as I dislike, (because I expect no national
 ' Benefit, and I fear much Inconveniency from
 ' it) Mr. *D'Anvers* has acted a very wicked
 ' Part, and is little better than a *Sower of Sedi-*
 ' *tion*. — If there was such a Reason, but no
 ' such Opportunity, he has acted a very weak
 ' Part, and is but a *shallow Politician*. — If
 ' there was such a Reason and such an Oppor-
 ' tunity, but no Disposition in the Minds of
 ' Men to follow their Conviction, you may
 ' excuse your favourite Author, perhaps, by
 ' alledging that the Minds of Men are in the
 ' Power of God alone; but you will represent
 ' our national Condition to be more desperate
 ' than I ever thought it, or am yet willing to
 ' believe it. — Upon this Supposition I affirm
 ' that Mr. *D'Anvers* is not to be excused, if
 ' he continues to write; for if he cannot raise
 ' this Disposition by Persuasion, what does he
 ' aim at farther? I hope that he and you,
 ' who defend him, admire as much as I pro-
 ' fess to do that divine Saying of PLATO;
 ' *we may endeavour to persuade our Fellow-*
 ' *Citizens; but it is not lawful to force them*
 ' *even to That, which is best for them.*

Whilst all This pass'd, I took Notice that
 an *antient venerable Gentleman* shew'd more
 Emotion, and greater Impatience than I re-
 member'd to have seen him ever express be-
 fore. As soon as the *other* had concluded, he
 broke Silence in the following Manner;

' You have endeavour'd to prove, Sir, that
 ' the *Craftsman* should not have begun to

‘ write; or at least that he is inexcusable for
 ‘ continuing. Now I not only differ from you,
 ‘ but I differ from you upon the very Founda-
 ‘ tion, on which you have establish’d that
 ‘ whole Argument.

‘ The Face of Things was, I agree, as calm
 ‘ as you represent it to have been, when my
 ‘ honest Contemporary *Caleb* took up his Pen.
 ‘ They were *hazyon* Days truly. We were
 ‘ not only *quiet*, but we seem’d *implicit*, and
 ‘ dull Uniformity of *eternal Assent* prevail’d
 ‘ in every Place. I agree that, since that Time,
 ‘ Things are very much alter’d. A *Ferment*,
 ‘ or *Spirit*, call it which you please, is rais’d;
 ‘ but, I bless God, it is not the blind and furi-
 ‘ ous *Spirit of Party*. It is a *Spirit*, which
 ‘ springs from Information and Conviction,
 ‘ that has diffus’d itself not only to all Orders
 ‘ of Men, as you observed, but to Men of all
 ‘ Denominations. Even They, who act a-
 ‘ gainst it, encourage it. You cannot call it
 ‘ *Torism*, when such Numbers of *independent*
 ‘ *Whigs* avow it. To call it *Whigism* would
 ‘ be improper likewise, when so many *Tories*
 ‘ concur in it. He, who should call it *Jaco-*
 ‘ *bitism*, would be too absurd to deserve an
 ‘ Answer. What is it then? It is, I think, a
 ‘ Revival of the true old *English Spirit*, which
 ‘ prevail’d in the Days of our Fathers, and
 ‘ which must always be national, since it has
 ‘ no Direction but to the national Interest;
 ‘ *est jam una Vox omnium*; and I hope we
 ‘ shall

‘ shall never have Occasion to add, *magis Odio*
 ‘ *firmata quam Praesidio.*

‘ *This Spirit* the *Craftsman* has contributed
 ‘ to raise; and I affirm, in my Turn, that sup-
 ‘ posing him to have no other Reason for rai-
 ‘ sing and supporting it, than a general Obser-
 ‘ vation of the contrary Temper, into which
 ‘ the Nation had fallen, He deserves the Ac-
 ‘ knowledgments of every honest Man in *Bri-*
 ‘ *tain*, for the Part he has acted. The Dispute
 ‘ between us is thus reduced to one single Pro-
 ‘ position; and if I prove This, all your Rea-
 ‘ soning, Sir, falls of Course to the Ground.

The *other* assented; the State of the Dis-
 pute was fix’d; and the *old Gentleman* pro-
 ceeded in his Argument to this Effect;

‘ Give me leave to borrow, upon this Oc-
 ‘ sion, an Image, which my Lord *Bacon* em-
 ‘ ploys, in one of his Essays, upon another.
 ‘ A People, who will maintain their *Liberties*,
 ‘ must pray for the Blessing of *Judah*, to
 ‘ avoid the Fate of *Issachar*; the greatest
 ‘ Curse, which can befall them. Far from
 ‘ jogging on silently and tamely, like the *Ass*
 ‘ between two Burthens, such a People must
 ‘ preserve some of the Fierceness of the *Lion*,
 ‘ and even make their Roar to be heard like
 ‘ his, whenever they are injured, or so much
 ‘ as threatned.

‘ I do not mean to recommend your *sed-*
 ‘ *tious, rebellious Spirit*, which will create a
 ‘ perpetual Scene of Tumult and Disorder,
 ‘ and expose every State to frequent and dan-
 ‘ gerous

'gerous Convulsions. Neither would I be
 'thought to approve even that *popular Peevish-*
 'ness of Temper, which sometimes prevails,
 'so as to discompose the Harmony of the
 'several Orders of Government. But This I
 'assert, that *Liberty* cannot be long secure, in
 'any Country, unless a *perpetual Jealousy*
 'watches over it, and a *constant determined*
 '*Resolution* protects it in the whole Body of
 'the Nation. The *Principle* must be perma-
 'nent and equal. The *Exercise* of it ought
 'to be proportion'd to the Occasions. The
 'hundred Eyes of *Argus* were not always
 'kept open; but they were never all closed.
 'The whole Body of a Nation may be as
 'jealous of their *Liberties*, as a private Man
 'of his *Honour*. They may be, at all Times,
 'animated by a generous Resolution of de-
 'fending these *Liberties*, at any Risque; as he
 'may, at all Times, feel in his Heart the
 'Courage of venturing his Life to maintain his
 '*Honour*. But as there is no necessary Con-
 'sequence from this *private Character* to That
 'of a *quarrelsome Bully*; so neither is there
 'any necessary Consequence from the *publick*
 '*Character* I have recommended to That of
 'a *factious, rebellious People*.

' *Liberty* is a tender Plant, which will not
 'flourish unless the Genius of the Soil be pro-
 'per for it; nor will any Soil continue to be so
 'long, which is not cultivated with incessant
 'Care. *Variae illudunt Pestes; Mischiefs of*
 '*various Kinds abound*; and there is no Sea-
 'son

son, in the Revolution of the great political Year of Government, when we can say, with Truth, that *Liberty* is entirely free from immediate, or remote Danger.

In every Kind of Government some Powers must be lodged in particular Men, or particular Bodies of Men, for the good Order and Preservation of the whole Community. The Lines, which circumscribe these Powers, are the Bounds of Separation between the *Prerogatives of the Prince*, or other Magistrate, and the *Privileges of the People*. Every Step, which the Prince, or Magistrate, makes beyond these Bounds, is an Encroachment on *Liberty*, and every Attempt towards making such a Step is a Danger to *Liberty*.

Thus we see how great a Trust is reposed in Those, to whom such Powers are committed ; and if we look into the Heart of Man, we shall soon discover how great, though unavoidable, a Temptation is laid in their Way. The Love of Power is natural ; it is insatiable ; almost constantly whetted ; and never cloy'd by Possession. If therefore all Men will endeavour to encrease their Power, or at least to prolong and secure the Enjoyment of it, according to the uncertain Measure of their own Passions, and not according to the stated Proportion of Reason and of Law ; and if neither one nor the other of These can be attempted without a Danger to *Liberty* ; it follows undeniably that, in the Nature of Things, the

Notion

‘ Notion of a perpetual Danger to *Liberty* is
 ‘ inseparable from the very Notion of Govern-
 ‘ ment.

‘ That these Principles are true, will appear
 ‘ evident from Practice and Experience, as
 ‘ well as from Speculation. All Forms of
 ‘ Government suppose them to be so; and in
 ‘ such as are not *absolute Monarchies* we find
 ‘ the utmost Precautions, which their several
 ‘ Institutions admit, taken against this Evil;
 ‘ from hence that Rotation of Employments
 ‘ in *Commonwealths*; the annual, or other more
 ‘ frequent Elections of Magistrates; and all
 ‘ those Checks and Controuls, which the Wis-
 ‘ dom of Legislators, prompted by Experience,
 ‘ has invented.

‘ In *perfect Democracies* these Precautions
 ‘ have been taken in the highest Degree; and
 ‘ yet even there They have not been always
 ‘ effectual. They were carry’d so far in the
 ‘ *Athenian Form of Government*, that this
 ‘ People seem’d more in Danger of falling
 ‘ into *Anarchy* than *Tyranny*; and yet *one of*
 ‘ *their Magistrates* found Means to become
 ‘ their *Tyrant*, and to transmit this Power to
 ‘ his Successors.

‘ In *mix’d Governments*, the Danger must
 ‘ still be greater. Such a one we may justly
 ‘ reckon That of *Rome*, as well during the
 ‘ *regal as republican State*; and surely no Hi-
 ‘ story can be more fruitful in Examples of
 ‘ the Danger, to which *Liberty* stands ex-
 ‘ posed from the natural, and therefore con-
 ‘ stant

stant Desire of amplifying and maintaining Power, than the *Roman History* is, from the last of the *Kings* to the first of the *Emperors*.

A *Monarchy*, limited like ours, may be placed, for aught I know, as it has often been represented, just in the *middle Point*; from whence a Deviation leads, on one Hand, to *Tyranny*; and, on the other, to *Anarchy*; but sure I am that if we are situated just in the *middle Point*, the least Deviation is the more cautionally to be guarded against. *Liberty* would be safer, perhaps, if we inclined a little more than we do to the *popular Side*.

It may be said, and I would anticipate the Objection, that if we are thus placed, our Care ought to be exerted equally against Deviations on *either Side*; and that I am the more in the Wrong to appear so apprehensive of Those on *one Side*, and so little apprehensive of Those on the *other*; because even our *own History* might have shewn us that Deviations to the *popular Side* have cost us at least as dear, as ever Those to the *other Side* can be pretended to have done, But let it be consider'd;

First, that as far as these *national Calamities*, hinted at in the Objection, have been the unavoidable Consequences of Methods necessary to secure or retrieve *Liberty*, it is infamous to repine at them, whatever they have cost.

Secondly,

' Secondly, that the Cases compared to-
 ' gether, and supposed in this Objection to be
 ' equal, are not so. I may safely appeal to
 ' every impartial Reader of our *History*, whe-
 ' ther any Truth he collected from it ever
 ' struck him more strongly than This; that
 ' when the Disputes between the *King* and
 ' the *People* have been carry'd to such Extremes;
 ' as to draw national Calamities after them, it
 ' has not been owing primarily to the Obsti-
 ' nacy and weak Management of the *Court*,
 ' and is therefore unjustly charged on the just
 ' *Spirit of Liberty*. In Truth a *Spirit of*
 ' *Liberty* will never destroy a free Constitu-
 ' tion; a *Spirit of Faction* may. But I appeal
 ' again, whether Those of our Princes, who
 ' have had Sense and Virtue enough to encour-
 ' age the *one*, have had any Thing to fear
 ' from the *other*.

' Now if Experience shews, as I am per-
 ' suaded it does, that the Prerogative and
 ' Power of a Prince will never be in any real
 ' Danger, when he invades, neither openly
 ' nor insidiously, the *Liberties of his People*;
 ' the same Experience will shew that the
 ' *Liberties of a People* may be in very real
 ' Danger, when, far from invading the *Pre-
 ' rogative and Power of the Prince*, they sub-
 ' mit to *one*, and are even so good as to en-
 ' crease the *other*. The Reason of this Diffe-
 ' rence is plain. A *Spirit of Faction* alone
 ' will be always too weak to cope with the
 ' legal Power and Authority of the *Crown*;
 ' and

and the *Spirit of Liberty*, in the whole Body of the People, which contradistinguishes this Case from the other, may be raised by the Fear of *losing*; but cannot be so raised by the Hopes of *acquiring*. The Fear is common to *all*; the Hope can only be particular to a *few*. The Fear, therefore may become a general Principle of Union; the Hope cannot.

But if a *national Spirit* cannot be any other than a defensive and, therefore unprovoked, an harmless, inoffensive *Spirit*; That of a *Prince* cannot, without due Coercion, be kept within the same Bounds; for here the Tables are turn'd; and the Hope of *acquiring*, which can never be a common Principle among the *Multitude* to unite and carry them into Action, becomes an almost irresistible Motive to the *Prince*; who, by yielding to it, indulges the most powerful Passions of the Soul; who finds many to share the Difficulties and Dangers of the Enterprize with him; and who shares the Prize with none.

Generally and abstractedly speaking, therefore, as *publick Liberty* is more exposed under *mix'd Governments*, than under *perfect Democracies*; so is it more exposed under *limited Monarchies* than under any other Form of *mix'd Government*.

What encreases the Danger to *Liberty* in this Case is, that the Opportunity of invading it, which lies open to a sovereign Prince,

suits

' suits almost any Character. The Powers
 ' intrusted to other Magistrates, as in a *Com-*
 ' *monwealth*, are subject to immediate Con-
 ' trouls; the Exercise of them is subject to
 ' future Revisions; and is limited to a short
 ' Time; so that if such Magistrates invade
 ' *Liberty*, with any Prospect of Success, it
 ' can only happen, when they are able to com-
 ' pensate for the Disadvantages of their *politi-*
 ' *cal Circumstances*, by the Greatness of their
 ' *personal Qualifications*; by superior Under-
 ' standing and superior Courage; by a great,
 ' if not a good Character; and by the Appear-
 ' ance of Virtue at least. Few Men therefore
 ' are fit for such an Undertaking.

' But the *sovereign Prince*, who rules in a
 ' *limited Monarchy*, has an Opportunity open
 ' to him for Life; and such an Opportunity
 ' as requires no *extraordinary personal Quali-*
 ' *fications*. He may possess every Vice, or
 ' Weakness, which is opposed to the Virtues,
 ' or Appearances of Virtue, requisite in the
 ' *other Case*, and yet may destroy the *Liberty*
 ' of the bravest People upon Earth. The
 ' Pretences for concealing his Designs, and the
 ' Helps for carrying them on, which his Situa-
 ' tion affords above That of any Magistrate in
 ' a *Commonwealth*, will abundantly compen-
 ' sate for the Disadvantages arising from his
 ' *personal Character*, and will secure his Suc-
 ' cess, if the People are brought, by Artifice
 ' or Accident, to grow remiss in watching
 ' over their *Liberties*. Every Man is there-
 ' fore

' fore fit for such an Undertaking. If these
 ' general Reflections evince that *Liberty* must
 ' always be in some Degree of Danger under
 ' every Government ; and that this Danger
 ' must encrease in Proportion, as the *chief*
 ' Powers of the State are entrusted in fewer
 ' Hands and for longer Terms ; then *Liberty*
 ' is always in some Degree of Danger ; and
 ' That not the least, even under our *excellent*
 ' Constitution ; then the Necessity of keeping
 ' this *jealous Spirit*, the true Guardian of *pub-*
 ' *lick Liberty*, always alive and active in this
 ' Nation, is manifest ; then the Observation
 ' of our being fallen into the contrary Temper
 ' is alone a sufficient Reason to justify Mr.
 ' D'Anvers for joining his Endeavours to awa-
 ' ken us from our *political Lethargy* ; then,
 ' Sir, my Proposition is proved, and your Rea-
 ' soning falls to the Ground.

This Discourse furnish'd Matter of much
 Reflection to the Company ; some Objections
 were made ; some Doubts were propos'd ; and
 some Explanations ask'd for. I shall not trou-
 ble you with all these Particulars, but shall
 conclude my Letter, by relating to you in
 what Manner the *old Gentleman* reply'd, and
 by his Reply wound up the Conversation of
 the Evening.

' I believe, Gentlemen, (said he) that we
 ' do not differ so much as some of you seem
 ' to imagine ; for *first*, though I desire the
 ' Vessel of the *Common-wealth* may sail safely,
 ' yet I desire it may sail smoothly too ; and
 ' though

though I must think, till I hear better Rea-
 sons to the contrary, that *publick Liberty*
 cannot be so easily attack'd, and may be
 more easily defended, in a *perfect Democracy*,
 or in a *mix'd Republick*, than in a *limited*
Monarchy; yet will it not follow necessarily
 from hence, as has been supposed, that I
 prefer the *two first* to the *last* of these Forms
 of Government. On *either Side* there are
 Compensations; and if *Liberty* may be better
 defended in the *former*, yet still it may be
 defended, and domestick Quiet is perhaps
 better preserved in the *latter*.

Secondly, if I agree with the Gentlemen,
 who have insisted so much on the little Rea-
 son, which there was in the late Reign, or
 is in the present, to apprehend any Encroach-
 ments from the *Crown* on the *British Liber-*
ties; these Gentlemen must, I think, agree
 with me likewise that This will not alter
 the Case; subvert what I have endeavour'd
 to establish; or derive any Blame on Those;
 who have endeavour'd to revive that *publick*
Spirit of Watchfulness over all national In-
 terests, which is the proper and true Guar-
 dian of *Liberty*, in an Age, when that *pub-*
lick Spirit has more than begun to sink and
 die away. I hope there will be always Men
 found to preach this Doctrine in Season and
 out of Season, as the Apostles preach'd the
 Gospel; because if *this Spirit* is not kept at
 all Times in Vigour, it may fail us at some
 particular Time, when we shall want to ex-
 ert

'ett it most. In great and immediate Dan-
 'ger, the most sluggish Centinel is alerte; but
 'surely They, who, in Times of apparent Se-
 'curity, excite us to be upon our Guard, do
 'as real Service as They, who animate us to
 'our Defence, when we are actually attack'd;
 'and the *first* is, in my Opinion, that Kind
 'of Service, of which we stand the most in
 'need. I confess freely that I should not ap-
 'prehend so much Danger to *Liberty* in Times
 'of Suspicion, if I saw that neither *Power*
 'could subdue, nor *Artifice* divert, nor *Pu-
 'lanimity* oblige Men to abandon *this Spirit*;
 'as I should apprehend in Times of apparent
 'Security, if I observed it to be lost. In a
 'Word, no Laws, no Orders of Government
 'can effectually secure *Liberty* any longer
 'than *this Spirit* prevails, and gives them Vi-
 'gour; and therefore you might argue as rea-
 'sonably for repealing any Law, or abolish-
 'ing any Custom, the most advantageous to
 '*Liberty*; and which you cannot be sure of
 'restoring at your Pleasure, because you feel
 'no immediate Want of it; as you have ar-
 'gued for letting *this Spirit* die away, which
 'you cannot be sure of reviving at your Plea-
 'sure, because you perceive no immediate Oc-
 'casion for the Exercise of it.

' I hope that I have said enough to give me
 'a Right to conclude in this Manner; and if
 'I was to descend into particular Applications
 'of the general Truths, which I have advan-
 'ced, I think that no Doubt whatever could

‘remain in any of your Minds, upon this Subject.’ — After This, our Company broke up. If the same Subject is resumed, when they meet again, or on any other, which I judge proper to be communicated to you, it is highly probable that you will hear again from

Your Admirer,

Friend and Servant, &c.



LETTER II.

S I R,

THE same Company hath met and the same Subject hath been resumed; so that I think myself under an Obligation of writing to you again.

The *Person*, who gave Occasion to all that was said in your Defence the other Day, seem'd very desirous that the Conversation should be pursued at our last Meeting; and therefore as soon as we sat down, He address'd Himself thus to the *old Gentleman*, who had fought your Battle.

‘Sir, said he, I own myself a good deal reconciled to the *Craftsman* by the Discourse you held, when We were last together. That some Inconveniencies must follow from keeping this *Spirit of Jealousy* and *Watchfulness*

' *fulness* always alive, seems to me very evi-
 ' dent; but I begin to think that this Evil may
 ' be necessary, in order to secure us against
 ' greater. Every System of human Invention
 ' must be liable to some Objections; and it
 ' would be chimerical in us to expect a Form
 ' of Government liable to none. Even *Theo-*
 ' *cracy* was attended by some real Inconve-
 ' niencies, according to the *Jewish* Histories;
 ' and neither the divine Presence in the Taber-
 ' nacle, nor the ambulant Oracle, which the
 ' Priest carry'd about with him, could preserve
 ' intire Purity in Religion, or good Order in
 ' the State. We must be content therefore to
 ' bear the Disorder I apprehend from *that*
 ' *Ferment*, which a perpetual *Jealousy* of
 ' the Governors in the Governed will keep
 ' up, rather than abandon *that Spirit*, the
 ' Life of which is the Life of *Liberty*. When
 ' the *Jealousy* happens to be ill-placed, We
 ' may hope it will not rise to any great and
 ' dangerous Height. When it happens to be
 ' well grounded, it may have the good Effect
 ' of destroying a *wicked Minister*; of check-
 ' ing a *bad*; or of reclaiming a *misguided*
 ' *Prince*.

' You see, Sir, that my Conversion is pretty
 ' far advanced; and if you will please to de-
 ' scend into particular Applications of the ge-
 ' neral Doctrines you deliver'd, as you gave
 ' us Reason to hope that you would, it is very
 ' probable that the few Doubts I have still
 ' may be removed.

The rest of the Company seconded this Request. The good *old Gentleman* yielded to our common Desires, and spoke to the following Effect;

‘ The general Truth I am to prove by particular Examples is This; that *Liberty* cannot be preserved long by any People, who do not preserve that watchful and jealous *Spirit of Liberty*, on the Necessity of which I have insisted. If you are once convinced of this Truth, you will know what Opinion to entertain of *Those*, who endeavour to extinguish *this Spirit*, and of *Those*, who do all They can to keep it alive.

‘ There are two other general Truths relative to This, which I shall establish likewise by particular Examples, as I go along.

‘ One is This; that the *Spirit of Liberty*, far from inspiring that Rashness and undistinguishing Fury, which are peculiar to the *Spirit of Faction*, is slow to act even against the *worst Princes*, and exerts itself in Favour of the *best* with more Effect than any other *Spirit* whatever.

‘ The *second* is This; that how slowly soever the *Spirit of Liberty* may act in suspicious Times and against incroaching Governors; yet if it be kept alive, it will act effectually sooner or later, though under the greatest Disadvantages, and against the most powerful Opposition; in a Word, in the most desperate Cases.

‘ The

‘ The *first* of these Truths will recommend
 ‘ *this Spirit* to every good Prince and *honest*
 ‘ *Minister*. The *other* will encourage every
 ‘ Man, who is a Friend to *Liberty*, never to
 ‘ abandon the Cause through Despondency
 ‘ of Success, as long as He sees *this Spirit* pre-
 ‘ vail, or even subside.

‘ Having fix’d these principal Points of
 ‘ View, let us proceed; and though I would
 ‘ not advise you to admit the Works of *Ma-*
 ‘ *chiavel* into your Canon of *political Writ-*
 ‘ *ings*; yet since in Them, as in other apo-
 ‘ cryphal Books, many excellent Things are
 ‘ interspersed, let us begin by improving an
 ‘ Hint taken from the Discourses of the *Ita-*
 ‘ *lian Secretary* on the first Decade of *Livy*.

‘ He observes that, of all Governments,
 ‘ Those are the best, which, by the natural
 ‘ Effect of their original Constitutions are fre-
 ‘ quently renew’d or drawn back, as He ex-
 ‘ plains his Meaning, to their *first Principles*;
 ‘ and that no Government can be of a long
 ‘ Duration, where This does not happen from
 ‘ Time to Time, either from the Cause just
 ‘ mention’d, or from some accidental Cause.

‘ The Reason is obvious. There must be
 ‘ some Good in the *first Principles* of every
 ‘ Government, or it could not subsist at all;
 ‘ much less could it make any Progress. But
 ‘ this Good degenerates, according to the na-
 ‘ tural Course of Things; and Governments,
 ‘ like all other mix’d Bodies, tend to Dissolu-
 ‘ tion by the Changes, which are wrought in

‘ the several Parts, and by the Unaptness and
 ‘ Disproportion, which result from hence
 ‘ throughout the whole Composition.

‘ The most effectual, and indeed the sole
 ‘ Method of maintaining their Health and
 ‘ prolonging their Life, must therefore be to
 ‘ bring them back as near and as frequently as
 ‘ possible to *those Principles*, on which their
 ‘ Prosperity, Strength and Duration were ori-
 ‘ ginally founded.

‘ This Change, or Renewal of the State,
 ‘ hath been sometimes wrought by *external*
 ‘ *Causes*, as it happen’d at *Rome*, upon the
 ‘ Invasion of the *Gauls*. The *Romans* had
 ‘ departed from their antient Observances.
 ‘ The Ceremonies of Religion and the Laws
 ‘ of Justice were neglected by them. An
 ‘ Enemy, whom they despised and provoked,
 ‘ conquer’d them. The Impressions made by
 ‘ this dreadful Calamity brought them back
 ‘ to their first Institutions and to their primi-
 ‘ tive Spirit. They sprung up from this *se-*
 ‘ *cond Original*, as *Livy* calls it, with new
 ‘ Vigour, and rose to greater Fame, Power
 ‘ and Dignity than ever.

‘ But not to dwell on such Examples, as
 ‘ point out to us rather the Punishment of
 ‘ *Vice*, than the Means of *Reformation*, let us
 ‘ observe that this Change, or Renewal of the
 ‘ State, is oftener and better wrought by *in-*
 ‘ *ternal Causes*.

‘ Many excellent Institutions were con-
 ‘ trived in framing the *Roman Government*,
 ‘ which

' which served to maintain in Force the *first*
 ' *Principles* of that political System. Such
 ' were the Regulations about *Elections*; the
 ' Laws against *Bribery*; and many other
 ' written Laws, or confirm'd Customs. Such
 ' again was the Constitution of the *Senate*, in
 ' whom the Majesty of the Commonwealth
 ' resided, and whose Authority controul'd the
 ' Licentiousness of the People. Such was the
 ' Erection of that sacred, *tribunitial Power*,
 ' whose Prerogatives served to check the Usur-
 ' pations of the *Magistrates*, and who could
 ' arrest, with one Word, even the Proceedings
 ' of the Senate. Such was the Office of the
 ' *Censors*, whose Inquisitions and Lustrations
 ' corrected Abuses, reform'd Manners, and
 ' purged the Senate itself of corrupt and un-
 ' worthy Members.

' These Laws, these Customs, these diffe-
 ' rent Orders, controuling one another, and
 ' promoting the general Good of the Com-
 ' monwealth, had great Effect, during some
 ' Centuries. But this Effect could never have
 ' follow'd them at all, if the *Spirit of Liberty*,
 ' which had enacted these Laws, establish'd
 ' these Customs, and form'd these Orders,
 ' had not continued. The very best Laws
 ' are a dead Letter, nay often a Grievance,
 ' unless they are strenuously and honestly exe-
 ' cuted. They never can be so executed,
 ' unless the *Spirit* of them possess Those, to
 ' whom the Execution of them is committed;
 ' and it would be ridiculous to expect to find

‘ *this Spirit* in the *Magistrates*, and the several
 ‘ Orders of the State, unless it appear’d in the
 ‘ Body of the People, out of whom these
 ‘ Magistrates are chosen, and these Orders
 ‘ composed.

‘ The Examples, which *Machiavel* cites
 ‘ to shew that the Virtue of particular Men
 ‘ among the *Romans* did frequently draw that
 ‘ Government back to its *original Principles*,
 ‘ are so many Proofs that the Duration of *Li-*
 ‘ *berty* depends on keeping the *Spirit* of it
 ‘ alive and warm. Such Examples were fre-
 ‘ quent in *Rome*, whilst *this Spirit* flourish’d.
 ‘ As it decay’d, these Examples became more
 ‘ rare and fail’d at last intirely. The *old Laws*
 ‘ and *Customs* were, for the most Part, still in
 ‘ being. The Forms of *electing Magistrates*,
 ‘ and of *promulgating Laws* were, in the
 ‘ main, observed. There was still a Senate.
 ‘ There were still *Censors* and *Tribunes*. But
 ‘ the *Spirit of Liberty* being stifled by That
 ‘ of *Faction* and *Cabal*; and the several Or-
 ‘ ders of the Government being tainted by the
 ‘ general Corruption; these good Laws and
 ‘ Customs remain’d without Force; or were
 ‘ suspended; or were abrogated; or were per-
 ‘ verted to serve the Purposes of private Am-
 ‘ bition and Avarice.

‘ The Time-serving Flatterers of Princes
 ‘ and Ministers have no Point, amongst all
 ‘ the nauseous Drudgery imposed on them,
 ‘ which they are obliged more to labour than
 ‘ That of representing all the Effects of a *Spirit*
 ‘ of

' of *Liberty* as so many Effects of a *Spirit of*
 ' *Faction*. Examples might be found, even
 ' without searching long, or looking far after
 ' them, when This hath been done against
 ' the publick Sense of a *whole Nation*, and
 ' sometimes in Favour of a *Cabal*, neither nu-
 ' merous nor considerable enough to be call'd
 ' a *Party*. But still it will remain eternally
 ' true that the *Spirit of Liberty* and the *Spirit*
 ' of *Faction* are not only different, but repug-
 ' nant and incompatible ; so that the Life of
 ' either is the Death of the other.

' We must not imagine that the Freedom
 ' of the *Romans* was lost, because *one Party*
 ' fought for the Maintainance of *Liberty* ; an-
 ' other for the Establishment of *Tyranny* ; and
 ' that the *latter* prevail'd. No. The *Spirit*
 ' of *Liberty* was dead, and the *Spirit of Fac-*
 ' *tion* had taken its Place on both Sides. As
 ' long as the *former* prevail'd, a *Roman* sacri-
 ' ficed *his own*, and therefore no Doubt every
 ' other *personal Interest*, to the Interest of the
 ' *Commonwealth*. When the *latter* succeeded,
 ' the Interest of the *Commonwealth* was con-
 ' sider'd no otherwise than in Subordination to
 ' that *particular Interest*, which each Person
 ' had espoused. The principal Men, instead
 ' of making their Grandeur and Glory con-
 ' sist, as They formerly had done, in That,
 ' which the Grandeur and Glory of the Com-
 ' monwealth reflected on them, consider'd
 ' themselves now as *Individuals*, not as *Citi-*
 ' *zens*, and each would shine with his own
 ' Light.

' Light. To this Purpose alone they employ'd
 ' the Commands they had of *Armies*, the
 ' Governments of *Provinces*, and the Influ-
 ' ence they acquired over the Tribes at *Rome*,
 ' and over the Allies and Subjects of the Re-
 ' publick. Upon Principles of the same Kind,
 ' inferior Persons attach'd themselves to These;
 ' and that Zeal and Industry, nay that Cou-
 ' rage and Magnanimity, which had been ex-
 ' erted formerly in the Service of the Common-
 ' wealth, were exerted, by the *Spirit of Fac-*
 ' *tion*, for *Marius*, or *Sylla*; for *Cæsar*, or
 ' *Pompey*.

' It is plain that the Liberty of *Rome* would
 ' not have been irretrievably lost, though *Cæsar*
 ' had finish'd the civil War with absolute Suc-
 ' cess, and was settled in Power, if the *Spirit*
 ' of *Liberty* had not been then lost in the
 ' whole Body of the People; if the *Romans*
 ' had not been as ripe for Slavery, as the *Cap-*
 ' *padocians* were fond of it; for I think the
 ' *Cappadocians* were the People, who desired
 ' that a *Prince* might be set over Them, and
 ' refused to be a *free People*.

' I cannot believe that Those, who mur-
 ' der'd *Cæsar*, took such puerile Measures as
 ' *Cicero*, who was not let into the Secret,
 ' pretended that they had taken, when he
 ' saw the Consequences of their Action.
 ' But in This they err'd. They kill'd their
 ' *Benefactor*; at least, he was such to the
 ' greatest Part of them; and renew'd the civil
 ' War, in order to restore *Liberty* to a People,
 ' who

' who had lost the *Spirit of Liberty*, and who
 ' would not take it, when it was offer'd to
 ' them. Even in the Senate, *Octavius* had
 ' a Party; *Anthony* had a Party; but the
 ' *Commonwealth* had none. In short, the freest
 ' People upon Earth, by suffering the *Spirit*
 ' of *Liberty* to decay, and That of *Faction*
 ' to grow up, became Slaves to such a Suc-
 ' cession of Monsters, (continued with very
 ' few Exceptions, from the Reign of *Augustus*
 ' to the Destruction of the Empire,) as God
 ' never sent in his Wrath to execute Ven-
 ' geance on any other Nation.

' Thus I have endeavour'd to illustrate and
 ' confirm the *first general Proposition* laid
 ' down, by a summary Application of it to
 ' the *Roman* Story. I have not explain'd by
 ' what Degrees, and by what Means, *one* of
 ' these *Spirits* gradually decay'd, and the
 ' *other* grew up. The Subject is fine, and
 ' the Task would be pleasant; but it is unne-
 ' cessary to our present Purpose. We see
 ' enough at this Time, if we see that, in the
 ' greatest Revolution of the greatest Govern-
 ' ment of the World, losing the *Spirit of Li-*
 ' *berty* was the *Cause*, and losing *Liberty* was
 ' the *Effect*.

' If now we bring these Considerations
 ' home, we shall find not only the *first ge-*
 ' *neral Proposition*, but the others, relative to
 ' it, illustrated and confirm'd through the
 ' whole Course of our Annals. I shall make
 ' a Deduction of some of these Particulars.

' To

' To deduce them all would exceed my
' Strength and your Patience.

Here one of our Company interrupted the
old Gentleman's Discourse, by saying that since
we were come to a kind of Pause, He de-
sired Leave to make an Observation, which
he thought pertinent and material, on what
had been said, before we went into any new
Matter. — ' The Difference and Opposition
' between a *Spirit of Liberty* and a *Spirit of*
' *Faction*, continued he, hath been justly
' stated. A *Spirit of Liberty* will be always
' and wholly concern'd about *national In-*
' *terests*, and very indifferent about *personal*
' and *private Interests*. On the contrary, a
' *Spirit of Faction* will be always and wholly
' concern'd about *These*, and very indifferent
' about the *others*. When they appear there-
' fore in their proper Characters, they are di-
' stinguish'd as easily as Light and Darkness;
' and the Danger I apprehend is over.

' But *Faction* puts on the Mask of *Li-*
' *berthy*; and under this false Appearance, dis-
' puts her Being even with *Liberty* herself.
' Now here, methinks, a great many Dan-
' gers arise; the Danger of mistaking, when
' it is so hard to distinguish; the Danger of
' being Bubbles and Tools of *Faction*, whilst
' we fancy ourselves Assertors of *publick Li-*
' *berthy*; the Danger of continuing under this
' Delusion, till it is too late to prevent such
' Mischiefs as we never intended to bring on
' our Country. The *Spirit of Faction* may
' take

' take (and, I doubt not, hath often taken)
 ' Possession of Numbers, who meant to en-
 ' tertain no *other Spirit* than That of *Liberty* ;
 ' for Numbers have not the Discernment of
 ' *Spirits*. This Possession may continue and,
 ' in Fact, I believe it hath continued very
 ' often, till *Faction* hath accomplish'd, or
 ' secured the Accomplishment of her Ends.
 ' I made this Observation, which results na-
 ' turally from what hath been said, and insist
 ' upon it, because if *Faction* could not lie la-
 ' tent under the most specious and popular
 ' Pretences imaginable, there would be no
 ' great need of putting us on our Guard a-
 ' gainst it ; and because if it can lie thus la-
 ' tent and conceal'd, we may be expos'd to
 ' the Dangers I have mention'd, which Side
 ' soever of the Question we take in political
 ' Disputes. At this Time, to speak as I think,
 ' the Case is so clear on *one Side*, that no
 ' Man, who adheres to it, hath the least Pre-
 ' tence left him to say that he pursues the
 ' *publick Interest* ; or is directed in his Con-
 ' duct by the generous, dis-interested Spirit of
 ' *Liberty*.

' I could support my Assertion by many
 ' Proofs, if it was necessary in this Company.
 ' One I will mention for its Singularity ; and
 ' it is This.

' We have seen and heard in a Nation,
 ' hitherto free, *such Maxims* avow'd and
 ' pleaded for, as are inconsistent with all the
 ' Notions of *Liberty*. *Corruption* hath been
 ' defended,

' defended, nay recommended, as a proper,
 ' a necessary, and therefore a reasonable Ex-
 ' pedient of Government; than which there
 ' is not, perhaps, any one Proposition more
 ' repugnant to the common Sense of Man-
 ' kind and to universal Experience. Both of
 ' these demonstrate *Corruption* to be the last,
 ' deadly Symptom of *agonizing Liberty*. Both
 ' of them declare that a People, abandon'd to
 ' it, are abandon'd to a reprobate Sense, and
 ' are lost to all Hopes of *political Salvation*.

' The *Dependence* of the *legislative* on the
 ' *executive Power* hath been contended for by
 ' the same Persons, under the same Direction;
 ' and yet nothing surely can be more evident
 ' than *This*; that in a Constitution like ours,
 ' the Safety of the *whole* depends on the *Bal-*
 ' *lance of the Parts*, and the *Ballance of the*
 ' *Parts* on their mutual *Independency on one*
 ' *another*; agreeably to which *Thuanus* makes
 ' *Ferdinand* say, in answer to the *Castilians*,
 ' who press'd him to take away the *Indepen-*
 ' *dency* of the States of *Arragon*; *Æquilibrio*
 ' *Potentiae Regni Regisque salutem publicam*
 ' *contineri*; *Et si contingeret aliquando alterum*
 ' *alteri præponderare, proculdubio alterius*
 ' *aut utriusque Ruinam ex eo secuturam*; that
 ' the publick Safety depends on the equal *Bal-*
 ' *lance of the Power of the King, and of the*
 ' *Power of the Kingdom*; and that if ever it
 ' should happen that one outweigh'd the other,
 ' the Ruin of one, or of both, must undoubted-
 ' ly follow.

‘ On

‘ On *one Side* then the Mask is pull’d off.
 ‘ The weak may be seduced to concur; the
 ‘ strongest may be forced to submit; but no
 ‘ Man can be any longer deceived.

‘ On the *other*, it must be acknowledged
 ‘ that the Appearances are extreamly fair.
 ‘ True Notions of *Liberty* and good Govern-
 ‘ ment are profess’d and pursued. Our Grie-
 ‘ vances are complain’d of; our *Dangers* are
 ‘ foretold; not only *Those*, which all Men
 ‘ feel or see, but *Those*, which are more re-
 ‘ mote from Observation. In short, the
 ‘ *Spirit of Liberty*, such as it hath been de-
 ‘ scribed, seems to breathe from *this Quarter*,
 ‘ and to diffuse its Influences over the Na-
 ‘ tion.

‘ As I am a Lover of my Country and of
 ‘ *Liberty*, I have rejoyced in This. I rejoice
 ‘ in it still; and yet I confess freely that I
 ‘ took some Umbrage at a *Paper*, which
 ‘ came out not long ago. The Design and
 ‘ Tendency of it seem’d to me to favour the
 ‘ Cause of a *Faction*; and of a *Faction*, how-
 ‘ ever contemptible in its present State, al-
 ‘ ways to be guarded against. The Paper I
 ‘ mean is *Fog’s Journal* of the 6th of *June*;
 ‘ where you have seen a ridiculous Speech,
 ‘ supposed to be made by General *Monk*, and
 ‘ translated, as the Author says, from *Leti’s*
 ‘ *History of Oliver Cromwell*.

‘ If this wretched Production had appear’d
 ‘ in *Mist’s Journal*. I should have felt neither
 ‘ Surprise nor Concern. *That Writer* never
 ‘ wore

' wore so much as the *Mask of Liberty*; and
 ' shew'd his Game so plainly, that whatever
 ' he got by *Faction*, *Faction* could get nothing
 ' by Him. But *Fog*, who writes incompara-
 ' bly better, hath appear'd to write with a
 ' much better Design. Those, who are warm-
 ' est in the *national Interest*, without Regard
 ' to *Persons*, and independently of all *Factions*,
 ' have made this Judgment of Him; and
 ' therefore I was surpris'd and concern'd to
 ' find that He expos'd Himself even once, or
 ' in any Degree, to the same Reproach as was
 ' frequently and justly made to his *Predecessor*.

The *Gentleman's* Observation gave Occasion
 to much Discourse. Our *old Sage* desired it
 might be remember'd that he had not under-
 taken the Defence of every *weekly Writer*,
 though he had undertaken yours, Mr.
D'Anvers. ' The *Paper*, continued he,
 ' which hath been so much mention'd, is a
 ' very silly Paper, to whatever Purpose it was
 ' design'd.

' If it was design'd to inspire an Horror of
 ' those Miseries, from which the *Restoration*
 ' deliver'd the Nation, it was a very super-
 ' fluous Work at this Time, when there is no
 ' real, or pretended Difference of Opinion
 ' upon that Head amongst us. Those, who do
 ' not go to Church upon the 29th of *May*,
 ' nor on any other Day, will agree with Those,
 ' who do, in this Point, upon better Autho-
 ' rity than That of *Leti*, and for better Rea-
 ' sons than Those, which are contain'd in
 ' the

'the foolish Declamation attributed to
'*Monk.*

‘ If it was design’d to make us commemo-
‘ rate the Restoration of the two Brothers,
‘ *Charles* and *James*, as a national Blessing in
‘ itself, and independently of the other Con-
‘ sideration, the Project was equally ridiculous.
‘ The Flattery bestow’d upon *these Princes*,
‘ whilst they were in *Exile*, might pass, and
‘ many Things concurr’d to make it pass.
‘ But to talk in the same Stile to Mankind at
‘ this Time, when they have both sat on
‘ our Throne; when so many of us remember
‘ both what they *did*, and what they *would*
‘ *have done*, is contemptible to the last De-
‘ gree.

‘ If it was design’d for more *modern Appli-*
‘ *cation*, and to raise a Spirit amongst us, in
‘ favour of the *Pretender*, the Project was too
‘ foolish to have been hatch’d at home. It
‘ must have been imported from abroad.
‘ What *Jacobite* can be sanguine enough to
‘ hope that his Cause should revive, when he
‘ beholds the heroical King and Queen, who
‘ fill our Throne, auspicious Parents of a nu-
‘ merous Progeny of young Heroes and He-
‘ roines, rising up to emulate their Virtues, and
‘ to gladden, like them, the *British* Nation.

‘ This single Consideration might be suffi-
‘ cient to damp the Hopes of any *Jacobite*,
‘ who lives at home, and is a Witness of all
‘ this Glory. But however I shall mention
‘ another, which ought to have its Weight
‘ likewise,

likewise, and which will have more per-
 haps amongst some People. The Spirit of
Jacobitism is not only gone; but it will ap-
 pear to be gone in such a Manner as to leave
 no Room to apprehend its Return; if we re-
 flect that it hath died away, whilst all that
 could be done to keep it alive was doing by
Those, who profess'd it, and by *Those*, who
 valued and recommended themselves on their
 Opposition to all the Effects of it; if we con-
 sider the Numbers of People, who have aban-
 don'd this Interest, notwithstanding the ut-
 most Provocations to the contrary.

In short, I persuade myself that if the
Pretender had no Rival in the Throne, in-
 stead of having there one so formidable as our
 most august Monarch; yet his Way to the
 Throne would not be more open to him.
 The whole Bulk of the People hath been
 brought by the *Revolution*, and by the pre-
 sent Settlement of the Crown, to entertain
 Principles, which very few of us defended
 in my younger Days. The *Safety* and *Wel-*
fare of the Nation are now the first and prin-
 cipal Objects of Regard. The Regard to
Persons and to *Families* hath been reduced
 to the second Place; and it holds even That
 but under the Direction of the *former*. Can
 any Man believe that a People brave enough
 to dispose of *their Crown* for the greatest na-
 tional Advantage, even when the Throne
 was full, will ever dispose of it as long as the
Spirit of Liberty remains amongst them, for
 the

‘ the greatest national Mischief, if the Throne
 ‘ should be empty ?

‘ There is but *one Design more*, which I can
 ‘ conceive to have given Occasion to this silly
 ‘ Paper ; but *one Quarter more*, from which it
 ‘ could possibly come ; and these Guesses, per-
 ‘ haps, will not appear the least probable.
 ‘ Might it not be design’d to instill a Jealousy
 ‘ of *Jacobitism* and to prejudice Mankind
 ‘ against all Writings, which *Those*, who are
 ‘ offended at them, cannot answer ? — Might
 ‘ it not be design’d to furnish the *spruce, pert,*
 ‘ *Orator*, who strew’d some of his Flowers in
 ‘ the *Daily Courant* of the 11th of June, with
 ‘ an Hint, which He hath most happily and
 ‘ modestly improved ? *Fog*, says He, *avows*
 ‘ *Jacobitism* ; *the Craftsman concurs in the same*
 ‘ *Design* ; nay, *every Jacobite in England*
 ‘ *sinks his Master’s divine Right in the popular*
 ‘ *Topicks of Debts, Taxes and Corruption* ; so
 ‘ that *Jacobitism* may now be imputed, upon
 ‘ this Authority, to ninety nine in an hundred
 ‘ of the whole Nation ; for ninety nine in an
 ‘ hundred do complain of *Debts, Taxes and*
 ‘ *Corruption*. I am sure there is *Arrogance*
 ‘ and *Impertinence* both in such an Insinua-
 ‘ tion too gross to be deny’d ; whereas the
 ‘ *Craftsman* may destroy the whole Proof,
 ‘ brought against Him of *Arrogance*, by an-
 ‘ swering *three silly Questions* in the *Negative*.

‘ If This was the Design, I will be bold,
 ‘ for bold it may justly seem, to say that *this*
 ‘ *Expedient* is, at least, as bungling and likely

' to prove as ineffectual, as any that have been
 ' produced by the *same, great Genius*, who
 ' contrived it; for if we were inclined to be-
 ' lieve that the *Craftsman, Fog*, or any other
 ' Person, carries on the Measures of *Faction*,
 ' under the Mask of *Liberty*; should we be-
 ' lieve it on the Credit of *Those*, who oppose
 ' them, and who are notoriously influenced to
 ' write (though under specious Pretences of
 ' promoting Loyalty to the *King*, and an Ac-
 ' quiescence in his *Majesty's Measures*, yet in
 ' reality) for no other Service than That of a
 ' *small Number of Men*; nay, strictly speak-
 ' ing, of a *single Man*? With what Face can
 ' *such Writers* impute *Faction* to any one
 ' living, or dead?

' Let them be assured that we can examine
 ' and judge for ourselves; and that neither
 ' the *Craftsman* nor *Fog* would be able, if
 ' they went about it, to impose upon us, any
 ' more than they themselves have been able
 ' to do.

' The *pretty Author*, I just now mention'd,
 ' begins his Essay with Airs of *Wit*, and ends
 ' it with Airs of *Wisdom*. What pity is it
 ' that he should succeed in neither? In his
 ' first Paragraph he represents the *Craftsman*,
 ' with curious Impropriety, as a *Magician*,
 ' who conjures up *Spirits*; as a *Dog*, who
 ' barks at a Distance; as a *little Insect*, who
 ' nibbles at a Character; and my Friend *Caleb*
 ' was all these Things, it seems, at the same
 ' Instant. After this Specimen of Writing,
 ' we

‘ we may expect to see him compared, in
 ‘ some other Production of the *same Author*,
 ‘ to a *Bird* and made to fly different Ways
 ‘ and in different Places at once.

‘ But let us leave the *Wit* and come to the
 ‘ *Wisdom*; which will bring us back to our
 ‘ Subject.

‘ In the last Paragraph of this elaborate
 ‘ Piece, the Author sets the Example of my
 ‘ Lord *Falkland* and others before our Eyes;
 ‘ who strengthen’d, as He says, the republican
 ‘ Party so long, *that when They found out*
 ‘ *their Designs and forsook them, it was too*
 ‘ *late to prevent them.* After This, He calls
 ‘ most charitably on several, well-meaning
 ‘ Persons to take Warning; for some, whom
 ‘ He allows to be such, He thinks in Danger
 ‘ of being drawn in to favour the Purposes of
 ‘ Those, whom He calls *Opposers of our Go-*
 ‘ *vernment.*

‘ Behold this *little Gamaliel in Cathedra*!
 ‘ Observe the Scholars He places at his Feet
 ‘ for Instruction! *Risum teneatis Amici?*
 ‘ Can the gravest of you forbear Laughter?

‘ When We come to apply the general
 ‘ Propositions laid down still more particu-
 ‘ larly to the *English*, than We have done to
 ‘ the *Roman History*, I shall shew you per-
 ‘ haps that *this Author*, like most other *fine*
 ‘ *Men*, treasures up in his Memory the Ob-
 ‘ servations He meets with in History, instead
 ‘ of making his own upon the Examination
 ‘ and Comparifon of the Facts and Characters

' He finds there ; and that the Example He
 ' hath chosen will come out against the very
 ' Purpose He hath apply'd it to. In the mean
 ' Time, let us observe that the Alarm, which
 ' hath been taken by some of this Company,
 ' and I suppose by others, at the Publication
 ' of that stupid Paper in *Fog's Journal*, shews
 ' how little Reason there is to apprehend that
 ' Those, who are actuated by the *Spirit of*
 ' *Liberty*, and pursue the *national Interest*,
 ' should be imposed upon by the *Spirit of*
 ' *any Faction*.

' The *Spirit of Liberty* is a jealous *Spirit* ;
 ' and *Faction* is equally the Object of its Jeal-
 ' lousy, whether the Views of *Faction* be
 ' directed in Favour of the Crown, or against
 ' it. I make this Distinction here, though I
 ' shall have Occasion to speak more fully up-
 ' on it hereafter, because I perceive that We
 ' are apt to confine our Idea of *Faction* to
 ' such Men and such Measures, as are in Op-
 ' position to the Men in Power, and to the
 ' Measures They take ; whereas in Truth a
 ' Number of Men in Power, who exercise it
 ' solely for their own private Advantage and
 ' Security, and who treat the Nation as their
 ' Farm, or rather as a Country under Contri-
 ' bution to them, (let Them shelter Them-
 ' selves under what Authority They please)
 ' are as much a *Faction*, as any Number of
 ' Men, who under popular Pretences endea-
 ' vour to ruin, or at least to disturb the Go-
 ' vernment, that they may raise Themselves.

' If

' If the *Spirit of Liberty* were extinguish'd,
 ' as it is discouraged, the *Spirit of some Fac-*
 ' *tion or other* would, no doubt, prevail; but
 ' This would not succeed under the Mask of
 ' *Liberty*. There would be, in such a Case,
 ' no Need of wearing this Disguise. Men
 ' would avow *Faction*. They would chuse
 ' That, which suited their Interest best; and
 ' indeed it would be of no great Moment
 ' which They chose.

' But if the *Spirit of Liberty*, which be-
 ' gins to revive in this Country, becomes pre-
 ' valent, there will remain nothing to fear
 ' from any *Faction* whatever, whether *mask'd*,
 ' or *unmask'd*. Whilst it is *mask'd*, and the
 ' Instruments, or Members of it pursue the
 ' *national Interest*, though they intend *an-*
 ' *other*, the bad Principle is however so far
 ' productive of Good, and the Cause of Vir-
 ' tue is so far promoted by Vice itself. When
 ' it comes to be *unmask'd*, and the Instru-
 ' ments, or Members of it are hurry'd by In-
 ' discretion, or forced by the Course of Events,
 ' as They must be, to shew their Game, *Fac-*
 ' *tion* is that Moment disarm'd. The Dis-
 ' tinction mark'd, the Separation follows of
 ' Course; and Those, who espouse the Cause
 ' of the *Nation*, will find Themselves doubly
 ' strengthen'd by the Assistance, which *Fac-*
 ' *tion* gave Them at one Time, and by the
 ' Opposition she makes to Them at another.
 ' In short, Gentlemen, the *Spirit of Jaco-*
 ' *bitism* may crawl about and skulk in Cor-
 ' D 4 ners.

ners. The Spirit of the *other Faction* may roll in gilded Spires, and with erected Crests, in every publick Place, and hiss and threaten and cast its Venom around ; but the *Spirit of Liberty*, like the divine Rod of *Aaron*, will devour all the Serpents of the *Magicians*.

‘ I see therefore no Cause to fear that We may be drawn in to serve the Purposes of *Faction*, whilst We pursue the Cause of *Liberty*; and if we suffer’d ourselves to be drawn off from this Pursuit by the Jealousy, which *one Faction* endeavours to give us of *another*, We should be arrant Bubbles indeed. *Fog* is not to be defended for publishing a Paper liable every Way to Blame, and capable of no Excuse ; but if He hath hurt any Body by it, He hath hurt himself ; and the Weight, which is laid upon it by Those on *one Side*, (who, perhaps, writ it) is as ridiculous as the Project of Those, who thought to advance the *Jacobite* Cause by it, if it came from *that Side*.

Here the *old Gentleman* broke off, and though He was press’d to resume the Discourse He had begun, when this Interruption happen’d, He desired to be excused, because it was late, and promised to comply with our Request upon some other Occasion. If He keeps his Word, as I am persuaded He will, you shall hear again from,

S I R, Yours, &c.

LETTER



L E T T E R II.

S I R,

OUR *old Gentleman* having kept his Word with the Company, I design'd to have kept mine with you; but some Business calling me into the Country, I send you a few Minutes of the Conversations, which have pass'd, in Hopes that the Subject will not be left imperfect for as long a Time as my Affairs may oblige me to be absent. Throw these Minutes into what Form and make what Use of them you please. They are design'd to serve an *honest Cause*; the Cause of *Truth* and of *Liberty*. You have espoused it; and I hope will pursue it.

You are able to do This with Success, even in Opposition to the most plausible Writers; and how much more against the *curfory Observer*, who appear'd in the *Daily Courant*, and the *London Journalist*?

I do not suppose you will think it worth your while to set seriously about answering Them; but it may be worth while now and then to shew Them how little they deserve to be answer'd.

They complain heavily of the *Prolixity* and *Dulness* of the Letters, which you have publish'd. Might They not be taught, what
They

They have already taught the World, that an Essay of *two* or *three Columns* may be longer than an Essay of *five* or *six*? Let them not carp at my Words, since They cannot mistake my Meaning.

Might They not be convinced that They are the least competent Judges, in the whole Nation, of the *Dulness* of others, for this plain Reason; that it is not in the Case of *Dulness*, as it is in That of *Wit* and *Learning*; in which He is the best Judge of these Qualities in others, who possesses them Himself in the most eminent Degree?

But there is a *Judge*, before whom all Productions of this Sort are try'd, and by whose Sentence alone They must stand, or fall. This Judge is the *Publick*; and I am apt to think that these Authors may be inform'd of the Sentence pronounced by the *Publick* on your Papers, Mr. *D'Anvers*, and on their own, if They will take the Trouble to enquire of *Messieurs Roberts, Peele, and Francklin*.

I am even inclined to believe that they have enquired; and that, despairing of Success before *this Tribunal*, they have appeal'd to *another*; where Those, whom the *Publick* rejects, are pretty sure of being received.

Sure I am that they cannot hope to succeed any where else, whilst they found their Merit on *Billingsgate*, *false Quotations*, *gross Misrepresentations*, and an eternal *Begging of the Question*.

That

That they are guilty of all These may be soon proved. I will point out some Instances; as many as the Haste I am in allows me Time to mention.

The *cursor* *Observator* accuses You and Me (for *these Writers* are pleased to suppose us to be the *same Person*, who corresponds with *Himself*) of *quoting falsely* and *applying foolishly* in every Case, whilst he *quotes falsely himself*, and ridicules the *Application* of what, it is manifest, he never read. His whole Charge is built on a *Lye* and a *Blunder*.

Machiavel is made, according to him, in one of my Letters, to suppose *that the first Destruction of Rome by the Gauls* (and I never heard of a *second*) *was a Judgment from Heaven on the People for their having departed from their antient Observances and religious Ceremonies*. — With This he makes himself wonderfully merry; and having heard that *Machiavel* did not pass for a very strong Believer, he ridicules the Imputation of such a Supposition to that *great Politician*.

But let *this Scribbler* learn to read, before he blots any more Paper. Let him learn to speak of what is, or is not in Books, after he hath look'd into those Books, and not from his idle Imagination of what an Author would, or would not have said, agreeably to the Character of the Author, which his Ignorance hath taken upon Trust.

My

My old Gentleman never said that *Machiavel* supposed the Destruction of Rome by the Gauls was a Judgment from Heaven ; but he reckon'd amongst other Particulars, in which the Romans had begun to degenerate, and to which they were brought back by this great Misfortune, That of neglecting the Ceremonies of Religion and the Laws of Justice. Now *Machiavel* does say This in exprefs and strong Terms, as this Writer would have known, if he had consulted the first Chapter of the third Book of his Discourses on Livy.

But I will tell him something more. This very *Machiavel* hath written a whole Chapter concerning the * Religion of
 * L. I. C. II. the Romans ; in which he mentions that Rome was more obliged to *Numa* than to *Romulus* ; in which he shews that her Grandeur and Felicity were owing to her Religion ; nay, he asserts in general that as Religion raises Commonwealths, so the contempt of it must ruin them. Good Gods ! Is This talking like *Machiavel* ? — Why truly it is thus that *Machiavel* talks ; and in talking thus he shews more Learning and Sense than the *Observer* is Master of.

Cast your Eye, Mr. *D'Anvers*, on the next Paragraph ; in which this able Person undertakes to prove from Reason, as well as History, a Matter of Fact. The Fact is This ; that the Destruction of Rome, by the Gauls, was owing to the Opposition set on Foot to
 the

the Measures and Person of the great, and much injured Camillus.

It was a great Mistake, it seems, to mention *this Incident in the Roman History*, in one of my Letters. The *Observer* shall find that it was a greater Blunder in him to dwell upon it.

He knows as little of *Livy* as he does of *Machiavel*, or I believe of any other good Author. Let him turn to the *Roman Historian*. He will find that *Livy*, in the Transition, which he makes from the Prosecution of *Camillus* to the Invasion of the *Gauls*, says that if there be any Thing certain in human Affairs, Rome could not have been taken, if that Citizen had remain'd in it. But does he attribute the Invasion of the *Gauls* to this Man's Banishment? No. He attributes it to the Conduct of *three rash and foolish Brothers*, who were sent Ambassadors to the *Gauls*, and who, by breaking the Law of Nations, justly provoked this People. He attributes it to the Force of a *Faction*, which prevail'd to screen *these Criminals*, and exposed the State to Ruin, rather than give them up to Justice.

Thus the *Fact* stands in History. Let the *Observer* now consider whether it would be very difficult to make certain Applications of it, which he would not like. I doubt these Applications would appear much more apposite than That, which is said to be intended,
in

in his Paper, of the Character of the great and much injured Camillus.

He succeeds, you see, but ill, when He meddles with *Facts*; and I do not find that He pretends much to *Reason*. The rest of his Paper contains little more than *Fool*, *Knave*, *Libeller*, *Incendiary*, &c. I shall therefore take Notice of but one Thing more; and That is the Advantage He would make of a Mistake in *Printing*.

He must have perceived, or He can perceive nothing, than it was a Mistake in *Printing*. If the Meaning of my Letter had been, that the *Craftsman* might destroy the whole Proof of *Arrogance* brought against Him, by answering in the *Negative* all the Questions ask'd in the Paragraph referr'd to, it should have been said *five silly Questions*; for They are *five*, not *four*; but the Truth is that no Regard was had to the *two introductory Questions*; and that the *three main Questions*, which follow, were alone meant. A *Writer* must be reduced very low, by his *Cause*, or be very low in his *Character*, who catches at such an impertinent Opportunity of being what He imagines *smart*.

I should say a Word or two to the profound Mr. *Osborne*, who hath been pleased to let us know that He prefers the *absolute Monarchy of Augustus* to the *free State of the Roman Commonwealth*. He prefers, likewise, I suppose, (at least his Discourse leads one to think so) the Violence, the Treachery, and the bloody

bloody Massacres, on which this *absolute Monarchy* was founded, to the civil Disorders, which were occasion'd by establishing and maintaining an *equal Commonwealth*. I should desire him to compare the Reigns of a *Caligula*, a *Nero*, a *Domitian*, an *Heliogabalus*, (which had never happen'd, if the Usurpation of *Augustus* had never happen'd) with the glorious *fourth* and *fifth Centuries* of the Republick of *Rome*; but I have not, at present, Time for This. I hope you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, will give Him some salutary Correction at your Leisure, and make Him ashamed of having prophaned the Language of a *free People* in so prostitute a Manner, and to such slavish Purposes! Advise Him to learn better Notions of Government from Mr. *Gordon's* excellent Discourses, prefix'd to his Translation of *Tacitus*; in which He will find his Favourite *Augustus* set in a true Light, and proved to be an infamous Tyrant, though somewhat more artful than his *Successors*. He must certainly acknowledge the Obligation; since you cannot be suspected of doing it on any Account but That of a charitable Disposition towards Him. If He was capable of imposing on the dullest *Quid-nunc* in any Coffee-House, or of seducing the most raw Boy, that ever eloped from School, you might be suspected of some farther and deeper Design; but when you write against so harmless a Creature, your Efforts must pass, and ought to pass, for the pure Effects

Effects of the most disinterested, the most refined Charity.

Let me only ask the Favour of you to touch *three Points*, amongst others, whenever you condescend to meddle with *Squire Osborne*. *One* is to assure him, in my Name, (and, if you please, in your own) that a good Minister ought not to be *abused*; nay more, that he, who abuses him, is a *Rogue*, a *Rascal*, and an *impudent* (I had almost said, for I conform to his Dialect, a *traiterous*) *Fellow*; and might have justified myself by the Authority of a Writer on Mr. *Osborne's* Side, who talk'd of *Allegiance to Ministers*; but let this important Author know, at the same Time, that we defy him to make the least Use of these Concessions against any one Sentence, any one Word in any *Craftsman*, that hath been publish'd.

There are *two other Things*, of which I desire you likewise to take Notice. *One* is scandalously impudent; the *other* infamously unfair.

When his *Patron* is commended by any honest Man in *Britain*, it is done most certainly with a *Sneer*. The *great Man* is an Expression, which hath undoubtedly occasion'd more *Sneers* than this Nation had seen in a Century before; but it is saucy and impudent in Mr. *Osborne* to suppose that one, who speaks of the *King* and *royal Family* with all the Respect that is due to Them, means a *Sneer*.

The


The *other Thing*, which I desire you to take Notice of, is the malicious and mean Comment made on an Expression in my last Letter to you, where I call'd his present Majesty a *formidable Rival of the Pretender*. Mr. *Osborne* is pleased, out of the Abundance of his Loyalty, to resent This as an Insult on the King. Now though, in Strictness of Fact and Propriety of Language, his Majesty neither is a *Rival* to any Body, nor can have a *Rival*, being our *rightful and lawful King*, by the Consent of his People in *Parliament*; (the *only good Title* to the Crown of these Realms;) yet in Pretension there is a *Rivalry*; and I may defy Mr. *Osborne* to give any other Reason for keeping up so large an *Army* in Times of *Peace*.

You will observe, Mr. *D'Anvers*, that the only Design of this Letter is to make some short Observations on two silly Papers, which have been publish'd against my *former Letters* to you. You are now desired to apply the *old Gentleman's* general Positions to the *English History* from the Minutes, which I have sent you, and which I believe will be as agreeable to the *Publick*, as it was to the *Company*, in which he deliver'd it.

I am SIR,

Your Friend and Reader, &c.

E REMARKS



REMARKS

ON THE

HISTORY of ENGLAND.



LETTER IV.

FEW Nations have gone through more Revolutions, few Governments have appear'd more unsteady, or fluctuated more between *Prerogative* and *Privilege* than This of *Great Britain*.

If we are *Freemen*, it is because the *Spirit of Liberty* has been never yet quite extinguish'd among us.

We have been surprized, betray'd, forced, more than once, into Situations little better than That of *downright Slavery*. But these Usurpations have not become Settlements. They have disorder'd the Frame, but not destroy'd the Principles of a *free Government*. Like cloudy Mornings, They have soon pass'd over, and the Sun of *Liberty* has broke out again with double Force, and double Lustre.

It

It must be a Pleasure to reflect on that Uniformity of *Spirit*, which created and has constantly preserved, or retrieved the original Freedom of the *British* and *Saxon Constitutions*.

I feel a secret Pride in thinking that I was born a *Briton*; when I consider that the *Romans*, those Masters of the World, maintain'd their Liberty little more than seven Centuries; and that *Britain*, which was a free Nation above seventeen hundred Years ago, is so at this Hour.

However savage our *British* Ancestors may be represented by the *Romans*, (whom the Luxury of *Greece* and the Effeminacy of *Asia* had already corrupted) They certainly were a People of *Spirit* and of *Sense*; who knew the Ends of Government, and obliged their Governors to pursue those Ends.

Cæsar himself acknowledges that They fought boldly for their *Liberties*, when He invaded them; and there is good Reason to believe, from his manner of Writing and abrupt Way of leaving this Island, that They gave Him a warmer Reception than He is willing to own.

But to speak of them after an Author, in whose Time they were better known than they were by *Cæsar*, or even by *Tacitus*; *Dion Cassius*, when he is about to relate the Expedition of *Severus* into *Britain*, says that they held a great Part of the Government in their own Power.

Their long Resistance against the *Saxons* shews their Love of *civil Liberty*.

Their long Resistance against the Usurpations of the Church of *Rome*, begun by *Gregory*, that Flatterer of *Phocas* and *Brunebault*, under Pretence of converting the *Saxons*, shews their Love of *ecclesiastical Liberty*.

Though the *Saxons* submitted to the Yoke of *Rome*, in Matters of Religion, they were far from giving up the Freedom of their *Gothick* Institutions of Government.

The *Saxon Heretoges* (That is, *publick Generals*) were chosen only to conduct them in *War*, not to rule over them in *War* and in *Peace*.

These *Heretoges*, among the *German Colonies*, who settled in the Countries they conquer'd and founded new Governments, became *Kings*, and had Trappings enough to set off their Majesty, and to enforce their Authority ; but the supreme Power center'd in the *Micklemote*, or *Wittagenmote*, composed of the *King*, the *Lords*, and the *Saxon Freemen*, that original Sketch of a *British Parliament*.

Here all important Affairs were treated. The Conduct of their *Kings* was examined in it, and controul'd by it.

The Rights of the People, in those Days, must have been carry'd to a very great Height ; since they went Hand in Hand with Those of the *Church* ; and since a positive Law declared that if the King did not defend both,
He

He should lose even the Name of King. Nec Nomen Regis in eo constabit, verum Nomen Regis perdit.

The Principles of the *Saxon Commonwealth* were therefore very *democratical*; and these Principles prevail'd through all subsequent Changes.

The *Danes* conquer'd the Crown, but they wore it little; and the Liberties of the *Saxon* Freemen they never conquer'd; nor wrought any Alteration in the Constitution of the Government.

Thus much it was thought necessary to premise concerning the original Constitution of our Government. We now come to that Period of History, from whence We propose to deduce our following Remarks.

WILLIAM, the *Norman*, is come down to us in History under the Character of 'a *Conqueror*'; and though it may be disputed whether he was strictly so any more than several other Princes, who have supported their Titles by their Swords; yet we may confess that He imposed many new Laws and Customs; that he made very great Alterations in the whole Model of Government; and that He, as well as his two Sons, ruled, upon many Occasions, like *absolute*, not *limited Monarchs*.

Yet neither *He*, nor *They* could destroy the old Constitution; because neither *He*, nor

They could extinguish the old *Spirit of Liberty*.

On the contrary, the *Normans* and other Strangers, who settled here, were soon seized with it themselves, instead of inspiring a *Spirit of Slavery* into the *Saxons*.

They were originally of * *Celtick*, or *Gothick* Extraction, (call it which you please) as well as the People They subdued. They came out of the same *northern Hive*; and therefore they naturally resumed the *Spirit* of their Ancestors, when they came into a Country, where it prevail'd.

Stephen, the fourth King of this Race, owed his Crown to the good Will of the Nation; and he owed this good Will to the Concessions he made in Favour of *Liberty*.

John came to the Crown, after the Death of his Father *Henry II.* and his Brother *Richard I.* by the Election of the People. His *Electors*, indeed, found themselves deceived in their Expectations; for he govern'd in the most extravagant Manner. But they soon made him feel whose *Creature* he was. The Contests between the Laity and an ambitious usurping Clergy ran very high at this

* We have thought fit to explain the Expression, in this Place, though We know the Word *Celtick*, as well as *Scythian*, hath been used in the same large and general Sense, which is made use of here; and We could shew (if such a Trifle deserved it) that by the *Celtæ* Antiquity did not always understand the People inhabiting a Part of *Gaul*, notwithstanding the Quotations out of *Polybius*, *Diodorus*, &c. which have been urged, by way of Cavil, against us.

Time. *John* had made his Advantage of these Divisions. But the *Spirit of Liberty* prevail'd and That of *Faction* vanish'd before it. Men grew ashamed of being the Tools of *private Ambition*, when *publick Safety* was at Stake. Those of the *high Church* and Those of the *low Church* united in one common Cause. The King bluster'd and drew out his Army; but it was a *British* Army. No Wonder therefore, if the King submitted, and *magna Charta* was sign'd.

It was sign'd again by his Son and Successor, *Henry III.* in full Parliament and with the greatest Solemnity. The People however abated nothing of their *jealous, watchful Spirit*; and it was well for *Liberty* they did not. The long Reign of this Prince was one continual Struggle between *Him* and *Them*. The Issue of this Struggle was favourable to the *latter*. By exerting their Strength, they encreased it under *Henry III.* They lost no Ground under *Edward I.* and they gain'd a great deal under *Edward II.*

Thus was the present Constitution of our Government forming itself for about two Centuries and an half; a rough Building raised out of the Demolitions, which the *Normans* had made, and upon the solid Foundations laid by the *Saxons*. The whole Fabrick was cemented by the Blood of our Fathers; for the *British Liberties* are not the *Grants of Princes*. They are *original Rights*, Conditions of *original Contracts*, coequal with

Prerogative, and coæval with our *Government*. As such, in the Days we speak of, they were claim'd; as such they were asserted by Force of Arms; as such they were acknowledged; and as such they were constantly maintain'd afterwards by that *pertinacious Spirit*, which no Difficulties nor Dangers could discourage, nor any Authority abate; not even That of the *Pope*, as impudently as it was exercised, and as foolishly as it was revered, in those superstitious Ages.

Had *this Spirit* relax'd in the Course of so many Years, our Government must have settled in an *absolute Monarchy*, or *tyrannical Aristocracy*.

The *Norman Kings*, of imperious Tempers, assumed great Power. The *Barons* did the same. The *People* groan'd under the Oppression of *Both*. This Union was unnatural and could not last. The *Barons*, enjoying a Sort of *feudatory Sovereignty*, were often Partners and sometimes Rivals of the *Kings*. They had opposite Interests and they soon clash'd.

Thus was the Opportunity created of re-establishing a more equal free Government than That, which had prevail'd after the *Norman Invasion*.

The *Kings*, the *Barons* and the *Clergy*, not less ambitious or avaricious than either of the others, had powerful Means of promoting their Usurpations. The Commonalty had little, or no Share in the Legislature; made

no Figure in the Government ; and it is hard to conceive how they could act, as the others might, and certainly did, by particular Concerts, to the Advancement of their particular Interests.

All these Disadvantages were supply'd by that *Spirit of Liberty*, which diffused itself through the whole Mass. Numbers were on the Side of the *Commons*. In all Disputes therefore it was necessary to apply to Them. They made the proper Use of such Conjunctions. Whoever lost, they were sure to be Gainers ; for so they deem'd themselves, when they suffer'd all the Hardships of War, and even laid down their Lives in the Quarrel, if they left *Liberty* more improved and better secured to their Posterity.

By Concessions to the *Commons*, our *Kings* maintain'd and extended their Prerogatives over the *Barons*. By espousing the national Interest, the *Barons* continued able to cope with the *Crown*, till they broke among themselves. Nay, even the *Church*, notwithstanding that antient and close Alliance between *secular* and *ecclesiastical Tyranny*, was forced, on some few Occasions, to be a Friend to the Liberties of the *People*.

The *King*, the *Barons* and the *Clergy* were all, in reality, Enemies to *publick Liberty*. Their Party were so many *Factions* in the Nation ; yet they all help'd, in their Turns, to establish *Liberty*.

So

So true it is that every Thing, even the Vices of Mankind, and the Misfortunes of a Country, will turn to the Advantage of *Liberty*, where the *Spirit* of it is maintain'd in Vigour; as every Thing, even the good Qualities of Mankind and the Prosperity of a Country, may operate a contrary Effect, where this *Spirit* is suffer'd to decline.

As losing the *Spirit of Liberty* lost the *Liberties of Rome*, even while the Laws and Constitutions, made for the Preservation of them, remain'd entire; so we see that our Ancestors, by keeping *this Spirit* alive and warm, regain'd all the Advantages of a free Government, though a *foreign Invasion* had destroy'd them, in great Measure, and had impos'd a very tyrannical Yoke on the Nation.



LETTER V.

WE are now come to the Reign of *Edward the third*. We must desire our Readers to stop here, and at the Reign of his Successor a little; since no Reigns can furnish us with more memorable and pertinent Examples, to shew how the *Spirit of Liberty* exerts itself in Favour of *good Princes*; how slow it is to act even against the *worst*; and yet

yet how effectually it is able to act, even in the most *desperate Cases*.

Old *Froissart* * says that the Eng- * *Vol. 1.*
lish had an Opinion, grounded on *C. 2.*
Observations made from the Days of good King *Arthur*, that between *two valiant and able Princes* in this Nation, there always intervenes a King *moins suffisant de sens & de Prouesse*; of less Sense and Courage. I shall not warrant the exact Truth of this Observation. The Proportion, I fear, is much greater on the *worst Side* in all Kingdoms. But certainly *Edward III.* whose Story gave Occasion to *Froissart* to broach this Anecdote, stands between his Father *Edward II.* and his Grandson *Richard II.* a bright Instance of this Truth, that *great and good Princes are Favourers of Liberty, and find their Account in promoting the Spirit of it; whilst the weakest and the worst Princes chiefly affect absolute Power, and often meet with the Fate they deserve for such Attempts.*

The *former* know that they have nothing to apprehend from *this Spirit*; and They wisely prefer the generous Efforts of *good Will* and *Affection* to the reluctant Compliances of such as obey by *Force*.

The *latter*, conscious that they are unable to *lead*, endeavour to *drive* their People. Unworthy to be *Kings*, They struggle to be *Tyrants*.

Few were the Blemishes, which may be thought to tarnish the Lustre of this Reign of
Edward

Edward the third. Few and short were the Struggles between *Him* and his *People*; for as he was fierce and terrible to his *Enemies*, He was amiable and indulgent to his *Subjects*. He not only observed the *Laws*, but He made the *Sense of the Nation*, in some Measure, a *Law* to Him. On this Principle, (in which, to a considering Mind, there will appear as much Wisdom as Goodness) he removed a *Son*, nay a favourite *Mistress* from Court.

Henry IV. if I mistake not, did something of the same Kind; and which of their Successors, after such Examples, could presume to think it below his Dignity to consult the *Inclination of his People*, and make *Them* the Rule of his Conduct?

Under this great Prince, the Constitution of our *Parliaments*, and the whole Frame of our *Government* became reduced into a better Form. A *Spirit of Liberty* breathes in the *Laws* of this glorious King; and the Power and Duty of *Parliaments* are set forth, in some of them, with such Terms as would never have been pass'd by a Prince, who had put the least Pedantry, or the least Foppery into his Notions of Kingship.

The *Spirit of Liberty* was not idle in this Reign, though it had little, or no Occasion of Exercise against the Crown. The Usurpations of the Church were many and grievous. They had been long murmur'd against; but a false Respect for *Religion* had hitherto main-

maintain'd them. This Delusion began now to be removed. WICKLIFFE arose to dispel this magick Charm; to undraw the Veil of this pretended Sanctuary; and to expose the Horrors and Trifles, which lurk'd behind it, to publick View, Indignation and Contempt. The *Ax* was now first aim'd at the *Root of Popery*; and *Prelates* were taught the first Lessons of Moderation. *Parliaments* fate and proceeded on Business, even on *ecclesiastical Business*, without the Intervention of *Mitres*. There was, I believe, one *Parliament* held, to which few, or none of the *Prelates* were summon'd; in order, perhaps, to teach them how little *their Concurrence* was essential to give due Weight to the *Counsels*, or full Authority to the *Acts of Parliament*.

As *this Prince* loved, instead of hating, as He encouraged, instead of discountenancing, the *Spirit of Liberty* in his People; so he was strengthen'd and supported by it in such a Manner, and in such Circumstances as cannot be parallel'd.

The Nation had been miserably harass'd by *civil Wars* and *Oppressions* of various Kinds, when he came to the Crown. The Burthen of *personal Service*, and the *Taxes* raised to defend the Dominions, which his Predecessors held on the Continent, had exhausted all Degrees of People. This Mischief was so much resented by them, that *foreign Interest* and *foreign Counsels* may be justly re-

reckon'd among the principal Causes of all the Disputes, and even Wars, between *Them* and their former *Kings*.

In this Situation and in this Temper of Mind was the Nation, when *Edward* the *third*, by laying Claim to the Crown, and undertaking the Conquest of *France*, open'd to his Subjects the terrible Prospect of being worse than ever oppress'd by the same *Grievances*; and yet his *Nobility* and *Commonalty* seconded him in all these Enterprizes, with fewer Complaints than could have been expected. These Men, so apt to complain of *Grievances*, and so little patient under them, carry'd him triumphantly through all his Wars abroad, though they struggled with *Want*, *Pestilence* and *Famine* at home.

What Principle produced this wonderful Change? Did higher Notions of *Prerogative* prevail? Had the Doctrines of a *slavish Submission* at once possess'd our Ancestors? By no Means. It was not the Power, it was not the Authority of the *King*, which forced; but it was the Character of the *Man*, which invited to these Compliances. The *Spirit of Liberty* exerted itself in Favour of the *Patron of Liberty*.

A corrupt Parliament, a degenerate Nobility, a servile Commonalty will sacrifice any Thing to any Prince; to a *Richard* the second, or an *Edward* the third, equally and indiscriminately. But a free, a generous, a virtuous People (such as we may boast our Ancestors

Ancestors were in those Days) will sacrifice every Thing, except *Liberty*, to a Prince like *Edward III.* and *Liberty* is a Sacrifice, which a Prince, like *Him*, will never require at their Hands. To *Him*, who would require it, They would sacrifice nothing. Such a *People* may be *well govern'd* with Ease; and it ought to be hard to *govern them ill*. They will do more for a Prince, whom they *love* and *esteem*, than he has a *Right* to expect from them. If they *do less* for a Prince, whom they *despise* or *bate*, they are surely very excusable.

In order to render this Example still stronger and more useful, it may be proper to point out, besides his general Character, some of those Particulars in the Conduct of *Edward III.* which probably induced his *People* to sacrifice their Estates, and their Lives too, so chearfully in a *Cause*; to which, under *other Princes*, they had been so averse.

In the *first Place*, as his Father *Edward II.* lost his Crown and his Life, in the most miserable Manner, by suffering Himself to be govern'd by his *Ministers* and protecting them from the Resentments of the People; so his *Son* very early exerted his own Authority, and freed Himself from the Guardianship, or rather Subjection, of the *Queen* and *Mortimer*, who had long oppress'd the Nation, and dishonour'd the young King by their scandalous Conduct.

The

The next Reason seems to have been This; though he was magnificent in his Court; yet he limited, with great Care, the Exactions of his *Purveyors*; kept a severe Hand over them; and suffer'd no more to be levy'd on his People, than what the necessary Expence of his *Houſhold* required. He ſaved for his *People*, not for *Himſelf*.

Thirdly; the *Taxes*, laid in his Time, were laid for *viſible* and *important Services*, wherein the *Honour* at leaſt of the Nation was concern'd; which every Man knew and approved.

Fourthly; the *Expences* were leſſen'd by that *double Oeconomy*, which is ſo rarely found, or even underſtood. I mean not only that *inferior Oeconomy*, which conſiſts in the Management of the Receipts and Iſſues of the *publick Revenue*; but that *ſuperior Oeconomy*, which conſiſts in contriving the great Schemes of *Negotiation* and *Action*. When the Talents for *this Oeconomy* are wanting in *Thoſe*, who govern, the Publick pays for their *Want of Genius*; and the *Prince's*, or *Minister's Errors* are ſo many additional Taxes on the *People*. When theſe Talents are not wanting, the very Reverse happens. The Genius of the *Prince*, or *Minister* comes in Aid of the *publick Charge*. Much is ſaved; and *Art* and *Management* ſupply it all.

Edward III. began his War againſt *France*, in Conjunſtion with *German Allies*. He ſaw no better Expedient at that Time. But as
ſoon

soon as Fortune and Intrigue had procured it for him, He took another shorter, cheaper, and more effectual Method. He supported the Earl of *Monfort*, Competitor with *Charles of Blois*, for the Dutchy of *Brittany*. *Avecques les Allemans, & les Brabancons (says Froissart) il n'avoit riens fait, fors despendre grossement; & l'avoit mene & demene les Siegneurs de l'Empire, qui avoient prient son Or & son Argent, ainsy qu'ils avoient voulu, & riens fait. Si descendit a la Requeste du Comte joyeusement, &c.* That is, with the Germans and the Brabancons, all he had been able to do was to spend great Sums of Money. The Princes of the Empire, who had taken as much as they would of his Gold and his Silver, and had done nothing for it, were accusom'd to amuse him, and to tire him out. He condescended therefore to the Request of the Earl very joyfully.

Fifthly; it was not owing to his Success that the People had a good Opinion of his Enterprizes, and promised themselves an happy Issue, how difficult, or dangerous soever these Enterprizes might appear. Their Confidence was placed, and very justly, in those Qualities, and that Tenor of Conduct, which they observed in their King; and to which his prodigious Success was owing. No Man contrived, prepared, resolved with more Phlegm; or acted with greater Fire; the Reverse of his Successor, who resolved rashly and executed irresolutely. He waited sometimes

F

for

for Opportunities; but he always improved them, when they happen'd; and those *Accidents*, which govern, or dictate the Measures, and perpetually shift the fluctuating Schemes of *weak Governments*, were bent, by this *great Prince*, to serve the *wisest* and most *steady Purposes*.

Sixthly; if he drain'd away some of the national Wealth by *Taxes*, He restored it very amply again, by the great Care he took of extending and improving *Trade*; by which he open'd new Mines of Treasure; and, for a few temporary Contributions, enrich'd his People to future Generations. A *Prince*, who adds to the *national Stock*, has a Right to share the Advantage he procures, and may demand *Supplies* from his People, without blushing. But a *Prince*, who lives a *Rent-Charge* on the Nation he governs; who sits on his Throne, like a monstrous *Drone* in the Middle of an *Hive*, draining all the Combs of their Honey, and neither making, nor assisting the *industrious Bees* to make any; such a *Prince*, I say, ought to blush at every Grant he receives from a *People*, who never received any Benefit from *Him*. The Duke of Gloucester told *Richard the second*, on his restoring *Brest* to the Duke of *Brittany*, that he should have taken a Town by his own *Valour* and *Conduct*, before he resign'd what his *Ancestors* had left him. Much to the same Purpose might an *oppress'd People* justly answer a *craving Prince*. When you have increased

creased the *Riches*, and advanced the *Prosperity* of the Nation, you will have some Right to make *these Demands* upon us; but till then we shall think that you have none.



L E T T E R VI.

* **T**HE glorious Scene of Government, which display'd itself, in the Reign of *Edward the third*, was strangely alter'd on the Succession of *Richard the second*; a violent, haughty, obstinate and weak Prince; whose Reign, as one of our Historians observes, affords but little Matter that may shine in History; and cannot boast of any one great and distinguish'd Captain; any one memorable Battle, or important Siege; but *Prorogations of Truces, Abstinenances, Sufferances, Patiences, Tolerances* were the Language and Amusement of the Times; and Treaties were all the while kept on Foot for a perpetual Peace; Treaties, says He, hitherto fruitless, illusory and impracticable.

It must be confess'd that the Reins of Government hung pretty loose in the Hands of *Edward III.* towards the latter End of his

* Mr. Franklin was taken up for printing this Paper and the preceding one, on the Reign of *Edward the third*; but no farther Prosecution hath been yet commenced against Him on that Account.

Reign ; from whence proceeded the Growth of those *Factions*, which disturb'd the Beginning of his *Grandson's* Reign. Some Part of This was owing, very probably, to the Abuse of *Wickliffe's* Doctrines ; more to the cruel Treatment, which the inferior Part of the *Commonalty* received. The *Lords* grew Tyrants, and the *Commons* Rebels. But these Commotions were soon suppress'd by the united Force of the rest of the Nation ; much sooner, and with Consequences less fatal than in other Countries, where *Rebellion* and *popular Insurrections* seem to have been the epidemical Distempers of that Age.

If the *Spirit of Faction* was soon quell'd among the *Commons*, it prevail'd openly, scandalously, and dangerously in the *Court*. Something of it might be discern'd, perhaps, among the *Lords*, who opposed the *Court* ; even in the Duke of *Gloucester*, the Favourite of the People ; in the Duke of *Lancaster*, a wise Prince, and who acted long the moderating Part ; in *Arundel* and others. Nothing of it was to be observed in the general Proceedings of *Parliament*, and in the *national Conduct*.

The Justness of the Character, given before of *Richard the second*, discover'd itself very early in his Actions. He had a *Brutality* and a good Opinion of himself ; one of which might have betray'd him into a Discovery of what it was his Interest to conceal, if the other had not made him capable of

of doing it, even on Reflection. Hence came those famous and foolish Sayings of this Prince, which History has preserved, and which gave his People timely Warning what they had to expect from him. Of his *Commons* He said, *that SLAVES they were, and SLAVES they should be.* Upon an Address from *Parliament* to remove his *Chancellor* and *Treasurer*, his Answer was, *that he would not remove, at their Request, the meanest Scullion out of his Kitchen.*

However, He found Men, as all Princes may easily do, who flatter'd him in his *Vices* and *Follies*; such Men, for Instance, as *Nevil, Vere, Poole, Tressilian*, and others; who, to fasten Him to *themselves*, made the *Nation* odious to Him; as They made Him odious to the *Nation* by their *Rapine*, their *Insolence*, and by a weak Administration; which exposed the Kingdom to be invaded by the *Scots*, and threaten'd and insulted by the *French*.

During all this Time, *Parliaments* met frequently, and gave *necessary Supplies*; some *Grievances* They redress'd; but bore the Mal-Administration of the *Court Faction* till the tenth Year of this King; when They prosecuted the *Favourites* with great Justice; with Temper, and yet with Vigour. They spared nothing to provide for the Defence of the Kingdom by *Sea* and *Land*; and having put the Administration, for a Time, into the Hands of Persons chosen by *Themselves*, gave

the King such a Warning, as might have taught Him to abandon a *Faction*, and to throw himself on his *People*; but it proved in vain. His *favourite Ministers* persuaded him *that They suffer'd for his Sake; that the Aim of their Enemies was to dethrone Him by disgracing Them*; and whilst all the Troubles of his Reign were due to his Support of *Them*, they made Him believe that they suffer'd for executing *his Orders*, and maintaining *his Authority*. — Nay, They represented to Him that, by *accusing the Counsellors*, a *Man plainly shews that He believes the Sovereign incapable of governing*; and that the *readiest Way to discredit a Prince, is persuading his Subjects, that He makes Use of ill Ministers*. — These Arguments and Artifices, ridiculous as They seem, succeeded and had their Effect for some Time longer.

The *deluded King* enter'd into a closer Conjunction than ever with his *Ministers*. He took their Iniquities on Himself; made their Cause his own; was privy to their Plots of poisoning their Enemies; of packing Juries; of corrupting the Judges to give Opinions against Law; and to all that dirty Work, which *They* wanted, not *He*. Nay, by his Encouragement, They raised Troops; and a Battle was fought in *their Quarrel*; but They were defeated; and the *fourteenth Parliament*, call'd the *Wonder-working Parliament*, having punish'd the *Judges and Ministers* with proper Severity, endeavour'd to reconcile
the

the King and his People. They gave him great Subsidies, and renew'd their Homage and Fealty to Him.

Even all This still proved in vain. No Experience was sufficient to reclaim *Richard the second*. He govern'd tyrannically at home, and took a *Wife* and bought a *Peace* from *France*. It is remarkable that the *Peace* cost him 400,000 *l.* much more than he got by his *Wife*. His favourite Ministers had, before this Time, endeavour'd to persuade him to give up *Calais*, and purchase the Friendship of *France* to assist him against the *Lords* and others, who opposed him. This is not the last, nor least, Instance of conducting foreign Affairs purely with Regard to the Interest of Ministers, and without any to the Honour and Interest of the Nation.

The *Factions* among the great Men were of double Advantage to the King for a Time.

First, the Body of the People, who shew'd themselves sufficiently animated with a Spirit of Liberty, grew cool in espousing the Quarrels of the *Lords*, after they thought Liberty secured by the Proceedings of *Parliament*, in the tenth Year of this King; and though many particular Actions of Violence, of Treachery, and of Cruelty were committed by *Richard the second*, They bore all with the greatest Patience for several Years.

In the next Place, these *Factions* among the great Men enabled the King to divide

them; to play one against the other; and to build up his Tyranny on the Ruins of both. His Uncle, the Duke of Gloucester, was basely betray'd and barbarously murder'd by Him. He procured a pack'd Parliament, consisting of Men imposed on the Shires and Towns by the King's Authority, wholly managed by Court Favourites, and which bent all its Endeavours to destroy the Liberties and Privileges of the People. With the Help of such a Parliament, He wreak'd Vengeance on Those, who had opposed him; got his Authority exalted above all Law, and exercised a most cruel Tyranny.

The People still bore; and it is probable that the King, and others as well as He, imagined that they would be obliged to bear on; since the whole Legislature united in their Oppression. But in This He was deceived. When the Parliament took the Part of the People, the People follow'd the Motions of Parliament. When They had no Hopes from Parliament, They follow'd the first Standard, which was set up against the King. The same Spirit of Liberty, which had been so slow to act under so many Provocations, acted with the greatest Vigour, when it was least expected. The King, at the Head of an Army in Ireland, the Duke of York at the Head of another in England, and the Earl of Salisbury at the Head of a third, could do the King no Service. The Armies would not fight for the King against
their

their *Country*. The whole Nation abandon'd Him, or acted against Him. Some of his *Ministers* were hang'd; particularly Those, who had been the great Instruments of taxing and oppressing the *People*. He was, at length, forced to *resign*, and to subscribe an *Instrument* with his own Hand, by which He confess'd Himself *unworthy* to govern the Kingdom any longer. This *Instrument of Resignation* was not only unanimously approved of in Parliament, but *Articles of Accusation* were order'd to be drawn up against Him, to justify their Resolution of *deposing* Him. These *Articles* were thirty-five in Number, setting forth the Particulars of his *Misgovernment*; two of which are to this Effect;

That He had put the Administration of the publick Affairs in the Hands of unexperienced and ill-designing Persons, to the great Damage of the People, who were loaded with excessive Taxes;

That, in his Negotiations with foreign Princes, He had made Use of so many Equivocations and Sophistries, that none would take his Word any more.

It is very observable that these Extremities fell upon *Richard the second*, at a Time, when every Thing seem'd to contribute to his Support, in the Exercise of that *arbitrary Power*, which He had assumed. Those, whom He had most Reason to fear, were removed either by *violent Death*, or *Banishment*; and others were secured in his Interest by *Places*,
or

or *Favours* at Court. The great Offices of the Crown, and the Magistracy of the whole Kingdom were put into such Hands, as were fit for his Designs; besides which, He had a *Parliament* entirely at his Devotion; but all these advantageous Circumstances served only to prove that a Prince can have no real Security against the just Resentments of an injured and exasperated Nation; for, as *Rapin* observes upon the sad Catastrophe of this Reign and That of *Edward II*; in such Governments as That of England, all Endeavours used by the King to make Himself absolute are but so many Steps towards his own Downfal.

It is farther observed, by another eminent Writer upon this Reign, (which He justly calls a *Reign of Favourites*) that the King, in his Distress, saw Himself forsaken by Those, whom He should have forsaken before; the very Men, who had so much flatter'd Him with their excessive Love and Loyalty; and, like those mean Insects, which live with a little Warmth, but shrink at any Change of Weather, They, who had contributed to all his Errors in his Prosperity, transplanted their Zeal into the new Sunshine, as soon as his Successor demanded the Crown.

LETTER

LETTER VII.

FROM the Reigns of *Edward the third*, and *Richard the second*, we shall hasten downwards, as fast as some necessary Observations will permit. Those of the Princes of *York* and *Lancaster* form a Period of more than eighty Years, which pass'd in *foreign* and *civil Wars*; in frequent *Revolutions* of Government, and in all those Disorders, which usually accompany and follow such *Revolutions*.

The Party of *Richard the second*, even after the Death of that unhappy Prince, broke out into open Rebellion against *Henry the fourth*, but their Efforts were vain. He held the Crown fast, which the *Parliament* had given him; and the chief of his Opposers perish'd in their Attempts. Happy had it been, if they alone had suffer'd; but here we must observe a necessary and cruel Consequence of *Faction*. As it oppresseth the whole Community, if it *succeeds*; so it often draws Oppression, not on itself alone, but on the whole Community, when it *fails*. The Attempts to dethrone *Henry the fourth*, justified him no Doubt, in supporting himself by a *military Force*. They excused him, likewise, very probably, in the Minds of many,
for

for governing with a *severe Hand*; for doing several *illegal* and *tyrannical Actions*; for invading the Privileges of *Parliament*; at least, in the Point of *Elections*; and for obtaining, by these Means, *frequent* and *heavy Taxes* on the People; for as all This might appear the harder, because it happen'd in the Reign of a *King*, who had no Title to his Crown but the *good Will of the People*, and the *free Gift of Parliament*; so it might appear, on the other Hand, the less grievous, because some Part of it was render'd necessary by the Opposition, which a *Faction* made to a *parliamentary Establishment*; and because the rest of it was represented, perhaps, under that Umbrage, to be so likewise, by the *Court Logick* of that Age.

A People may be persuaded to bear patiently a great deal of Oppression, as long as they can be persuaded that they bear it only to defend their *own Choice*, and to maintain their *own Acts*; but if they discover This to be nothing more than a *Pretence*, by which *such Powers* are kept up as are unnecessary to their Security, and dangerous to their *Liberty*; by which the Wealth of the whole Nation is drain'd into the Coffers of a *few*; and by which, in one Word, they become exposed to *Ruin* by the very *Means*, which they took to avoid it; it cannot be expected that they will be patient very long.

It deserves particular Notice that although *Henry the fourth* was willing to shew his
Cle-

Clemency, at the Beginning of his Reign, by inflicting a very slight Punishment on the *wicked and bated Ministers* of the late King; yet it being alledged in their Excuse *that Richard had compell'd them to act*, the Parliament took Occasion from thence to pass an Act, by which it was declared that, for the future, Compulsion should be no legal Excuse to justify Actions, contrary to Law. The Reasonableness and Expediency of *this Act* are very manifest; for it is the indispensable Duty of a good Minister to dissuade his Master from all *illegal Measures*; or, if He cannot prevail, to quit his Service, rather than suffer Himself to be made the Instrument of Them; and if the *Commands of the Prince* were to be allow'd a sufficient Justification, the Prerogative of *doing no Wrong* would be extended to *Ministers*, and Nobody would be left accountable for *Mal-Administration*.

In the short, but triumphant, Reign of *Henry the fifth*, the *Spirit of Faction* was awed; and the *Spirit of Liberty* had no Occasion of exerting itself; at least, with Struggle and in any signal Manner, under a Prince just, moderate and pious, according to the Religion of those Times.

The Reign of his Son was the Reign of *Faction*; and it discloses an horrid Scene of *Iniquity, Folly, Madness*. The scandalous Management of *publick Affairs*, which brought infinite Loss and Dishonour to the Nation, gave

gave real Occasion, as well as Pretence, to Commotions and Insurrections. The contemptible Character of the Man, who sat on the Throne, revived the Hopes of the Faction of *York*. The Faction of *Lancaster* took the Alarm. Most of the great and active Men were attach'd to one Side, or to the other, by Obligation, by Resentment, by Hopes, or by Fears. The *national Interest* was sunk, to the Shame of the Nation, in the particular Interest of *two Families*.

In the *civil Wars*, which happen'd a Century and an half, or two Centuries before this Time, the Point in Dispute was *how* the People should be govern'd. In *These* we are speaking of, the Point in Dispute was *who* should govern. The *first* was worth contending for and deserved all the Blood, which was shed in the Quarrel. But This cannot be said of the *last*, which ought always to be look'd upon with great Indifference; except in Cases, where it has so immediate and necessary a Relation to the *first*, that securing the *first* depends, in a great Measure, on settling the *last*. Such Cases have happen'd; and particular Instances may be easily found; but the contrary Cases, where Men have fought for *Governors*, without regard to *Government*, are easy to be found likewise; and That was plainly the Case of the two Factions of *York* and *Lancaster*.

The *Parliaments*, in those Days, seem'd to be in another Temper; very little concern'd

wha

who was King, and very much to preserve the *Constitution*. In the many *Revolutions*, which happen'd, each Side would have the *Parliament* for them. Whatever *Titles* They set up, They were glad to hold the Crown by the Grant, or by the Confirmation of *Parliament*. The *Parliament* wisely comply'd, whoever prevail'd. The Chance of War determin'd who should be King; at one Time *Henry the sixth*, at another *Edward the fourth*, and the *Parliament* accordingly plac'd Them on the Throne, and settled their Government.

There is another Observation, which ought to be made, before we leave this Period of Time. The Reigns of *Richard the second*, and *Henry the fourth*, had shewn the dangerous Consequences of that *Influence*, which the Crown had obtain'd in the *Elections of Members of Parliament*. The watchful *Spirit of Liberty* was soon alarm'd, and prevail'd to make such Regulations about *Elections*, and about the Qualifications of the *Electors* and the *Elected*, as seem'd at that Time, sufficient to prevent this Influence for the future. These *Regulations* appear in several Laws, made during the Reigns of the *three Lancastrian Princes*; and our *Elections* proceed, in a great Measure, upon them to this very Day. These *Regulations* have required and must, in the Nature of Things, require to be alter'd, as the Course of *Accidents*, or the Change of *national Circumstances* shall suggest Reasons for

for so doing. But then such *Alterations* have been, and ought always to be contrived so as to adapt them better, and to enforce them more strongly; because the *Principle*, on which they are founded, can never vary, and is so essential to the Preservation of *Liberty*, that if it be lost, and if a Practice in Opposition to it should ever prevail, the *Ballance* of our Government would be that Moment lost, and the *British Constitution* left at the Mercy of any *ambitious Prince*, or *wicked Minister*.

For this Reason, Mr. *Rapin* observes very justly *that there are but two Ways of depriving the English of their Liberties; either by laying aside Parliaments, or bribing Them; and, in another Place, He says that the English Freedom will be at an End, whenever the Court invades the free Election of Parliaments.*

It is necessary to insist upon this Observation a little; because it hath been ridiculed, though dully, and great Pains have been taken to explode the Doctrine contain'd in it; which was laid down in these Words. *In a Constitution like ours, the Safety of the Whole depends on the Ballance of the Parts; and the Ballance of the Parts on their mutual Independency on each other.* These Words, it seems, even with Those of *Thuanus* to explain them, convey no Idea to the *London Journalist*; but This will be found, as I apprehend, to be *his Fault*, or *his Defect*; not *Oldcastle's*. A Man born without the Sense
of

of Hearing, or stopping his Ears, and determined at any Rate not to hear, may be deaf to the Voice of *Stentor* himself.

I shall not enter into any Altercations with the *London Journalist*, nor go out of the Road to have the Honour of such Company. But when I meet Him in my Way, I shall encounter Him frankly ; without the least Fear of being crush'd by the Weight of his *Arguments* ; or, which is more, by the Power of his *Patron*.

To say, like *this Author*, that the carrying on of *Business*, and maintaining Government by Powers absolutely distinct, and absolutely independent, is a meer Utopian Scheme, must proceed from Ignorance, or Folly. Have not Powers, absolutely distinct and independent, been join'd by federal Unions ? Are no such Examples to be found, even at this Day ? Has not This been brought about by the very Reason given to prove that it can never happen ; because Men agree when they see Reason for Agreement ; and they see Reason for Agreement, when they see their Interest in agreeing ? *Osborne* could not be in earnest, when he let such Stuff fall from his Pen. He meant to elude the *Argument*, and to perplex his Readers, or he meant nothing. But This shall not pass. The Matter is too important. He shall be talk'd to, as he desires, without a *Metaphor* ; and what has been advanced shall be apply'd to our Government.

A King of *Great Britain* is that supreme Magistrate, who has a *negative Voice* in the *Legislature*. He is entrusted with the *executive Power*; and several other Powers and Privileges, which we call *Prerogatives*, are annex'd to this Trust. The two Houses of *Parliament* have their Rights and Privileges; some of which are common to *both*; others particular to *each*. They prepare, they pass *Bills*, or they refuse to pass such as are sent to them. They address, represent, advise, remonstrate. The *supreme Judicature* resides in the *Lords*. The *Commons* are the *grand Inquest* of the Nation; and to *Them* it belongs likewise to judge of *national Expences*, and to give *Supplies* accordingly.

If the *legislative*, as well as the *executive Power*, was wholly in the King, as in some Countries, He would be *absolute*; if in the *Lords*, our Government would be an *Aristocracy*; if in the *Commons*, a *Democracy*. It is this *Division of Power*, these *distinct Privileges* attributed to the King, to the *Lords*, and to the *Commons*, which constitute a *limited Monarchy*.

Again; as they constitute a *limited Monarchy*, so the Wisdom of our Government has provided, as far as human Wisdom can provide, for the Preservation of it, by this *Division of Power*, and by these *distinct Privileges*. If any *one Part* of the *Three*, which compose our Government, should, at any Time, usurp more Power than the *Law* gives, or make an
ill

ill Use of a *legal Power*, the other *two Parts* may, by uniting their Strength, reduce this Power into its proper Bounds, or correct the Abuse of it; nay, if at any Time *two* of these Parts should concur in usurping, or abusing Power, the Weight of the *third* may, at least, retard the Mischief, and give Time and Chance for preventing it.

This is that *Ballance*, which has been so much talk'd of; and This is the Use of it. Both are plain to common Sense, and to Experience; as will appear farther in the Course of these Remarks; where we shall have Occasion to shew how often the proper Use of *this Ballance* has saved our Constitution; and to what Misfortunes we have been exposed by the Neglect, or improper Use of it.

Since this *Division of Power*, and these *distinct Privileges* constitute and maintain our Government; it follows that the *Confusion* of them tends to destroy it. This Proposition is therefore true; that, *in a Constitution like ours, the Safety of the Whole depends on the Ballance of the Parts*. Let us see whether it be true *that the Ballance of the Parts consists in their mutual Independency*.

To speak again without any *Metaphor*, the Power, which the several Parts of our Government have of *controuling* and *checking one another*, may be call'd a *Dependency on one another*, and may be argued for by Those, who want to throw Darknes round them, as the *Dependency* opposed to the *Independency*,

mention'd in the *Proposition*. But the Fallacy is gross. We have shewn that this Power of Controul in each, which results from the *Division of Power* amongst all the Parts of our Government, is necessary to the Preservation of it; and thus a Sort of *constitutional Dependency*, if I may have Leave to express myself in that Manner, is created among Them; but this *mutual Dependency* cannot be opposed to the *Independency* pleaded for. On the contrary, this *mutual Dependency* cannot subsist without such an *Independency*; for whenever this *Independency* is lost, the *mutual Dependency* is that Moment changed into a *particular, constant Dependency* of one Part on two; or, which is still more unreasonable, of two Parts on one. The *constitutional Dependency*, as I have call'd it for Distinction's Sake, consists in This; that the Proceedings of *each Part* of the Government, when They come forth into Action and affect the whole, are liable to be examined and controul'd by the *other Parts*. The *Independency* pleaded for consists in This; that the Resolutions of *each Part*, which direct these Proceedings, be taken *independently* and without any *Influence*, direct or indirect, on the *others*. Without the *first*, each Part would be at Liberty to attempt destroying the *Ballance*, by usurping, or abusing Power; but without the *last*, there can be no *Ballance* at all. I will illustrate This, by supposing a Prince, who claims and exercises a Right of *levying Money without*

out Consent of Parliament. He could not be opposed effectually, if the *two Houses of Parliament* had not a Right to oppose Him ; to call his *Ministers* to Account ; and to make Him feel that, far from being *absolute*, He was under this *constitutional Dependency* ; but He would not be opposed at all, if the *two Houses of Parliament* were under his *Influence*, and incapable of directing their Proceedings *independently* of Him. One would be ashamed to insist thus much on a Point so very clear, if *some Men* were not so harden'd to all Sense of Shame as to maintain the contrary ; and that there are Men capable of doing This, is one of those melancholy Symptoms, which characterize the *present Age*. I could almost appeal to the cool Thoughts, and the private Reflections of some of *these Writers*, whether any Thing can be more scandalous than the Task they have undertaken. To skreen their *Patrons*, They endeavour to distinguish us out of our greatest *national Advantages* ; as was observed in the Case of *Dunkirk*. To reconcile the Minds of Men to *such Measures*, as their *Patrons* may want, and as no *honest Man* will take, They endeavour to demolish the very *Corner-stones*, on which the whole Fabrick of *Liberty* rests. Their Iniquity, it must be confess'd, is very systematical. When They write for *Corruption*, They write for the *Means*. When They write for the *Dependency of the Parliament on the Court*, They write for the

End. Well might *Oldcastle* say of *these Writers*, their *Patrons* and *Abettors*, that the Mask was pull'd off on one Side. Let me conjure them, in the Name of Modesty, to call Themselves *Whigs* no longer. It is Time They should lay that Appellation aside ; since it will not be hard to prove, from the general Tenor of their Writings, that the Maxims They advance, the Doctrines They inculcate, and the Conduct They recommend, lead to the Destruction of *civil Liberty*, as much as the political Lessons of *Sibthorpe*, *Maniwarling*, or Archbishop *Laud* Himself. They and their Followers declared Themselves directly against *Liberty*. To plead for it was almost *Blasphemy* ; and to assert it little less than the Sin against the *holy Ghost*, according to the Doctrines taught by *those Divines*. Such Absurdities made few Converts in *those Days* ; and the Preachers of them would meet with the utmost Contempt in *These*. But the *Writers*, of whom We now complain, affect to maintain the Cause of *Liberty*, whilst They betray it. They assert the Principles of *Liberty in general*, and sometimes reason upon Them well enough ; but when They apply them to *particular Cases*, They prevaricate, evade, and exert all their poor Endeavours to turn the Cannon of *Liberty* against Herself. The *others* had *Fænum in Cornu*. They put Mankind on their Guard against them, and were the true Promoters of all the Mischief and Confusion, which

which follow'd, when the Nation run into the utmost Extreame, in Opposition to them. *These Men* insinuate themselves as Friends to *Liberty*. They are look'd upon as such by some few Persons, who mean well to *Liberty*, even at this Time ; and yet They are almost wholly employ'd in promoting That, which is destructive of *Liberty* and inconsistent with it ; *Corruption* and *Dependency*. *Laud* and the others endeavour'd openly to lop the Branches and cut down the Tree ; but *these Men* are privately poisoning the Root of *Liberty*. The Power of the *Court* and the Authority of the *Lawyers* could not make the levying *Ship Money* pass for *Law*, nor prevail on the Nation to bear it. But if it were possible to suppose an *House of Commons* as dependent as *these Lawyers*, (and They would be as dependent, if the Doctrines, which We oppose, prevail'd amongst them) the Nation might then be loaded with *Taxes*, oppress'd with *Debts*, and reduced to the greatest Misery by *Law*. Our *Liberties*, as well as our *Estates*, might be taken from us. We might be *legally undone*. These are possible Consequences of *such Doctrines*. If they are not probable, We owe no Thanks to the *weekly Preachers* of them. The Nature of our *present Settlement*, which is built on the Foundation of *Liberty*, the Interest and Honour of the *Prince* now on the Throne, as well as of all his illustrious Posterity, are our Security against these Dangers ; but still I say,

We owe no Thanks to the *Writers* on the Side of the *Ministry*.

I have dwelt pretty much upon this Point, to shew what is the real Design of *these Remarks*; and I will venture to add that *those Persons*, who oppose *such Doctrines* as We have been opposing, will appear at last to be the truest Friends to his Majesty King GEORGE and the *Protestant Succession*; which can subsist only upon *those Principles*, upon which it was originally establish'd.



LETTER VIII.

IF the Reign of *Henry the sixth* was a Reign of *Faction*, Those of the House of *York* were so likewise. — The Popularity, Bravery, Cruelty, Rashness, Uxoriousness, Incontinence of *Edward the fourth*; in short, his good and his bad Qualities work'd the different Effects of supporting, exasperating and increasing *Factions*. The Characters of *Henry the sixth's Queen* and of the Earl of *Warwick*, to mention no more of the principal Actors on that bloody Stage, conspired to maintain and aggravate this national Calamity.

In these long, continued Struggles, the whole Nation became involved, and the *Factions* of *York* and *Lancaster* growing every Day more animated and better disciplined, We are not to wonder that They fought
usque

usque ad Internecionem; at least, till the Field of Battle, the Scaffold, and some Theatres of clandestine Murthers had left no Man, on one Side, alive, who was in a Condition to oppose, or give Jealousy to the other. But That, which may very justly raise our Wonder, is that *Edward the fourth*, having secured to Himself and his Family the Possession of the Throne, by the Murther of *Henry the sixth*, and his Son, and by the total Defeat of the whole *Lancastrian Party*, should suffer *two new Factions* to be nursed up, which divided his *own Party*, occasion'd the Murther of his Sons and, by establishing the short-lived Tyranny of his *Brother*, brought the Earl of *Richmond* to the Throne, and sunk for ever the House of *York* in That of *Lancaster*.

Edward the fourth's Queen was the original Cause of all this Mischief, and a principal Sufferer herself in the Course of it. She was resolved to govern at any Rate; and *Rapin* observes that, as her being Queen gave Her no Manner of Title to meddle with the Affairs of the Publick, she knew how to manage that Matter another Way; namely, by the Influence she had over the King. Though Edward often proved false to Her, she bore it very patiently, and never shew'd her Uneasiness at it. Edward, charm'd to find Himself at Liberty to pursue his Inclinations, without Danger of continual Reproaches, repay'd her Moderation with the most obliging and condescending Behaviour;

behaviour ; of which she knew how to make a good Use. She maintain'd this Ascendant over her *Husband* to the last, and for a little Complaisance, which cost Her nothing in present, she purchased a Degree of Power in the State, which cost her dear in Consequence, by alienating the Affections of the People from her *Husband*, during his Life, and ruining his Family afterwards, as I have hinted before.

Her Aim was, according to Rapin, to secure her Power during the King's Life and, in Case she survived Him, to make sure of the Government of the Kingdom, in the Name of the Prince her Son, when He should come to be on the Throne ; but by a Fatality, not unusual to the best-laid Projects, this very Thing proved the Occasion of her own and her Family's Ruin.

I cannot think, as *Rapin* seems to do, that her Project deserved to be rank'd amongst Those, which are the *best-laid*. It appears to be the narrow Project of a *Woman*, who had Cunning, Insinuation, and the Spirit of Intrigue, with much Pride and Ambition ; but wanted that extensive Knowledge and that superior Genius, (such as *Catherine of Medicis* and our Queen *Elizabeth* possess'd) which is necessary to conduct so great a Design as her Passion prompted Her to undertake ; for what was her *Project* ? Was it to acquire an Interest in the *Nation*, by deserving well of it ?—Nothing less. It was singly This ; to form a *Faction at Court*, by raising her Relations
and

and immediate Dependents, which should be wholly *her own*, and into whose Hands she might throw all the Power and Profit, which the King had to bestow. She had the good Luck to compass this Design, and triumph'd, no doubt very wisely, in her great Success. Surrounded by her Creatures, she look'd no farther than that Circle, and either took no Notice of the Temper of the *Nation*, or judg'd of it by the Temper of the *Court*. But the Rise of *this Faction* immediately form'd another and establish'd the Distinction of *antient* and *new Nobility*. The *former* had the true natural Strength, which great Estates in *Land* and establish'd *Credit* in the Nation gave Them. The *latter* had no Strength of their own; none but that adventitious Strength, which arose from *Employments* and *Favour at Court*. They brought nothing to Court, which could make the Court amends for the *Envy* and *Discontent*, which their Elevation created. To supply This, two Things were done; which serv'd, perhaps, to fortify the *Queen* in her Delusion, and thereby made the Ruin of her ambitious Projects the surer. All Those, who were not in the good Graces of *her Faction*, were disgraced at Court, and in Effect banish'd from it. Nay they were persecuted by the Power of it; as the Duke of *Clarence*, the King's own Brother, was even to Death. The Names of the Parties of *York* and *Lancaster* might subsist and be made Use of, on proper Occasions; but in reality, the being
for

for or against the Party of the *Queen* was the sole Distinction, which prevail'd; and even the Friends of the House of *York*, whom the *Queen* did not affect, were debarr'd from having the *King's* Ear; excepting only *Three* of his old and most faithful Servants, who maintain'd Themselves against *Her* and her *Faction*. I mean *Stafford*, Duke of *Buckingham*, *Hastings* and *Stanley*.

Another Method, which *this Queen* took to strengthen herself and her *Faction*, was by raking up Money by illegal and oppressive Means; particularly by setting Prosecutions on Foot against the rich Men of the Kingdom, several of whom were arraign'd of *high Treason*, and encouraging the Judges to get them found guilty at any Rate. *Habington* observes (in his History of *this King*) that as their Wealth was the principal Evidence against them, though their Persons were acquitted, their Estates were found guilty.

The *same Historian* observes farther, that
' the Memory of these Carriages hithertofores,
' in a Business that concern'd the Life of a
' Man, reputed innocent, drew the World in-
' to much Fear that he would now decline to
' Rigour. Neither was the *King* totally ex-
' cused although this cruel Avarice was laid to
' the *Queen*, who having a numerous Issue and
' Kindred, by Favour raised up to the highest
' Titles, was almost necessitated, for Suppor-
' tance of their Honours, to rack the King-
' dom.

Edward

Edward seem'd sensible, before his Death, of the mischievous Consequences, which this Conduct and the clashing of *two Factions* might produce. He endeavour'd to prevent them by *reconciling the two Parties*; a poor Expedient! (as *Rapin* justly observes) which could not easily produce the Effect he expected.

The Duke of Gloucester, who conceal'd his Design till his Brother's Death, took Advantage of *these Factions*. He made his Court publickly to the Queen, and held a private Correspondence with the opposite Party. Nay, he found Means, by fomenting it, to raise a Third for himself.

I have dwelt the longer, in this Place, on the strange Turns and cruel Effects of *Faction*; because, I believe, no Example can be produced out of any History, which sets them in a stronger Light; and because this Period of Time affording but small Matter to recommend the *Spirit of Liberty*, which had little to do in the Transactions of it, I imagine that pointing out the fatal Consequences of the contrary *Spirit*, which then prevail'd, may answer the same End; as exposing of *Vice* is frequently the strongest Recommendation of *Virtue*.

But we must not imagine, notwithstanding all the contrary Appearances in this Period, that the *Spirit of Liberty* was absolutely extinguish'd. Though *that Flame* was lost, for the most Part, in the constant Glare of *Faction*, yet it was still alive; and by living,
pre-

preserved the Constitution of our Government, during the whole Course of these *civil Wars*.

If we look closely into these Scenes of Confusion, we may discover many particular Instances of the Operations of *this Spirit*. Such were the Difficulties and Delays opposed to the Grant of *Tonnage* and *Poundage*, for nine Years together; and the many Restrictions added to *this Grant*, when it was at last obtain'd by *Edward* the IVth. Other Instances to the same Purpose might be quoted; but we chuse to insist on a more *general Observation*, already mention'd by us, which runs thro' the whole Period, and is so strongly vouch'd by History as to admit of no Cavil.

The *Observation* we are going to make contains a memorable Exception to this Proposition, which is but too generally true, *that the Spirit of Liberty and the Spirit of Faction are incompatible and cannot long subsist together*. The Virtue of our Ancestors made this Exception; and if it hath been remember'd to their Shame that they sunk the *national Interest* in the particular Interest of *two Families*; it ought to be remember'd to their Honour that they did so in this single Point only, *Who should reign*, and in no other. We took Notice, in a former Paper, that upon every Revolution, each Side engaged the *Parliament* for them, and that whoever prevail'd, the *Parliament* wisely comply'd. This Conduct, which lasted from *Richard* the II. down to *Richard* the III. preserved our *Liberties*;

berties; but it could not have been pursued, nor could our *Liberties* by Consequence have been preserved, if the *Spirit of Liberty* had not been latent in the Hearts of those very Men, who seem'd to breathe nothing but *Faction*. How could it have happen'd that the sole Title of *Conquest* was never establish'd in so many Revolutions brought about by the *Sword*, if the Actors in them had not been strongly affected with a Love and Reverence for the free Constitution of our Government? The Princes of *York* and *Lancaster* themselves were willing, nay desirous to have a *Parliamentary Confirmation* of their Titles, real or pretended. But how came they to be so desirous of it? How came they to think it necessary? The Case is plain. The Temper of their *Parties* and of their *Armies* begot this Necessity. The *Spirit of Liberty* prevail'd enough in the whole Body of the Nation, out of which these *Parties* and *Armies* were composed, to preserve the Principles of *publick Freedom*, though not enough to preserve the *publick Peace*. — *Each Side* contended to have a *King* of their own *Party*; but *neither Side* would have a *Tyrant*. — They sacrificed their Lives to *Faction*; but would not give up their *Liberties*. — The victorious *Armies* led their *Kings* to the Foot of the Throne; but carry'd them no farther.

The Author of the *short History of standing Armies* observes that, in all the Wars of *York* and *Lancaster*, whatever *Party* prevail'd, we
do

do not find They ever attempted to keep up a standing Army. Such was the Virtue of those Times, says He, that they would rather run the Hazard of forfeiting their Heads and Estates to the Rage of the opposite Party, than certainly enslave their Country, though They themselves were to be the Tyrants. — This Remark is just, as far as it goes; and it goes as far as *that Author* wanted to carry it; but it is not so full, nor carry'd so far as History will warrant. That the Princes, who obtain'd the Crown by their *Armies*, did not attempt to govern by their *Armies* afterwards, is most true, and may reflect some Honour on *those Princes*, and on the Heads of their *Parties*. But there is something more than This remarkable in the Conduct of those Times; for even in the Heat of Victory, in the Raptures of a successful Revolution, and before the *Armies* could be disbanded, We see these Princes obliged to ascend the Steps of the Throne in such Manner, and under such Conditions, as the *Parliament* thought fit to prescribe, and as were not always agreeable to Them. This, I am sure, reflects great Honour on the *Parliaments*, who were Actors in the last Scenes of all these Revolutions; and on the *Armies*, who contented Themselves to become Spectators in such Conjunctions. — We will take the *first Example*, which presents itself in these Wars.

The Duke of *Lancaster* was at the Head of an Army of 60,000 Men, when He came
to

to the Crown. The *Proclamation*, which He publish'd the very Day he was crown'd, shew'd how very unwilling He was to seem to hold his Crown purely by Right of *Election*. He would gladly have set up That of *Conquest*; or a Title derived from *Richard the second's Resignation*; or a Title by *Blood*; or any Title, but the *true One*. Notwithstanding This, He was obliged, when nothing could have obliged Him but the Sense of his *own Party* and *Army*, to submit to as formal an *Election* as ever was made. The *two Houses* took Notice of the blind Claim of *Right*, which He enter'd. They *chose* Him to be King, upon the Question put to Them, after having given their Negative to the Duke of *York*; to his *Sons*; and to *others*, who were severally proposed in the same Manner to Them. They seem industriously to have contrived and pursued, on this Occasion, a Method of proceeding as opposite as possible to the Views and Inclination of *this Prince*, whose *Army* attended Him, and whose *Rival* was his Prisoner.

Again; to take another Example from the latter *End* of these Wars. The Battle of *Northampton* being won and *Henry the sixth* taken, the Duke of *York* hastens out of *Ireland* to put Himself at the Head of his *Party* and his *Army*. The *Parliament* meets. The Duke asserts his undoubted Right by *Descent* to the Crown, which he demands as due to Him, without any Interposition of *Parliament*.

ment. He shews the utmost, and even an indecent Impatience to take Possession of it. He is supported by his *own Party*. He is opposed by *others*. But the Matter is by all submitted to the Debate and Decision of *Parliament*. The *Debate* itself must have been grievous enough to a Prince so fond of a Crown, and so much warm'd with the Notion of his *hereditary Right*. But the *Decision* of this Affair must have wounded Him to the Quick. So little Regard was paid to his *Right*, that He was forced to content Himself with leaving the Crown on the Head of *Henry the sixth* during that Prince's Life, and not to have the Prospect of succeeding to it, till after that Prince's Decease; which, by the Way, was a Point of the less Value to Him, because He was older than *Henry the sixth*, and could not hope to be the better for it, according to the Course of Nature. He submitted to all these Mortifications; and a very *judicious Historian* attributes his Submission to his *Moderation*; but I believe Those, who fully consider his *former Conduct*, and his passionate Behaviour, at *this Time*, will hardly subscribe to such a Judgment. His Submission, like That of *Henry the fourth*, in the Case before-cited, was a Submission, which the Temper of his *Party* render'd necessary. They would not force the Resolutions of the *two Houses*; and why the *two Houses* would go no farther in his Favour, at that Juncture, might easily be accounted

counted for, if This were a proper Place for that Disquisition.— After the Battle of *Wakefield*, where the Duke of *York* was kill'd, and That of *St. Alban's*, where the Earl of *Warwick* was beaten, the Faction of *York* were determined, by the Dangers They had run, and by the Losses They had sustain'd, to balance no longer, but to set the Crown on the Head of the Earl of *March*; and yet They proceeded no otherwise than under the Authority of *Parliament*, which had ratified the *Agreement* made between the late Duke of *York* and *Henry the sixth*. By one Article of this Agreement it was stipulated that if King *Henry* broke it in any Point, the Crown and royal Dignity should immediately devolve on the Duke of *York*, if alive; or, in Failure of Him, on his next Heir. The Earl of *Warwick* therefore, in a Kind of *military Assembly*, (for a Part of the *Army*, at least, was there) proceeded to the Election of *Edward the fourth*; but He proceeded on this Foundation. The great Efforts made to break *this Agreement* and to defeat the Effect of it, by King *Henry's Queen*, and the *Lancastrian Party*, were interpreted, and not without Colour, as so many Infractions of it. By Consequence, *Edward the fourth* had an immediate Right to the Crown, by Virtue of the *Act of Parliament*, made in Confirmation of *this Convention*, which *Act* and *Convention* were produced by *Warwick*, who caused them to be publickly read. The Pro-

ceeding of *this Assembly*, which hath a tumultuous Air in History, was therefore in reality a *Proclamation* of a King, made by Authority of *Parliament*, and not of an *Election* of a King, without that *Authority*.

Let us conclude that if the *Spirit of Faction* hath, on some Occasions, prevail'd over the *Spirit of Liberty* so far as to defeat and even pervert the Designs of the *latter*; the *Spirit of Liberty* hath likewise revived, in its Turn, on other Occasions, and prevented the Consummation of that Misery, which *Faction* would naturally and of course have produced. Let us conclude that all *standing Armies*, for whatsoever Purpose instituted, or in whatsoever Habit cloath'd, may be easily made the Instruments of *Faction*; because a Body of Men separated, in many Respects, from the Rest of the Nation, constrain'd to *different Customs*, and in some Measure subjected to *different Laws*, may be easily persuaded that they have a *different Interest*. Let us conclude that these *Casuists in red* are the most dangerous in this Respect, that having *Swords* by their Sides, They are able at once to cut those *gordian Knots*, which *others* must untie by Degrees. But let us conclude, at the same Time, that if a *Spirit of Liberty* be kept up in a free Nation, it will be kept up in the *Army* of that Nation; and that when it is thus kept up, though the *Spirit of Faction* may do great Hurt, it cannot compleat the publick Ruin. We see the
Truth

Truth of this Observation exemplify'd near *three Centuries* ago ; and let us remember with Gratitude that the same Truth was again confirm'd to us no longer ago than *two and forty Years*.



L E T T E R IX.

ONE of the Historians of *Britanny*, if I remember right, and I think it is *Argentre*, says the People of that Dutchy grew so much tired with the Disputes between *Charles of Blois* and the *Monforts*, that the two Parties agreed, just before a Battle, to make an End of the Quarrel at once, by taking off that Prince, against whom the Fortune of the Day should declare itself. — Our Ancestors were very far from following this Example ; but They seized the Opportunity, which was presented to Them, after *Richard the third* had usurp'd the Throne, and murder'd his Nephews, of abolishing *Tyranny* and extinguishing *Faction*.

The Princes of *York* and *Lancaster* butcher'd one another in such a Manner, that the Right of the former center'd in *Elizabeth*, eldest Daughter of *Edward the fourth*, and the Pretensions of the latter were allow'd, by the whole *Lancastrian Party*, to belong

to the Earl of *Richmond*.— This was the State of the *Families*.

The Faction of *York* detested *Richard* for his Usurpation and Cruelties. — The Faction of *Lancaster* hated Him for his Name ; and neither the great Qualities, which he really had, nor the good Qualities which He affected, could reconcile Mankind to his Barbarity. — This was the Temper of the *Nation*.

The Opportunity, thus form'd, was improved by the universal Concurrence, which a *Spirit of Liberty* and a Regard to the *publick Good*, independent of *Party*, inspired. The Faction of *York* became willing to receive a King of the House of *Lancaster* ; and the Party of *Lancaster* a Queen of the House of *York*. All Parties labour'd to unite the *two Roses* ; and *Faction* itself was bent, in this fortunate Conjunction, to extirpate *Faction*.

The Deposition of *Richard*, and the Advancement of the Earl of *Richmond* to the Throne, upon this express Condition that He should marry the Princess *Elizabeth*, were pursued with Success, even when *Richard* thought Himself most secure ; when the *Parliament* had been obliged to confirm his Usurpation ; to declare the Children of *Edward* Bastards ; and to attain the Earl of *Richmond*.

What a Scene of national Peace and Prosperity was open'd by this Revolution and
new

new Settlement! But how soon was it shifted? How soon were the wise and honest Views of the *many* defeated by the Cunning and Iniquity of the *few*? — *Henry the seventh*, a *Creature of the People*, (if ever any Prince was such) had been raised to the Throne, in order to cut up the Roots of *Faction*; to restore publick Tranquility; and to establish a *legal Government* on the Ruins of *Tyranny*. — He did the very Reverse of all This. His Reign and That of his Son have been two of the severest, under which our Country hath groan'd since the *Conquest*; and yet, in these very Reigns, the Foundations of *Liberty* were laid much broader and stronger than ever. — How This came about, it must be useful, and perhaps it may be entertaining, to consider.

Henry the seventh, who would have been glad, a little before, to have assured Himself of the Crown on any Terms, grew difficult as soon as he had obtain'd it. He durst not avow a Title by *Conquest*; but he evaded the Appearances of a *parliamentary Title* very industriously, and made the Ceremony of his *Coronation* precede the Meeting of his *Parliament*. He evaded, in the same Manner, the Appearances of any Communication of Right from the Princess *Elizabeth*, by deferring his Marriage till an *Act* had pass'd to settle the Crown on *Him* and *his Posterity*, without any Mention of the House of *York*. In short, his whole Skill, Credit and Power

were employ'd to get the Act of Settlement so generally and so ambiguously penn'd, as to leave Him Room to assert afterwards a Right inherent in *Himself*, and independent of the Authority of *Parliament*. Nay, He went farther; for, in the *Bull* of Confirmation, which he obtain'd from the *Pope*, and in which He affected to have all Sorts of Titles enumerated, He took particular Care to have That of *Conquest* inserted.

Such a Conduct gave sufficient Reason for Alarm; but We do not find that it was taken. The *Tyrant* was dead; and the *new Establishment* was made. The Nation was overjoy'd; and the Work of *Liberty* was done by Halves. The *new King* found a Compliance with all his Measures, as *new Kings* generally do. But little Reflection was made, perhaps, at that Time, on these Proceedings of the *Court*; or if a just Reflection was made, We may easily believe that it was soon stifled by that Adulation, which represents the most necessary Precautions, the most just Complaints, and the Assertion of the clearest Rights as Proofs of *Disaffection*.

The whole Course of *Henry the seventh's* Reign was answerable to these Beginnings; and he seems to have establish'd himself in the Power of pursuing Principles of Government, evidently repugnant to Those, upon which he had been raised to the Throne, before the Nation was well aware of what he intended. He planted *Faction* anew, and
was

was the true Cause of all the Disturbances, which follow'd from it, and which began even in the first Year of his Reign. Many of the *York* Party had signalized themselves in his Cause. All of them submitted to his Government; and that small Branch of this Party, which had supported *Richard the third*, was too inconsiderable to hurt him; but he soon made it considerable, by driving almost the whole *York* Party into that Interest. *He had conceived, says Rapin, so mortal an Hatred for the whole House of York, that he let slip no Opportunity to humble the Yorkists; behaving always towards them not as a just King, but like the Head of a Party.*

That some of his *Ministers*, of the *Lancastrian* Party, might find their private Account in such a Measure, and sacrifice to it both the Interest of their *Master* and their *Country*, is obvious enough; but how the *King*, who was certainly an able Man, could prefer *dividing*, instead of *uniting* his People in Affection and Obedience, would appear very marvellous, if Experience had not taught us that Men of the greatest Genius fall sometimes into the same Errors, as Men of the least Genius would be apt to commit in the same Circumstances. — How This happens we are not, in this Place, to enquire.

Henry the seventh proceeded as he had been suffer'd to set out, and establish'd by Degrees, and Those not slow, a Power almost absolute. His Jealousy, his Pride, and his insatiable,
 sordid

sordid Avarice had their full Swing. He became hated even by his *own Party*, and might very probably have lost his Crown, if many *Circumstances*, both at home and abroad, had not conspired in his Favour, and if he had not improved them all with the utmost Ability of Council and Dexterity of Management. The Chief of these *Circumstances*, and it well deserves to be remark'd, was This, — *They*, who ventured their Estates and Lives in several Insurrections against Him, and *They*, who privately fomented these Insurrections, instead of uniting on a *national Principle*, and bending their Endeavours to a *Reformation of Government*, united on a *Principle of Faction*; for the King's Behaviour had revived *this Spirit*, as we observed above; but still *this Spirit*, though revived, had not attain'd its former Strength. The Nation in general was tired of *Faction*; dreaded a Relapse into the Consequences of it; and would not engage for a *Simmel*, a *Warbeck*, or even a real Prince of the *House of York*. A national Coolness, on one Side, and Vigilance and Vigour, on the King's Part, defeated all these Enterprizes, as fast as they were form'd. Every one of these Defeats gave *Henry* additional Strength and Increase of Reputation, which is Strength in its Effects. Thus it happen'd in this Case; and thus it hath happen'd in many others. By making an *ill Use of his Power*, the King was the real Author of all the Disorders in the State, and of all the Attempts

tempts against his Government; and yet, the better to prevent such Disorders and to resist such Attempts, *farther Powers* were intrusted to Him. Because he had *govern'd ill*, it was put in his Power to *govern worse*; and *Liberty* was undermined, for fear it should be overthrown. It hath fared sometimes with *Monarchy* as with the Church of *Rome*. Both have acquired *greater Wealth and Power* by the *Abuse* of what they had, and Mankind have been egregiously the *Bubbles* of both.

We must not however conclude that this King made *Force* the sole, though He made it the principal Expedient of his Government. He was wise enough to consider that his *Court* was not the *Nation*; and that however He might command with a Nod in *one*, He must captivate, at least in some Degree, the good Will of Mankind, to make Himself secure of being long obey'd in the *other*; nay more, that He must make his People some Amends for the *Oppressions*, which his Avarice particularly expos'd them to suffer. For these Reasons, as He strain'd his *Prerogative*, on some Occasions, very high; so He let it down again, upon others, and affected to shew to his *Parliaments* much Condescension, notwithstanding his Pride, as well as much Communication of Counsels, notwithstanding his Reserve.

To attribute to this *Solomon* of *Great Britain* the sole Merit of the *Laws*, made in his Time, as some have done, seems unreasonable;

able ; but it was certainly great Merit in Him, and We may add rare Merit, instead of opposing, or refusing, constantly to remunerate his People, by promoting and passing of good *Laws, which evermore were his Retribution for Treasure.* These are my Lord Bacon's Words, and better than His cannot be found to express the general Character of the *Laws*, which the Wisdom of those Times produced. They were *deep and not vulgar ; not made upon the Spur of a particular Occasion for the present ; but out of Providence of the future, to make the Estate of the People still more and more happy, after the Manner of the Legislators in antient and heroical Times.* — Husbandry, Manufactures, general Commerce, and Increase of useful People were carefully attended to and considerably advanced ; so that whilst the Weight of *Taxes* and the Vexations of *Empson, Dudley*, and their *subordinate Harpies* were severely felt, every Man felt likewise the particular Benefit, which He received in the general Advantages procured to the Nation. These Drops of *Manna*, which fell from the Throne, soften'd the Murmurs of the People. They could not make the King *beloved* ; but They made Him *less hated* ; and the middle and lower Ranks of Men, who felt less the *Rigour of his Government*, felt more immediately the Effects of his *Care* and his *Wisdom*.

We will not refine so much as to say that the *Commons* were patient under the Pressures of

of this Reign, because They foresaw the Consequences of *those Measures*, which the King took to lessen the Power of his *Nobility*. He did not, perhaps, Himself discern these Consequences in their full Extent; but surely if this Part of his Conduct was *politick*, it was no less *popular* at that Time; since the same exorbitant Power of the *Peers*, which had been so formidable to the *Crown*, had not been less oppressive to the *Commons*. The Weight of *personal Service* had been terribly felt, during the Wars of *York* and *Lancaster*; and the Obligation of *that Tenure* had, no Doubt, contributed to prolong them. The *Tenant* therefore, who found *this Service* commuted into a *Rent*, could not but think his Condition mended, and be extremely pleased with *this Alteration*, though He did not see the Consequences of the *other*; which, by opening a Way to the *Lords* to alienate their Lands, open'd a Way to the *Commons* to increase their *Property* and consequently their *Power* in the State; as may be very easily observed in the succeeding Reigns.



L E T T E R X.

HENRY *the eighth* came to the Crown with very great Advantages. Whatever Objections had been made to his *Father's*
Title

Title, there remain'd no Pretence of objecting to *his*; and if any Pretence had remain'd, the Disposition to make Use of it would not have been found. The Nation was grown weary of *Faction*; fond of *Tranquility*; and every Day more and more attentive to the Arts of *Peace*.——The *Prerogative* had been extended wide and carry'd high; and the Means employ'd, to acquire and maintain this Authority, had been establish'd by a Reign of twenty-four Years.——The *Treasures*, which *Henry the seventh* had accumulated and left to his Son, were immense; and in leaving Him these *Treasures*, He left him That, which was more valuable than all of them. He left Him an Opportunity of gaining the *Affections* of his People, on his Accession to the Throne, by putting a Stop to that *publick Rapine*, which had been so long exercised; and by disgracing and punishing Those, who had been the *principal Instruments* of it. *Henry the eighth* seized the Opportunity and improved it. He confirm'd, in the first Moments of his Reign, that *Pardon*, which his Father had granted in the last of his Life, and when He could hope for no farther Profit by *not pardoning*. He invited, by Proclamation, such as had been wrong'd to complain and promised them Satisfaction.

If *Henry the eighth* had been avaricious, or weak enough to prefer *Wealth* to *Popularity*, He would have observed another Conduct. He would have thought *those Men*
fittest

fittest to serve Him, who had signalized
 Themselves most in fleecing the People; and
 without any Regard to their Ability in playing
 the *Game of Statesmen*, He would have cho-
 sen them purely for their Skill in *packing the*
Cards. *Empson* and *Dudley* would have con-
 tinued in Power, and have risen in Favour.
 But He was too wise, or too honestly coun-
 sell'd in these Beginnings of his Government,
 to pursue *such Measures*, or to employ *such*
Ministers. He kept some in his Council,
 who were of approved Abilities; but far from
 loading his own Administration with the
 principal Guilt of the *former*; far from grie-
 ving and provoking his People, by counte-
 nancing the *most hated*, and the *most justly*
bated, Men of the whole Kingdom, He threw
 those *Criminals* out of the Sanctuary of the
 Court, and exposed them to that *national*
Vengeance, under the Weight of which They
 perish'd. — The *Manner*, in which their
 Lives were taken away, seems liable to great
 Objection, and I would not be thought to ap-
 prove it; for a *Spirit of Liberty* can never
 approve *such Proceedings* even against the
worst and the *most guilty* of Men, as may be
 apply'd to destroy the *best* and the *most inno-*
cent. All I mean to commend is the Wisdom
 of *Henry the eighth*, in abandoning *these Mi-*
nisters; in gaining the *Affections* of his Sub-
 jects; and in making such Impressions of
 Gratitude on their Minds, as lasted long and
 were

were of Service to Him, even when He oppress'd the People in his Turn.

Vanity and *Presumption* were reigning Qualities in the Character of *this Prince*. The *first* betray'd Him into continual Errors. The *last* made Him persist in them. *Pride* is observed to defeat its own End, by bringing the Man, who seeks Esteem and Reverence, into Contempt. *Vanity*, *Self-Sufficiency*, *Presumption* (the Off-spring of *Pride*) have much the same Effect; since no one is so liable to be *deceived* and *govern'd* as He, who imagines that He is capable of *neither*.

The Characters of the Princes and Popes, of this Age, render'd the Scene of *foreign Affairs* very important. *Henry the eighth* was happy enough to have no Interest of *his own abroad* worth engaging Him in the Broils of the Continent. He was free from Guaranties of *foreign Dominions*, and from all Engagements to *foreign Princes*, which could in the least encumber Him. In this State He might have kept Himself with equal Dignity and Advantage. He might have increased his Strength, whilst other Princes wasted theirs. He might have been apply'd to as the Mediator, or Arbitrator of the christian World; and have found his Account in all the Wars and Negotiations, without being a Party in them.—He did the very contrary. A *Rose*, bless'd by the Pope; an *Emperor* serving in his Army, and taking his Pay; a whimsical Project of *Conquests*, never design'd to be made,

made, and impossible to be kept, if They had been made, were sufficient to draw Him into the most extravagant Engagements; in which He always play'd *Gold* against *Counters* with Allies, who generally play'd *Counters* against *Gold*. His Engagements, of this Kind, became numberless, frequently inconsistent, and so very rash and unadvised, that whilst his Aim, or his Pretence, was to keep a *Ballance* between the great Powers of *Europe*, He more than once assisted the *strongest* to oppress the *weakest*.— The Spring of all this strange Conduct lay in the private Interests and Passions of *Wolsey*, who became his *first Minister* very early, and was his *Favourite* earlier. If *Henry the eighth* negotiated perpetually, and was perpetually the Bubble of *Those*, with whom and for whom He negotiated, This happen'd chiefly because He was, in the first Place, the Bubble of his *Minister*. — *Wolsey's* Avarice was fed and his Ambition flatter'd by the *Emperor*; by the Court of *France*; and by That of *Rome*, in their Turns. He supported Himself, in great Measure, at home by the Opinion of his Credit abroad; and his *Master's* Favour to Him was strengthen'd by the Art of *Those*, whom He served at his *Master's* and his *Country's* Expence. In short, the Success, or Disappointment of his *private Schemes* were the Hinges, on which the whole Policy of this Nation turn'd for twenty Years; and the grossest Mismanagement, obstinately pursued,

I by

by the *Minister*, in the Midst of universal Disapprobation, was sanctify'd by the *King*.

The *King*, no Doubt, thought Himself as infallible in the Choice of *Men*, as in the Choice of *Measures*; and therefore when He had once given his Confidence to *Wolfey*, no Matter by what Inducements, his *Presumption* screen'd the *Minister* from his Suspicion.

It was easy for *Wolfey* to keep his *Master* from hearkening to particular Advice, or to the general Voice of the People; because it was easy to persuade him that he *wanted no Advice*; that *he could not be deceived*, though his *People might*; and perhaps, that it was unbecoming a *great Prince* to alter his *Measures*, or withdraw his Favour, on the Clamours of the Publick. At the same Time, we may fairly suppose (for the Monuments of *History* will justify us in supposing) that the *Butcher's Son* was not such a *Bungler*, nor render'd, by a *low Education*, so void of *Address*, as not to know how to *insinuate* without the Air of *advising*; and how to receive all his *own Suggestions* back from his *Master*, in the Style of *Orders*, with the utmost Demonstration of implicit Submission to his Judgment, and absolute Resignation to his Will.

But however blind the *King* might be, the Eyes of the *People* continued open to *his* and *their true Interest*. The Discontent grew general; and to this general Discontent were owing the principal Difficulties, which *Henry the eighth* met with, during the first half of his

his Reign. — As much Complaisance as he had been used to find in his *Parliaments*, he durst not always demand Money of them, for the Support of his Enterprizes. His *Minister* soon put him upon the Expedient of raising it by his *own Authority*. But these Attempts were resented warmly, and opposed so sturdily, even when the rough Name of a *Tax* was changed into the softer Sound of a *Benevolence*, that the *King* was obliged to retract; to compound; to excuse himself; to disavow his *Minister*; and to pardon all Those, who had been concern'd in *particular Insurrections*, from a Fear of *one*, which might become *universal*.

No Prince could be more firmly seated on his Throne. No Prince could be less framed to brook Opposition. No Prince could be less susceptible of Fear. And yet to this Point of Distress did *Henry the eighth* bring himself, by trusting his *first Minister* too much, and regarding the Sense of his *People* too little.

— All Orders of Men concurr'd on these Occasions; and the *Merchants* signalized themselves. Neither the Flattery, nor the Menaces of *Wolsey* could prevail on them to be silent, when they felt that *their own* and the *national Interests* were sacrificed, or neglected, at every Turn. Much less could they be couzen'd so far as to expose their Fortunes in *Trade*, (the only Fortunes, which *Merchants* acquired in those Days) in order to conceal the Blunder of a *Minister*, or to

stop the Clamour against him. We find a remarkable Instance of this Behaviour of the *Merchants* in the Year 1528 ; when the Commerce of the *low Countries*, on which our *woollen Trade* depended principally at that Time, was interrupted by a War with the *Emperor*, which evidently took its Rise from no other Motive than a Pique of the *Minister*.

The ill Success of these *illegal Methods* obliged the King to have Recourse to his *Parliament* ; but his *Parliament* thought like his *People* ; and the Opposition given in the *House of Commons* was such as became the representative Body of the Nation. That, which happen'd in the Year 1523, is worthy of particular Observation. It was not grounded only on the *Exorbitancy of the Sum demanded*, but likewise on the *Nature of the Service*, for which the Demand was made. As high as *Prerogative* was carry'd at this Time ; and as undisputed a Point as the Power of the Crown to make *War* and *Peace* might be ; yet it is undeniable that the *Commons* would not give Money, without knowing how it was to be employ'd ; and that they proportion'd their *Grants* to the Judgment they made of the Reasonableness, or Unreasonableness of the *Employment* design'd. — *Wolsey*, the most insolent Minister our Nation had seen at *that Time*, was however so far from objecting to this Method of proceeding in the *House of Commons*, that he open'd to that House,

House, in a long Discourse, the Reasons of the *King's Measures*, as he affected to call his *own Measures*; and endeavour'd to prove the Necessity of supporting them. Nay, when neither his *Rhetorick* could persuade, nor his *Authority* influence, he offer'd to debate the whole Matter, and to answer the Objections of Those, who opposed the *King's Desires*. The *House* rejected his Offer; observed their Forms; maintain'd their Dignity. They disapproved a War, wantonly undertaken, and in which the Interests of the Nation were not concern'd. They shew'd however their Regard to the *King*, by giving *some Part* of the Subsidy, and their Regard to the *Kingdom*, by refusing, to the last, to give the *whole*.

As for the *Minister*, he received the Mortification, which he deserved. — These frequent Oppositions, on the Part of the *People* and the *Parliament*, were really made to the *Minister*. *Henry the eighth* seem'd, on some Occasions, to desire that they should be so understood, even before *Wolfey's* Favour began to be in its Wain; and yet we shall have no Reason to be surprized, if we consider the true Character of *this Prince*, that these very Oppositions prepared his Mind for receiving those Lessons, which *Wolfey* was ready to give him against *Liberty* and in Favour of *arbitrary Power*. — A wicked Minister, who neither gains, nor deserves to gain, the good Will of a Nation, must secure and will endeavour to revenge Himself, by persuading his

Master to neglect it. Force and Corruption being the sole Means, by which he can maintain his *Power*, and preserve his *ill-gotten Wealth*, it is necessary for him that the *Prince*, whom He serves, should look upon *Those* as the sole Expedients, by which Government can be supported. *Wolsey* pursued this abominable Scheme. — *He look'd upon the King's Subjects*, says Rapin, *as so many Slaves; and unfortunately for Them, He inspired the King by Degrees with the same Principles; and insinuated to Him that He ought to consider the Parliament only as an Instrument to execute his Will.* — These were the *Seeds* He sow'd; which fell on a rank Soil; and produced, in the latter Half of *Henry's* Reign, such bitter Fruit as this Nation never tasted before, nor since. — *Wolsey* had been the Scandal and the Scourge of his Country, whilst he *lived*; and He continued to be so even in the *Grave*.



L E T T E R X I.

THE Divorce of *Henry the eighth* and *Catherine of Arragon* begins a new and most memorable *Æra* in the general History of *England*; and indeed of all *Europe*. It is the Beginning likewise of a new Period in the particular Reign, of which We are speaking. — A King, who had been till now the great Assertor of the Authority of the *Pope*,
and

and the great Defender of the Doctrine of the Church of *Rome*, undertakes to destroy the *former* in his Dominions, and gives several incurable Wounds to the *latter*. — A King, whose whole Attention had been employ'd abroad, and in whose Time *there was no Treaty and almost Conventicle* in Christendom, wherein He had not his particular Agent and Interest, (as my Lord *Herbert* expresses Himself) becomes wholly taken up with *domestick Affairs*; and if He looks abroad, during the rest of his Life, it is chiefly on Account of what passes *at home*. — He, who had conniv'd at *Seditions* and pardon'd *Insurrections*, grows impatient of the least Contradiction. — He, who had often compounded with his *Parliaments*, and submitted to them on many Occasions, dictates all their Proceedings; and the Voice of the *Law* is little else than the Eccho of the Voice of the *King*. — In short; He, who had been led, amused, govern'd by his *Minister*, drives, over-bears, tyrannizes; butchers his *Servants* and his *Wives*, his *Commons* and his *Nobility*.

When *Henry the eighth* first engaged in the Affair of the *Divorce*, He could not foresee the Consequences of it; because He certainly did not expect the Difficulties, which gave Occasion to them. He went on during the two first Years, in the beaten Road, by which so many others had gone before to the same End; and He seem'd to have no View besides That of employing the Authority of

one Pope to undo what the Authority of another Pope had done. Nay, after Cranmer had began to open other Views to Him, He seem'd still to cling to Rome; resolved to succeed any Way; but desirous to succeed that Way. — Happy was it that He took his Measures no better, and that He was no better served on this Occasion than on many others! — He suffer'd himself to be amused by Clement the seventh, the least scrupulous Man alive; and who would have divorced Him, or have done any other pontifical Job for Him, if the League form'd to reduce the Emperor's Power in Italy had succeeded. But the Emperor's Power there continuing to prevail, the Pope concluded his Treaty with this Prince on the most advantageous Terms. He obtain'd that favourite Point, for which He would have sacrificed not only the Interests of Henry the eighth, but even Those of the Papacy itself. I mean the Re-establishment of the Family of Medicis on the Ruins of the Florentine Liberty. The Loss of Genoa, the total Destruction of the French Army in the Kingdom of Naples, and several other Considerations induced Francis the first to make his Peace with the Emperor likewise, and to submit to the Treaty of Cambray.

Thus did Henry the eighth find himself at once disappointed in the Expectations He had been made to entertain from the Court of Rome, and destitute of all foreign Assistance; Francis being the only Ally, of whom He could

could avail himself to influence the Councils of *Rome*, in Opposition to the *Emperor*.

In this State of Affairs, *Henry* resorted to That, which will be always the best and surest Reserve of a King of *Great Britain*; the Inclinations, and Affections of his *People*. He had not the Trouble of disposing them, for He found them already disposed, to his Purposes. The Spirit, raised by *Wickliffe*, about two Centuries before, against the Usurpations of the *Pope* and the *Clergy*, was still alive. The Sufferings of the *Lollards*, as his Followers were call'd, had not abated it. The *Art of Printing* had been propagated; and the late Success of *Luther* had encouraged it. There were Multitudes therefore, in all Parts of the Kingdom, who desired a compleat Reformation of the *Church*, both in *Doctrine* and in *Discipline*. Others again were content that the *Papal Authority*, grievous in its Nature, and scandalous in its Exercise, as well as the extravagant Power and impertinent Immunities of the *Clergy*, should be taken away. But they meant to go no farther. Many would not go even so far as This; but were still Slaves to all their Prejudices; and remain'd, in the Midst of this Defection, attach'd to the *Pope*, as well as to the corrupted *Doctrine*, and the depraved *Discipline* of the *Church*.

Whilst the *Divorce* was solicited at *Rome*, and the Proceedings, relating to it, were carry'd on by the Direction, and under the Authority

thority of the *Pope*, it was the *King's* Affair; it was the Affair of his *Ministers*. But when it appear'd impracticable in this Method, and *Henry* resolv'd, in order to accomplish it in another, to deliver himself and his People from the Yoke of *Rome*; the Affair of the *Divorce* became a *national Affair*, and the Cause of the *King* became the Cause of his *Subjects*. As He proceeded in it, He was encouraged to proceed. The Concurrence of his *People* grew every Day more general, and He was supported with the greatest Warmth. He soon held the *Clergy* at his Mercy; and the *Popish Party* was broken and terrify'd, if not entirely crush'd.

During this eager Pursuit after *ecclesiastical Liberty*, a Power very dangerous to *civil Liberty* was erected. We observed before that the *Prerogative* had been carry'd high and extended wide in the Reign of *Henry the eighth*, who obtain'd much by *Law*, and obtain'd more by his Manner of *construing* and *executing* the *Law*. His Son, parting with none of his Authority, and improving the Conjecture so as to acquire a great deal more, acquired so much at last, that the Power of the *Crown* exceeded by far that Proportion, which is consistent with the Security of *publick Liberty*, and *private Property*. It is true, indeed, that He always took Care to have the *Law* on his Side; and would neither venture on the Exercise of *Acts of Power* against it, or without it. His Experience, in the

the former Part of his Reign, had taught him the Danger of such a Conduct; and, in the latter Part, he had no Occasion to pursue it. The Opinion of the Nation went along with Him now; and, as exorbitant as his Demands frequently were, his *Parliaments* refused Him nothing. At one Time, They gave up to Him, in a great Degree, the *legislative Authority*; and his *Proclamations* were made, under some Restrictions, equivalent to *Acts of Parliament*. At another Time, They ascribed to Him a Sort of *Infallibility*; and *Letters Patent*, under the great Seal, were made necessary to determine the *Articles of Faith*, which Men were to believe fully, and the *Doctrines, Rites and Ceremonies*, which they were to observe and practice, under severe Penalties. — The suspicious State of Affairs *abroad* was amplify'd to give a Pretence to one of these Laws; and the confused State of Religion *at home*, and the clashing of Parties about it, might afford some Colour to the other. — The Truth is, that any Pretence served, at this Time, to grant whatever the King desired; a stronger Instance of which cannot be imagined than That of the *Subsidy*, obtain'd in the Year 1540. Henry had got immense Riches by the *first and second Suppression of Monasteries*. A principal Inducement to the *last*, which was likewise the *greatest*, was This; that the King might be enabled, without taxing the People, to defend them against such *Invasions*, as the Court had

had been pleased to suppose; and with the Rumours of which the Nation had been purposely alarm'd. These *Invasions* did not happen. *Henry* continued in Peace with all his Neighbours; and yet, the very next Year, he not only accepted from the Clergy of the Province of *Canterbury*, with the Approbation of Parliament, a Grant of the *fifth Part* of their Revenue; but he demanded a *Subsidy* likewise of the House of Commons. So extravagant a Demand could not but meet with some Opposition. The *Subsidy* however was granted in as large a Proportion, as if the Nation had been engaged in a *dangerous War*. The Reasons for granting it were almost burlesque. It was affirm'd, *by the King's Party*, that *He had laid out vast Sums in securing the Coasts; and that the keeping his Subjects in Peace and Plenty cost Him more than the most burthenfome War.* — Thus a *Precedent* was made of converting into *ordinary Aids* of the Government those *heavy Taxes*, which ought never to be felt by the People, unless upon the *most extraordinary Occasions*. That they ought to be laid in Time of *War*, neither was, nor ever could be doubted. That they were equally necessary in Time of *Peace*, was now establish'd by the Logick of the *Court*; and we may be sure that the Argument would have been urged with still more Force and Effect, if the Nation had fallen, by the Management of the Courtiers in that Age, into such a Situation as could neither be call'd

call'd properly a *State of War*, or a *State of Peace*.

The absolute Power, which *Henry the eighth* exercised over the Purfes, Lives, Liberties and Consciences of his People, was due to the intire Influence, which he had gain'd over the *Parliament*; and this Dependency of the *two Houses* on the *King* did, in Effect, establish *Tyranny by Law*. — If we look for the *true Cause* of this Dependency, we shall find it, as *Rapin* hath very judiciously observed, in those Divisions of the Nation, concerning *Religion*, which I have mention'd above. — The *Party*, which oppos'd *all Reformation*, by a bigotted Attachment to the Discipline, as well as Doctrine of the Church of *Rome*, furnish'd the King with as many Pretences for grasping at Power, and squeezing Money out of his People, as *Ambition* could wish, or *Profusion* require. — The *other two Parties* concurr'd with the King, and went together to a certain Point; That is, to throw off the *papal Yoke*, and to lessen the Power of the *Clergy*. But here they separated, and went different Ways; *one* to carry the *Reformation forward*; and the *other* to stop it, where it *then stood*; whilst the *King* seem'd to keep in a middle Way between them both. — Sometimes, He seem'd to favour *Those*, whose Principles led them to an *intire Reformation*; and he touch'd the *Doctrine*, though with a gentler Hand than the *Discipline* of the Church. — Sometimes, he appear'd zealous

lous for the *Doctrine*, and even for some Part of the *Discipline*; and the Manner, in which he often executed that bloody Statute, the *Law of six Articles*, would incline one to think that he join'd to his *political Considerations* a Tincture of *religious Prejudice* on these Heads. But however That was, certain it is that the Hopes, which each of these *two Parties* entertain'd of the *King*, and the Fears, which they entertain'd of *one another*, occasion'd their continual *Bidding* for him, if I may be allow'd to use such an Expression. This Emulation form'd then, what it always must form, the most dangerous Conjunction, to which *Liberty* can be exposed. When the Motives of contending Parties are founded on *private Ambition* and *Avarice*, the Danger is great. How much greater must it be, when these Motives are founded on *Religion* likewise; when the Heads and Hearts of both Sides are heated even to Enthusiasm; when *this Spirit* mingles itself with the *Spirit of Faction*; so that some through Folly, and some through Knavery, are ready to sacrifice *publick Liberty* to their particular Schemes of *Religion*?

In such Circumstances as these was this Nation, when *Henry the eighth* died; and if he had left a Son and Successor, of full Age and bold and enterprizing like himself, our *Liberties* had been irretrievably lost, according to all Appearances. — *Henry the eighth* by applying to his *Parliaments* for the extraordinary

ordinary Powers, which he exercised, and by taking these Powers for such Terms, and under such Restrictions, as the *Parliament* imposed, own'd indeed sufficiently that they did not belong of Right to the *Crown*. He own'd likewise, in Effect, more than any Prince, who went before him, how absolutely the Disposition of the Crown of *England*, belongs to the People of *England*, by procuring so many different and opposite Settlements of it to be made in *Parliament*; and yet Tyranny was actually establish'd. The Freedom of our Government might flourish in Speculation; but certainly it did not subsist in Practice. — In the Case therefore supposed above, our Fore-fathers would very soon have found how fatal it is, in any Circumstances, by any Means, or under any Pretences, to admit Incroachments on the Constitution; and how vain it is, when these Incroachments are once admitted, for the Service of some present Turn, to prescribe Limitations to the Exercise, or Duration of them.

But Providence directed the Course of Things better, and broke those Shackles, which we had forged for ourselves. A *Minority* follow'd this turbulent Reign; the Government was weak; the Governors divided; and the Temper of the People such as made it prudent to sooth them. This the Duke of *Somerset* did, out of Inclination, and the Duke of *Northumberland*, out of Policy. To the former we owe not only the compleat Establish-
ment

ment of the Church of *England* on the Ruins of *Popery*, but the first and great Steps, which were made to restore a *free Government*. In the very first Year of his Administration, several Acts, which had pass'd in the Reign of *Henry the eighth*, and in some preceding Reigns, grievous to the People, and destructive of *Liberty*, were repeal'd; and among others that absurd Act, which gave to *Proclamations* the Force of *Laws*. The *Law of the six Articles* was likewise repeal'd. Others were explain'd; and several *new Laws* were made in favour of *civil*, as well as *ecclesiastical Liberty*; both of which got so much Strength, in the Reign of *Edward the sixth*, that they were able to stand the short but violent Shock of *Queen Mary's* Reign. This Princess lived long enough to confirm, not to destroy, our Religion by *Persecution*. The ill-concerted Insurrection of *Wyat* gave Strength to the *Faction*, which prevail'd at Court, and discouraged, for some Time, all Opposition; nay, the Methods taken to influence the *Elections* and to gain by *Corruption* the Members, who were chosen, were carry'd on so openly that the *Price*, for which each Man sold himself, was publickly known. No wonder then if the *papal Authority* was restored, and the *Queen's* Marriage with *Philip the second* approved. But this State of Things could not last long, nor was the Nation disposed to bear a continual Sacrifice of her Interest to *Rome* and *Spain*.

The

The *Parliament*, corrupt as it was, began to revolt against the *Court*. The *Spirit of Liberty* revived; and that Spirit, and the Spirit of Reformation in *Religion* had made more Progress than was readily perceived. This Progress had been made principally among the *Commons*; and therefore, though the Authority of the Crown, of the Council, and of the great Lords kept up other Appearances; yet there was a secret Fire burning, which must and would have broke out. The Effects of the Causes, laid in the Reign of *Henry the seventh*, began now to appear. The Lands of the *Nobility* were lessen'd, and Those of the *Commons* increased. *Trade* had been encouraged for several Years. We see that some Care had been taken of it, even in the troublesome Times of *Edward the fourth*, and very much was done towards the Advancement of it in the Reigns of *Henry the seventh* and *Henry the eighth*. The *West-Indies* had been discover'd about half a Century before; and Part of the immense Treasures, which flow'd from thence into *Europe*, began to increase the Profits; and, increasing the Profits, to increase the Industry of our Merchants. *Henry the eighth* had sold a very great Part of the *Church Lands* at low Prices, on purpose to engage the Body of the Nation in one common Interest against the *Romish Clergy*. The *Commons* had made their Use of this Strain of Policy, and had got into very great Estates in *Lands*, by These as well as

by other Means ; so that the *King*, the *Lords* and the *Church*, who had formerly held so great an Overballance of Property in *Land*, had now little more than one *Third* of the Whole belonging to them ; the Consequences of which were not foreseen by *Queen Mary* ; neither did she live long enough to feel them in any great Degree. They did not escape the Penetration of her *Sister*. She foresaw them ; and the great Glory and Happiness of her Reign may justly be attributed to this first Principle ; that she had the Wisdom to discern not only the actual Alteration, which was already made, but the growing Alteration, which would every Day increase in the State of *Property* ; that she accommodated at once the whole System of her Government to this great Change ; and instead of depending upon *Expedients*, which were now no longer of Season, chose the *sole Expedient*, that remain'd, for making herself and her People happy ; which was to place the whole Strength and Security of her Government in the *Affections* of her People, and in her superior *Credit* with them.

LETTER

LETTER XII.

WE have now brought these Remarks on the *English History* not only down to Times little remote from our own; but to a Period, when the Monarchy settled on a new Foundation; upon which it still continues and rests more firmly than ever at this Hour. The Observations therefore, which remain to be made, in order to illustrate what hath been advanced, concerning the *Spirit of Liberty* and the *Spirit of Faction*, will for these Reasons be the more apposite, the more affecting, and by Consequence the more useful; but, for these very Reasons likewise, it is probable that they will become the Occasions of louder Complaints, and of more impertinent Clamour. — We shall be sincerely sorry for This; because We look on the *Alarm*, which hath been taken at our Endeavours to revive the *Spirit*, and to confirm and propagate the *Doctrines of Liberty*, in a Country, where *Liberty* is still avow'd, and under a Government, establish'd on the *Principles of Liberty*, as a most suspicious and melancholy Symptom. But the stronger this Symptom appears, the more incumbent We shall think it upon us to pursue the honest

K 2

Design,

Design, to which We have devoted ourselves with Constancy and Vigour.

The *shameless Crew*, who write against their *Country*, as they would write against their *God*, for Hire, shall have little Regard from us. The scandalous Licence, with which They have presumed to draw *odious Parallels*, and the Impudence, with which They have imputed these *Parallels* to us, have been abundantly exposed already. The few, the very few Things, which they have alledged in Point of *Fact*, or *Argument*, have been often answer'd; perhaps too often, considering how little Weight They carry'd with Them, and how little Impression They were capable of making on the Understanding even of *Those*, who had *other Reasons* for inclining to that Side of the Question. The Ribaldry, which *these Scribblers* employ, hath been and will continue to be despised, not answer'd. It cannot be expected that we should take Notice of every little, frivolous, childish, *Declamation*, which appears in publick, however some Persons may demean themselves by pretending to admire them. The *Menaces*, affectedly and insolently thrown out on *one Side*, and the *Flattery*, servilely offer'd on the *other*, are equally Objects of our Contempt; and if We take a little Notice of *the former*, once for all, before We proceed any farther in these *Remarks*, it is purely because We cannot understand them to be the Language of *these Writers*. When They talk in this Style,

Style, They speak the Language of HIM, who guides their Pens, and who is known to reward their Labours. To *Him* therefore it may not be improper to address ourselves in the following Manner.

“ The *Persons*, whom you threaten, Sir,
 “ neither value your Favour, nor fear your
 “ Anger. Whenever you attempt any *Act*
 “ of *Power* against any of them, you shall
 “ find that you have to do with Men, who
 “ know they have not offended the *Law* ;
 “ and therefore trust They have not offended
 “ the *King* ; who know They are safe, as
 “ long as the *Laws* and *Liberties* of their
 “ Country are so ; and who are so little de-
 “ sirous of being safe any longer, that they
 “ would be the first to bury themselves in the
 “ Ruins of the *British* Constitution, if *You*,
 “ or any *Minister*, as desperate as *You*, should
 “ be able to destroy it. But let us ask, on
 “ this Occasion, what *You* are, who thus
 “ presume to threaten ? — Are you not *One*,
 “ whose Measure of *Folly* and *Iniquity* is
 “ full ; who can neither hold, nor quit his
 “ Power with Impunity ; and over whose
 “ Head the long-gathering Cloud of national
 “ Vengeance is ready to burst ? — Is it not
 “ Time for *You*, Sir, instead of threatening
 “ to attack *others*, to consider how soon *You*
 “ may be attack’d *Yourself* ? — How many
 “ Crimes may be charged upon *You* and
 “ *Yours*, which almost every Man can prove ;
 “ and how many more are ready to start into

“ Light, as soon as the Power, by which
 “ You now conceal them, shall determine?
 “ ——— When next You meditate Revenge
 “ on your *Adversaries*, remember this Truth.
 “ *The Laws must be destroy'd, before They*
 “ *can suffer, or You escape.*”

Let us now return to our Subject. ——— In the early Days of our Government, after the *Norman Invasion*, the Commons of *England* were rather formidable in their *collective*, than considerable in their *representative Body*; by their *Numbers* in extraordinary Emergencies, rather than by their *Weight* in the ordinary Course of Government. In later Days, they began to acquire some of *this Weight* by Degrees. They represented *Grievances*; They gave, or refused *Subsidies*; and they exercised, in a regular, senatorial Manner, the Powers lodged in them by the Constitution; but still they did not obtain the *intire Weight*, till they were wholly emancipated; and they were not so, till the *great Change*, which we are speaking of, happen'd. Before this Time, they had too much of the Dependency of *Tenants*, and the *King*, the *Nobility* and the *Clergy* had too much of the Superiority of *Landlords*. This Dependency of the Commons added to That, which the *Crown* frequently found Means of creating, either by influencing their *Elections*, or by corrupting their *Representatives*, (notwithstanding all the *Provisions* made against it, which we have

have touch'd in a * former Paper) kept this Part of the Legislature in such a State, as made it unable fully to answer the End of its Institution ; and the System of our Government was by Consequence, in this Respect, defective.

Could *Henry the seventh* have found Means, as he reduced the *Nobility* lower, to have hinder'd the *Commons* from rising higher ; could He have open'd a Way to the Diminution of the Property of the *Lords*, and have prevented that Increase of the same Property amongst the *Commons*, to which, on the contrary, he gave Occasion, and which Time and Accidents conspired to bring about ; the *Ballance* of this Government would have been totally lost, though the *outward Forms* of it had been preserved. Our *Liberty* would have been lost by Consequence ; and our *Kings*, with an *House of Lords* and an *House of Commons*, and all the Appearances of *limited Monarchs*, might have been as *arbitrary* as those Princes are, who govern Countries, where no such Constitution prevails. The Reason of This will appear plain to Those, who remember what hath been observed, in some of our former Papers, that a *dependent Exercise of the Powers, lodged in the two Houses of Parliament*, will endanger and may, more effectually than any other

* See the *Craftsman*, No. 225.

Expedient, destroy *Liberty* ; and that the Preservation of our Freedom is no Way to be secured but by a *free and independent Exercise of these Powers*. Now *such an Exercise* could not have continued, much less have been improved, if *Henry the seventh* had been able, at the same Time, to weaken his *Nobility*, and to keep his *Commons* from acquiring new Strength. But This was impracticable. At least, it was not attempted. *Henry the seventh* hasten'd to the Cure of that Evil, which press'd him most, the Power of the *Nobility*, as his *Son* soon afterwards effectually reduced the exorbitant Power of the *Clergy* ; and in pulling down these Powers, which, as they were constituted and had been exercised, hurt the *Crown* more than they served the *People*, these Princes became the Instruments of raising *another Power*, which is the best, if not the sole effectual Barrier against Usurpations of illegal, and Abuses of legal Prerogatives ; and which, at the same Time, can never be apply'd to do any real Hurt to the *Crown*, unless in Cases where it is bent and forced to do this Hurt by the *Crown* itself, in the first Place, against the natural Tendency and Direction of it.

This Increase of the Property of the *Commons*, by taking off from them a *constant Dependency* of one Sort, and by rendering them less obnoxious to an *occasional Dependency* of another, gave greater Dignity, and added greater Weight, in the Ballance of Government,

vernment, to their *representative Body*. The *House of Commons* became more powerful, without the Attribution of any *new Powers*, and purely by the different Manner, in which their *Independency*, the Effect of their *Property*, enabled them to exercise the *same Powers*, which they enjoy'd before. A Concert with a *few great Lords*, and a *few leading Prelates*, was now no longer sufficient to guide the Sense of *Parliament*, and to establish the Measures of *Government*; no, not even in Cases, where this Concert might be extended to some of the *Commons* Themselves. Intrigue and Cabal became unnecessary, when the *national Interest* was wisely pursued; and ineffectual, when it was not. The Way was open to gain the *Parliament*, by gaining the *Nation*; but to impose on the *Nation*, by gaining the *Parliament* was hard; for the *Weight without Doors* determined, in those Days, the *Weight within*. The same Causes, which render'd the *House of Commons* more considerable to the *Court*, to the *Nobility*, to the *Clergy*, to the *Commons* themselves, render'd likewise the whole Body of the *Commons* of more Importance to *Those*, who were chosen to represent them. Besides which, the Frequency of *new Elections*, which was deem'd an Advantage, as long as the Service was deem'd an honourable Burthen, gave the Nation frequent Opportunities of modelling the *representative Body*, according to the Interests and Inclinations of the *collective Body*.
From

From hence it follow'd, that that Credit and Influence in the *Nation*, which can only be acquired and preserved by adhering to the *national Interest*, became the sole Means of maintaining a lasting Credit and Influence in the *House of Commons*; upon which the Harmony of Government, and the Happiness of *Prince* and *People* depended more than ever.

Thus were we brought back, in Times very distant and in Circumstances very different, to the *Principles of Government*, which had prevail'd amongst our *Saxon* Ancestors, before they left *Germany*. Whatever particular Pre-eminences, or Powers, were vested in the *principal Men*, the great Affairs of State were directed by the *whole Body of the Nation*. — *De minoribus Principes, de majoribus omnes.*

Such were the natural Effects of this *new Settlement*; and thus our *limited Monarchy* became capable of as much Perfection, as Wisdom and favourable Accidents can communicate to any human Institution; for can We raise our Ideas of this Kind of Perfection higher than ordering the Distribution of *Property* and *Power* in such a Manner, that the Privileges of the *People* and the Prerogative of the *Crown* cannot be taken away, unless with their *own Consent*, or by their *own Fault*? Now to this Point of Perfection was the Constitution of our Government brought, and farther it could not be brought; because it is impossible to secure either *Prince*, or *People* against

gainst *Themselves*, or against the Effects of their *own Conduct*.

One Part of what hath been said upon this Subject will not, I think, be disputed. The other, perhaps, may seem a Paradox; and a Settlement, which render'd our Government more *democratical*, will not be readily allow'd to have been advantageous to the *Crown*, though it must be allow'd to have been so to the *People*. — Let us examine therefore whether it was really so, or not.

In all *limited Monarchies*, and we are not speaking of any other, the Power of preserving *these Limitations* must be placed somewhere. The Question therefore is, whether it can be placed more advantageously, even for the *Crown* as well as the *People*, than in the *whole Body of the Nation*.

Whilst the *Commons* had not *Property* enough to have any Share in *this Power*, the sole Check, which could be opposed to the Incroachments of the *Crown*, was the Power of the *Barons* and of the *Clergy*. But these two Orders of Men had their particular Interests, frequently opposite to *each other* and to Those of the *People*, as well as to Those of the *Crown*; so that they were not only very incapable of forming a secure Barrier to *Liberty*, but their Power became terrible and dangerous to the *Crown* itself. They slid easily into *Faction*. They often incroach'd on the *Prince's* Authority, whilst they resist-ed his Incroachments, real or pretended, on
their

their own Privileges; and under the plausible Veil of *Law*, or *Gospel*, private Ambition had a greater Share than publick Liberty in their Contests. It is true that, during these Contests, *magna Charta* was sign'd and confirm'd; and the Condition of the People, in Point of *Liberty*, very much improved. But This was the accidental Effect of the Contests between the *Kings*, the *Barons* and the *Clergy*, as We have remark'd in speaking of those Times, and not the natural Effect of the *Property* and *Power*, lodged in the *Barons* and the *Clergy*. The *Commons* were courted by all Sides, because they were wanted by all. Had they been Bubbles enough to look on the *Nobility* and *Clergy* as the proper Guardians of *Liberty*, and to have adhered to Them accordingly, they might indeed have avoided being Slaves to their *Kings*, but they would have render'd both their *Kings* and *Themselves* little less than Slaves to their *temporal* and *spiritual* Lords.

After the Reigns of *Edward the first*, and *Edward the third*, *Power* came to be better poized, and our Government took a more regular Form. The Prerogatives of our *Kings*, and the Privileges of our *Nobility*, the Authority and Immunity of the *Church*, and the Rights of the *People* were more ascertain'd; and yet, after this Time, the same Observations will hold good in a very great Degree. It is certain that the vast Over-balance of *Property* and *Power*, which still continued in

in the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, instead of preventing, softening, or shortening the Calamities, which follow'd, help'd to form and maintain those *Factions*, which began, renew'd, fomented the Civil Wars of *York* and *Lancaster*, as well as the wicked Conduct of *Richard the second*, and the weak Conduct of *Henry the sixth*. Redress of Grievances and sufficient Security against them for the future might have satisfy'd the *People*, if They had been left to Themselves; but nothing less than Revolutions of Government could satisfy the *Factions*, into which the great Men were divided, and into which They divided the Nation, by their Influence over the *People*, and by the Advantages, which the ill Conduct of the *Yorkists* and *Lancastrians* gave to each other.

Thus We see how unsafely for the *Crown*, as well as insecurely for the *People*, that *Property* and *Power*, which is necessary to preserve the *Limitations* of our Monarchy, was placed before the Time, when that great *Change* in the one and the other happen'd, which makes the Subject of this Discourse. But as soon as *this Change* did happen, the *Crown* was no longer exposed to the same Mischiefs.

When the little *Power*, which *Henry the fourth of France* had in the Town of *Rochelle*, was objected to Him, He made an Answer worthy of his heroick Spirit. *I do*, said He, *all I desire to do there, in doing nothing*

thing but what I ought. — This Moderation of Temper is, in all Governments, the best and, in limited Monarchies, the only sure and durable Foundation of Power. By preventing Jealousy in the People of the Prince, it takes away all Advantage against his Government from Faction; and the more watchful the People are over their Liberties, the more sensible will they be of this Moderation, and the more grateful for it. Faction proceeds always without Reason; but it can hardly ever succeed without Pretence, and sufficient Pretence will hardly be found under such a Government.

When a Prince, who manifests this Moderation of Temper, pursues the true Interest of his People, and suffers no other Interest to come into any Degree of Competition with it, far from being the Object of their Jealousy, he will be the principal Object of their Affection; and if he joins to this Character of Goodness That of Ability, He will be the principal Object of their Confidence likewise. These are the strongest Chains, by which a People can be bound to their Prince; easier indeed, but far stronger than Those of Adamant, by which Dionysius the elder boasted that He had secured the Tyranny of Syracuse to his Son; Force, Fear, a Multitude of Troops, and a Guard of ten thousand Barbarians. — A Prince, who establishes his Government on the Principles of Affection, hath every Thing to hope and nothing to fear from

from his People. A Prince, who establishes his Government on any *other Principles*, acts in Contradiction to the very End of his Institution. What Objection therefore could be made, even on the Part of the *Crown*, to a Settlement of *Property* and *Power*, which put the Guardianship of *Liberty* into such Hands as never did, nor ever will invade the Prerogative and Authority of the *Crown*, whilst they are employ'd to those Purposes, for which alone they were intrusted? It is confess'd that if a Prince should attempt to establish his Government on any *other Principle* than These; if He should chuse to depend rather on *deceiving*, *corrupting*, or *forcing* his People, than on gaining their *Affection* and *Confidence*; He might feel the Weight of their *Property* and *Power* very heavy in the Scale against Him. But then it must be confess'd likewise that, in such a Case, this Opposition of the *People* would be just; and that the *Prince*, not the *People*, would be answerable to Himself and his Family, to God and to Man, for all the ill Consequences, which might follow.

We hope that We have said nothing, in order to shew the Excellency of our *Constitution*, as it settled about the Time of *Queen Elizabeth*, which is not agreeable to Reason; and sure We are that the Truth of these general Propositions will be confirm'd by the particular Examples, which are to follow. — The Reign of *Queen Elizabeth* will be one
con-

continued Proof that the Power of preserving the *Limitations* of a Monarchy cannot be placed better, for a *good and wise Prince*, than in the *whole Body of the People*; and that the *Spirit of Liberty* will give greater Strength, as well as procure greater Ease, to the Government of such a Prince, than any absolute Monarch can hope to find in the most *abject Spirit*, which Principles of *blind Submission* and *passive Obedience* are capable of inspiring.—The *Reigns* immediately succeeding *This*, will be one continued Proof, that whenever the Power of the *People* hath been exercised against the *Crown*, it hath been owing primarily to the weak Management and Obstinacy of the *Court*, and to the unhappy Choice, which *those Princes* made of governing by *Factions*, in Opposition to the Sense and Interest of the *Nation*. From whence it will follow that the great Calamities, which befel our Country, in the Middle of the last Century, are unjustly charged on the *Spirit of Liberty*, or on the *Nature of the British Constitution of Government*.



L E T T E R X I I I .

THERE is no Part of our Annals, nor perhaps of the Annals of any other Country, which deserves to be more studied,
or

or to be oftner call'd to Remembrance both by Those, who govern, and by Those, who are govern'd, than the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*. We shall not however descend into all the Observations, which it affords; nor even into all Those, which might properly serve to our present Purpose.

In some * Papers We made a few Remarks on *this Reign*, and on That of King *James the first*, We apprehend that the Contraste between Them appear'd very strong on that Occasion. This Contraste will probably appear still much stronger, and by Consequence be the more instructive, when *those Remarks* and *These* We are going to make come to center in one single Point; to shew that the Conduct of Queen *Elizabeth*, under great Disadvantages, produced all the good Effects, which *Prince*, or *People* could desire; because it was wisely suited to the Nature of our *Government*; whereas the Conduct of King *James the first*, who had many and great Advantages, which his Predecessor wanted, made his Reign grievous to the *People*, uneasy to *Himself*, and accessory to those Misfortunes, which beset his *Son*; because it was ill-suited to the Nature of our *Government*, and founded on Principles destructive of *Liberty*.

Few Princes (no, not even her Cotemporary, *Henry the fourth of France*) have been

* See the *Craftsman*, No. 137, 138, 139.

ever raised to a Throne under more disadvantageous Circumstances, or have been surrounded in it with more complicated Difficulties than Queen *Elizabeth*. — Let us take a general Survey of them.

The Division and Animosity of *Parties* had been carry'd to the Height of religious Rage. The Cruelty of Queen *Mary's* Reign, in which much *protestant Blood* had been shed, and even That of her *Sister* with Difficulty spared, render'd of course the *persecuting Side* more desperate, and the *other* more exasperated. It is hard to imagine that Queen *Elizabeth* had been able to cultivate many personal Attachments to herself, before she came to the Crown ; except That of Sir *William Cecil*, afterwards Lord *Burleigh*, and perhaps one or two more. Her imprisonment for a Time, and the great Constraint, under which she lived, during her *Sister's* whole Reign, gave her little Opportunity for it ; and the jealous Eye, with which *Gardiner* and other ecclesiastical Zealots observed her Conduct, made it dangerous to attempt it.

In general, the *Protestants* desired her Succession ; and the *Papists* fear'd it. But the *former* were under Oppression, and even a Kind of Proscription. The *latter* had the whole Authority of the *Church* and the *State* in their Hands, in *this Kingdom* ; and That of *Ireland*, bigotted to Popery and prone to Rebellion, was at their Devotion. — The *Protestants* themselves were divided, and
Those,

Those, who meant equally a *Reformation*, fell into the utmost Asperity against each other, concerning the *Manner* of making it, and the *Point*, to which it ought to be carry'd, on account of *Religion* as well as of *Policy*.

In this divided State and in the Ferment, which such Divisions must necessarily cause, Queen *Elizabeth* found the People, whom she came to govern. Surely, a more nice and perilous State can hardly be imagined; especially for Her, who was led by Inclination and determined by particular Circumstances of Interest to establish the *Reformation*; That is, to declare for the *weakest*, though not the *least numerous Party*.

It is observed (I think by *Nathaniel Bacon* in his *historical* and *political Discourses*) that the Methods taken by *Henry the seventh* to accumulate Treasure, made a *rich King* indeed, but did not enrich the *Crown*. His *Son* had several Opportunities of doing both; instead of which He impoverish'd *Himself*, the *Crown*, and the *People*, by all the Methods, which the most wanton Profusion could invent. He exhausted the Wealth of the Nation. He did more. He debased the *Coin*, by mingling it with Copper, and loaded the Publick with Debts. These again were considerably increased in the Reign of *Edward the sixth*. Queen *Mary* was so far from diminishing them, that one of the principal Complaints against her Administration, next

to the Cruelty she exercised, was the great Diffipation of the *Revenue*, occasion'd by her Restitutions to the *Church*, and by her new Foundations of *Monasteries*. — In this low, incumber'd State *Queen Elizabeth* found the Revenues of the *Crown*, and the Wealth of the *Nation*.

Her Situation *abroad* was still worse than her Situation *at home*. *Calais*, and the other *English* Possessions in *Picardy*, had been lost in a Quarrel, where the Interest of *England* had no Concern. For the Sake of *Spain*, We had War with *France*. The War with *Scotland* still continued; and *Queen Elizabeth* had no one *Ally*, on whose Assistance she could depend.

Such distress'd Situations are rare; and when They have happen'd, They have been often render'd less difficult in Reality, than in Appearance, by some particular Circumstances, which have attended them. But when *Elizabeth* began her Reign, no such Circumstances existed in her Favour. On the contrary, almost every Circumstance aggravated her Distress. The Thrones of *France* and *Spain* were fill'd neither by *old Men*, worn out with Age and Cares; nor by *weak Men*, unequal to their Rank and Business; nor by *Children*, under the Tuition of Regents. *Henry the second* reign'd in *France*; *Philip the second* in *Spain*; Princes, in the Vigour of their Age; of great Ambition; of great Talents; and seconded by the *ablest Ministers* and *Generals* in

in *Europe*. The *French* Monarchy had been growing up, from the Time of *Lewis the eleventh*, towards that Fulness of Power and Affluence of Wealth, at which the *Spanish* Monarchy was already arrived. Both these Princes were, by Bigotry and by Policy, attach'd to the Court of *Rome*; implacable Enemies to the *Reformation*; and such by Consequence to Queen *Elizabeth*. *Henry the second* had a farther Reason for being so. He grasp'd, in his ambitious Views, the Crown of *England*, as well as That of *Scotland*; and look'd on Queen *Elizabeth* as the Usurper of a Right, belonging to his *Daughter in Law*. *Philip*, indeed, kept some faint and affected Measures with *Elizabeth*, as long as He apprehended the Union of so many Crowns in the House of *Valois*; but this Apprehension was soon at an end; and even his Shews of Friendship with it. *Henry the second*, and his eldest Son, *Francis the second*, died in about two Years. The Deaths of these Princes did, perhaps, diminish the Difficulties and Dangers, to which Queen *Elizabeth* stood exposed on *one Hand*; but then They increased these Difficulties and Dangers on the *other*; since they took off all Restraint from *Philip* in Pursuit of his Enterprizes against her. His Life lasted almost as long as Hers, and his inveterate Enmity as long as his Life.

Another Source, from which Difficulties and Dangers were incessantly arising to Queen *Elizabeth*, lay in the Objections, which the

Papists made to her Title on a Principle of *Religion*; and which were but too really, tho' indirectly, abetted by some *Protestants*, on a Principle of *Faction*.—Whilst Disputes about the Succession to the Crown were confined to *England*, and turn'd on Maxims of our own Growth, if I may use that Expression, We have seen how little Regard was paid to the *Titles*, and to the *pretended divine, indefeazable Right of Princes*. But when *foreign Nations* came to be interested in the Succession of our Crown, They reason'd and They proceeded on *other Notions*; not on *Those*, which both *Custom* and *Law* had establish'd here.

The Attacks, of this Kind, made on *Queen Elizabeth*, were the more grievous to Her, because They not only united the *Roman-Catholick Powers* against her; but they made the Divisions wider and more irreconcilable *at home*; where she placed the chief Strength and Security of her Government.

Mary Queen of Scotland, was a *Pretender*, neither abjured in *England*, nor disavowed and unsupported in other Countries. Sovereign of *one Part* of the Island, she had a powerful Party in the *other*; Wife of the *Dauphin*, and after That *Queen of France*; encouraged and assisted by her *Uncles*, who possess'd more then regal Power in that Kingdom; by *Spain*, and by the whole Popish Interest; she was justly formidable to *Queen Elizabeth*, as long as she lived.—Another Circumstance made Her so still more. The
Success

Success of the *Reformation* seem'd to increase the Zeal of Those, who continued in the Communion of the Church of *Rome*. The Influence of the Court of *Rome* became consequently stronger at this Point of Time. It appear'd both in *France* and in *England* too as powerful, though not as successful, here at least, as it had appear'd in the eleventh Century, in the Days of the brave, but unfortunate Emperor, *Henry the fourth*, and of that insolent Fryar, *Gregory the seventh*. — Even this Circumstance may justly seem to have been enforced by another; by the Establishment of the Order of *Jesuits*. This Order, the Off-spring of a mad *Spaniard*, has had the principal Honour, though other religious Orders have endeavour'd to share it, of giving to the *Pope* an Authority like That, which was exercised by the *King of the Assassins*, or the *old Man of the Mountain*, as He is call'd by some of the *French* Historians; an Authority, which proved fatal to *Henry the third* and *Henry the fourth of France*; and which had like to have proved so to *Queen Elizabeth* and even to her *Successor*.

Such were the Difficulties and Dangers, which encompass'd this Princess. The Situation of *England*, in her Time, resembled That of a Town powerfully besieged *without*, and expos'd to Treachery and Sedition *within*. That a Town, in such Circumstances, should defend itself, and even force the

Enemy, by its own Strength, to raise the Siege, hardly falls within the Bounds of Probability. But that all This should happen, and the Inhabitants feel none of the Inconveniencies of a long and obstinate Siege; nay, that They should grow opulent, during the Continuance of it, and find themselves at last better able to offend the Enemy than They were at first to defend their Walls, seems an Adventure of some extravagant Romance. But it conveys a true Image of this Reign. —Unally'd and alone, Queen *Elizabeth* maintain'd a glorious and successful War against the greatest Power and the richest Potentate in *Europe*. She distress'd him in the *West-Indies*. She insulted him in *Spain*. She took from him the *Empire of the Sea*. She fix'd it in Herself. She render'd all the Projects of universal Monarchy vain; and shook to the Foundations the most exorbitant Power, which ever disturb'd the Peace, or threaten'd the Liberties of *Europe*. She supported the oppress'd People of the *Netherlands*, against the Tyranny of their Prince. She supported the Protestant Subjects of *France*, against *Catherine of Medicis* and her Sons, those execrable Butchers of their People. She supported the Kings of *France*, *Henry the third* and *fourth*, against the Ambition of the Princes of the House of *Lorraine*, and the rebellious League of their *Popish* Subjects. She, who seem'd to have every Thing to fear in the Beginning of her Reign, became in the Progress

Progress of it terrible to her Enemies. The Pretender to her Crown lost her own. The English, who appear'd at first so favourable to the Queen of Scotland, became at last as desirous to sacrifice the Life of that unfortunate Princess to the Security of Queen Elizabeth. Whilst War, Confusion, and the Miseries, which attend Them, raged in the Dominions of Those, who bent their Aim at the Disturbance of her Government; she preserved her Subjects in Peace and in Plenty. Whilst the Glory of the Nation was carry'd high by Atchievements in War; the Riches and the Strength of it were rais'd by the Arts of Peace to such a Degree, as former Ages had never seen, and as We of this Age feel in the Consequences.—Well therefore might my Lord Bacon, speaking of Queen Elizabeth, say, * *as for her Government, I assure myself I shall not exceed, if I do affirm that this Part of the Island never had fortyfive Years of better Times; and yet not through the Calmness of the Season, but through the Wisdom of her Regiment.*

Having made these Remarks on the Difficulties and on the Success, which attended Queen Elizabeth; it is Time to consider the Cause, which produced the stupendous Effects of her Reign. Now this Cause is, I think, very plain. She was wise enough to see

* *Advancement of Learning, Lib. I.*

clearly into the Nature of that Government, at the Head of which she was placed; and to know that † *the supreme Head of such a Government owes a supreme Service to the whole*. She was wise enough to know that, to be *Powerful*, she must either *usurp* on her People; *deceive* Them; or *gain* Them. The *two first*, she saw, were hard, dangerous and dishonourable. The *last*, she saw, was easy, safe and glorious. Her Head and her Heart concurr'd to determine her Choice. She made Herself very soon the most popular Person in the Kingdom. In her Reign, the Sense of the *Court*, the Sense of the *Parliament* and the Sense of the *People* were the same; and whenever she exerted her own Strength, she exerted the whole Strength of the Nation. Nothing she ask'd was ever refused by *Parliament*; because she ask'd nothing, which would have been refused by the *People*. She threw Herself so intirely on the *Affections* of her Subjects, that she seem'd to decline all other Tenure of the Crown. At least, she was not very solicitous about clearing her Title to it by *Descent*. An *Act*, declaring her Right according to the Order of Succession settled in *Parliament* 35 *Henry the eighth* contented Her; and she neglected the Precaution, which her *Sister* had taken, in getting the *Act*, which excluded them

† See Nath. Bacon's *Hist. and Pol. Discourse*.

both from the Crown, repeal'd, as far as it related to Herself. The particular Reasons of her Conduct, in this Case, might perhaps be guess'd at with more Probability than They have been; but certainly one general Reason outweigh'd them all in the Mind of this heroical Princess. She knew that however the Subtlety of *Lawyers* and *political Casuists* might influence *Opinions*, nothing but her *own Conduct* could give her the *Hearts* of her People. *These* she deem'd her great Security. *These* she acquired; and the little Glosses, which might have been put on her *Title*, she despised. The being *not only ty'd, but knit to her People* was her Aim; and she pursued this great Point of View, on all Occasions; the least, as well as the greatest; and even on Those, where she thought it necessary to *refuse* or to *reprimand*. Nature, as well as Art, fitted Her for this Conduct. She had Dignity without Pride. She was affable, without sinking into low Familiarity; and when she courted her People, she courted Them like a Queen. This *Popularity* was sometimes carry'd so far, both in her Manners, and in her Expressions, that her Enemies have endeavour'd to make it pass for gross and fulsome Affectation; and for such, indeed, it ought to have pass'd if it had gone alone. It might have shock'd, instead of alluring, if it had not been seconded by every Action of her Life, and contradicted by none.

—Let

—Let us now consider therefore, in some Instances, what that Conduct was, which convinced her People so intirely of her *Goodness* and her *Wisdom*; and which procured Her such large Returns of *Gratitude*, of *Duty*, of *Affection* and *Zeal*.



L E T T E R X I V .

A First and essential Condition, towards obtaining the Love and Confidence of a *free People*, is to be neither *fear'd* nor *despised* by them. Queen *Elizabeth* was, at no Time, in any Danger of the *latter*; and she soon put Herself above all the Suspicions, which might have exposed Her to the *former*. The only Difference between Her and her Parliament, which carry'd any Passion or Unkindness with it, happen'd in the ninth Year of her Reign. It was founded on the Apprehensions of the Dangers, which would arise after her Death, if the Succession was not fix'd during her Life. But We do not find the least Insinuation of any Jealousy of her Government; though the Heat of *both Houses*, at that Moment, was too great to have conceal'd any Uneasiness, which had lain at their Hearts. That she was fond enough of her *Prerogative* is certain; but then she took Care that it should never be grievous; or that if it was so, on some Occasions, to particular
Persons;

Persons; it should appear, by the Occasions themselves, and by the Manner of exercising it, specious to the Publick. — The *Prerogative* certainly run high in those Days. Her *Grandfather* had raised it by Cunning, and her *Father* by Violence. The Power of the *Privy Council* in civil Affairs, and the *censorian* Power of the *Star-Chamber* in criminal Affairs, as my Lord *Bacon* very properly stiles it, took too much of the *Pleas of the Crown* and of the *common Pleas* out of their proper Channels, and * *served rather to scare Men from doing Wrong, than to do any Man Right.*

— But the Exercise of *these Powers* having continued in four preceding Reigns, the People were accusom'd to it; and Care being taken to give no flagrant Occasion of Clamour against it, We are not to wonder if it was borne, without Opposition or Murmur, in a Reign as *popular* as This.

The *High-Commission Court*, that We may quote another Instance, had no Doubt very extraordinary Powers. The *Bishops*, who held the principal Sway in it, exercised by these Means two very great Authorities at the same Time; *one*, as Ordinaries in their *Dio-ceses*; the *other*, as Judges in *this Court*; so that they might *fine* and *imprison*; as well as *excommunicate* and *deprive*. Now, it is not very probable that the *Parliament*, who

* *Bac. Hist. and Pol. Disc.*

thought

thought the *first* of these Powers too much (as may be seen by the Attempts made against it, in the 28th Year of this Reign) were very well pleased to see the *second* in the same Hands. However, the Steadiness of the *Queen*, in maintaining this Part of the *Prerogative*, which had been given Her, was the less unpopular, on Account of the unsettled State of *Religion* at this Time; of the great Moderation of the *Bishops* in these early Days of the *Reformation*; and of the prudent Manner, in which the Jurisdiction of the *High-Commission Court* was executed.

The Effects of a *bare-faced Prerogative* are not the most dangerous to *Liberty*, for this Reason; because They are open; because the Alarm They give is commonly greater than the Progress They make; and whilst a particular Man or two are crush'd by Them, a whole Nation is put on its Guard. — The most dangerous Attacks on *Liberty* are Those, which *surprize*, or *undermine*; which are owing to *Powers*, given under Pretence of some *urgent Necessity*; to *Powers*, popular and reasonable, perhaps, at first; but such as ought not to become settled and confirm'd by a *long Exercise*; and yet are render'd *perpetual* by Art and Management; and, in a great Degree, by the Nature of *these Powers* themselves. Examples, of this Kind, might be produced from the *Spanish* and other Histories. But *Queen Elizabeth* was far from setting any such Examples. She shew'd her
Mode-

Moderation, in desiring no *suspicious Powers*, as well as in the Exercise of her *Prerogative*; and *this Moderation* was the more remarkable, because no Prince ever had the Pretence of *Necessity* to urge on stronger Appearances. Her whole Reign may be almost call'd a State of *defensive* and *offensive War*; in *England*, as well as in *Ireland*; in the *Indies*, as well as in *Europe*. She ventured to go through this State, if it was a Venture, without the Help of a *standing Army*. The People of *England* had seen none, from the Days of *Richard the second*, and this *cautious Queen* might perhaps imagine, that the Example of his Reign and Those of other Countries, where *standing Armies* were establish'd, would beget Jealousies in the Minds of her People and diminish that *Affection*, which she esteem'd and found to be the greatest Security of her Person, and the greatest Strength of her Government. Whenever she wanted Troops, her Subjects flock'd to her Standard; and her Reign affords most illustrious Proofs, that all the Ends of Security, and of Glory too, may be answer'd in this Island, without the Charge and Danger of the *Expedient* just mention'd.

This Assertion will not be contradicted by Those, who recollect in how many Places, and on how many Occasions, her Forces fought and conquer'd the best disciplined veteran Troops in *Europe*. Other Examples might be brought to shew how careful Queen

Elizabeth

Elizabeth was to avoid every Thing, which might give the least Umbrage to her People. But we have said enough on this Head. Let us proceed to another.

The Conduct she held, with Respect to *Parties*, deserves to be remark'd; because the Moderation, the Wisdom, and the Equity, which she shew'd in it, contributed very much to cool the Ferment in the Beginning of her Reign; by which she had Time to captivate the good Will of her People; to settle her Government; to establish her Authority; and even to change the national Religion, with little Contradiction, and without any Disturbance.

Notwithstanding all the Indignities she had suffer'd, and all the Dangers she had run, before her Accession, several Persons were restored, and not a Man was attainted in her first Parliament. The Steps I have mention'd being once made, she stood on firmer Ground, and had less to fear from the *Spirit of Faction*. This Clemency, once shewn, she could, more safely and with greater Reason, exercise Severity, when the Preservation of the publick Peace made it necessary.

The Peace of the Kingdom was the Standard, to which she proportion'd her Conduct. She was far from casting herself with Precipitation and Violence even into *that Party*, which she favour'd; and on which alone she resolved to depend. She was far from inflaming their Spirits against the *adverse Party*;
and

and farther still from pushing any Sort of Men, *Puritans*, or even *Papists*, into Despair; or provoking them to deserve Punishment, that she might have a Pretence to inflict it. She pursued her own Scheme steadily; but She pursued it gradually; and accompany'd it with all the artful Circumstances, which could soften the Minds of Men, and induce Those, who were the most averse to her Measures, to bear them, at least, patiently. On these Principles she proceeded, in the whole Course of her Reign.

To the *Papists* she used great Lenity; till the Bull of *Pius Quintus*, and the Rebellion, and other Attempts, consequent upon it, obliged Her to procure new Laws, and execute more Rigour. Yet even then she distinguish'd * *Papists in Conscience from Papists in Faction*. She made the same Distinction with Regard to the *Puritans*. *Their Zeal was not condemned; only their Violence was sometimes censured*; until they attempted to set up their own Discipline, in Opposition to That, which had been establish'd by national Authority; until their Motives appear'd to be *no more Zeal, no more Conscience*, says Secretary *Walsingham*, *but meer Faction and Division*.

Thus cautious and steady was the Conduct of Queen *Elizabeth* towards *Parties*; steady to the Principle, and therefore vary'd in the

* *Walsingham's Letter.*

Application, as the Behaviour of *Parties* towards her Government vary'd; not as *Success* abroad, or the *Change of Servants at home*, might have influenced That of a Prince of inferior Abilities. What has been said relates to *Parties in the Nation*; for as to *Parties at Court*, the Conduct of this Queen, though directed to the same general End, seems to have been different. In the Nation she chose *one Party*. She render'd the System of *that Party* the System of the *Whole*. By this Establishment, the *other Parties* became so many *Factions*; and by the Conduct we have described, she defeated and disarm'd these *Factions*. At *Court*, she countenanced and perhaps fomented the *Parties*, which different Characters, and different Interests created. But however That was, she found Means to attach them all to Herself; and she found this Benefit by keeping her Ear open to Them all, that the Truth could not be conceal'd from Her by the most powerful of her *Ministers*; as We have explain'd in a *former Letter*, upon this Subject. On her Accession to the Throne, she retain'd thirteen of her Sister's Counsellors, and ballanced them by no more than eight of her own Religion. On *Those*, as well as on all others, which she afterwards admitted into the Ministry, says Cambden, she bestow'd her Favours with so much Caution, and so little Distinction, as to prevent either Party from gaining the Ascendent over her; whereby she remain'd Mistress of Herself, and pre-

preserved both their Affections and her own Power and Authority intire.

The Favours, by which she distinguish'd the Earls of *Leicester* and *Essex*, are not Exceptions, in the Course of so long a Reign, sufficient to destroy the Truth of this general Observation. Besides, both these Lords felt the Weight of her Displeasure, (nay one of them, the Rigour of her Justice,) when they presumed too much on her Favour, and swerved from their Duty. The singular Confidence, which she placed in *Cecil* and some others of her *Ministers*, cannot be quoted in Opposition to it; for if she distinguish'd them, it was rather by the Labours, than the Favours she heap'd on them. She supported them indeed against their Enemies; but then the Merit of *these Men* was far from being problematical. Their Works testify'd daily for them, in bold and well-concerted Enterprizes; in wise, and well-conducted Negotiations. The *People* reap'd the Benefit of their Services, as well as the *Prince*. They were justify'd in the *Nation*, as well as supported at *Court*. In short, by this Discernment of Spirits, by this skilful Management of *Parties*, without the Help of *military Force*, unless in actual Rebellions, *Queen Elizabeth* preserved her People in Tranquility; though there pass'd not an Hour in her whole Reign, without some Intrigue against her Life, and the publick Peace.

This *Moderation*, in assuming and exercising Power, might have been illustrated more, and evinced against all the little Cavils made, and to be made, if we had not avoided too great Prolixity. But it is Time to hasten to the Consideration of some other Parts of her Conduct:

Queen *Elizabeth* was accused of *Avarice* by her Enemies; and perhaps she was so by some of her Friends. Among that hungry Crew, which attends all Courts for the *Loaves and the Fishes*, she could not escape this Charge. But surely, the Nation had Reason to applaud her Frugality. Her *Grandfather* hoarded up Riches. Her *Father* dissipated them. The Consequence under both these Princes was, that every slight Occasion became a sufficient Pretence to ask for *Subsidies*; nay, they were ask'd and granted too, when even the slightest Occasion did not exist. They were ask'd by *Henry the seventh* for Wars, which he never intended to make; and by *Henry the eighth* for resisting *Invasions*, which were never design'd against Him. Thus was the Nation equally oppress'd by the *Avarice* of *One*, and by the *Profusion* of the *Other*.

But Queen *Elizabeth* neither hoarded up, nor lavish'd away; and it is justly to be question'd whether any Example of a prudent Oeconomy in private Life can be produced equal to That, which she practiced in the whole Management of her Affairs. The famous

mous BURLEIGH used to say, that *He never cared to see the Treasury swell like a disorder'd Spleen, when the other Parts of the Commonwealth were in a Consumption*; and his Mistress thought that *Money, in the Pockets of her Subjects, was better placed than in her own Exchequer*. Surely, these Maxims were wise, as well as popular. If a Prince amasses Wealth, to hoard it up like *Henry the seventh*, it is useless to Himself, and lost to the Publick. If He squanders it away, like *Henry the eighth*, He will enrich particular Men, and impoverish the State. But whilst these Treasures remain in the Purse of the Subject, they circulate in Commerce; they increase the common Stock; and they increase by Consequence the Riches of a Prince like *Queen Elizabeth*; for to such a Prince this Purse will be always open.

As immense as the Expences were, which she found Herself obliged to make from the Moment she ascended the Throne, she received nothing in *Taxes* from her People till the sixth Year of her Reign. The *Taxes*, then given, were given by Way of *Retribution*; which was generally the Method in her Time. In *former Reigns*, the People granted Aids, not without a general Communication at least of the Uses, to which they were to be apply'd; but often without a sufficient Assurance that they should be so apply'd. In this *Reign* that Method of Proceeding was inverted.

The Prince in the World, who deserved to be trusted the most, desired to be so the least. The Aids, which she had from her People, were not so properly *Grants*, as *Reimbursements* of Money, advanced for national Services. — And what Services? *For establishing the Protestant Religion; for defending England; for rescuing Scotland; for carrying on a successful War against an opulent and potent Enemy; for assisting the Subjects and even the Kings of France; for supporting the People of the Netherlands; for refining the debased Coin; for paying all the Debts and restoring the Credit of the Crown; for providing Ammunition at home, which before this Time we had been always obliged to purchase abroad; for improving both home and foreign Trade; for rebuilding and augmenting the Navy; and for doing all This, without any burthensome Imposition on the People; as the Parliament more than once acknowledged.*

It was so much a Maxim of *Queen Elizabeth*, to save for the *Publick* not for *Herself*; and to measure her Riches, by the Riches of the Nation, not by the Treasures she had in her Coffers; that she refused Supplies offer'd, and remitted Payments of Supplies granted, when she found that she was able to carry on the publick Service without them. The two great Principles of that *Oeconomy*, which enabled Her to do so much for her *People*, and to oppress them so little, seem to have been

been These. 1st, She made the most of her *Revenues*; not by tormenting, and racking her Subjects, like *Henry the seventh*, but by keeping a strict Hand over her *Officers*, and hindering them from enriching Themselves, either by direct Fraud, or by a clandestine Management, which may be justly term'd indirect Fraud, and is often more pernicious than the other. — 2^{dly}, She practis'd that *superior Oeconomy*, of which we have spoken in a *former Paper*, with the utmost Ability. What could be done by *Wisdom*, or *Courage*, she never attempted by *Money*; nor expected that her Subjects should *buy* her out of Difficulties. Strong at home, she affected little to lean on foreign Help. As her Alliance was often courted, and she seldom courted That of others, it was in her Power, and she took the Advantage, to engage in no Expence, but such as the Interest of her Kingdom render'd immediately necessary. To this Interest alone she proportion'd her Expence. This was the sole Rule of her Conduct. The *Hugenots*, whom she assisted in their first War, made their Peace without Her, and assisted to retake from her the Places, she had bargain'd for with them; yet she help'd them, in the Wars, which follow'd, with her Troops, her Ships, and her Money. The *Dutch* had given her no Cause to complain of their Behaviour. Yet when *France* abandon'd them at the Treaty of *Vervins*, and they had no Support but Hers remaining, she made a new

Bargain with them, and lessen'd her own Charge ; because she knew they were able, at that Time, to supply the Deficiency.

In all these Expences, she was careful neither to starve nor overfeed the Cause, while it lasted ; and she frequently stipulated a Repayment ; which she might exact afterwards, if she found Reason so to do ; or which she might remit, and thereby create a second Obligation to Her, if she found her Account in such an Instance of Generosity. *Queen Elizabeth* was not only thus *frugal* for her People, but perpetually attentive to the Methods of *inriching* them. In the very first Parliament, which she held, amidst the most important Affairs ; such as the Settlement of the *Crown* on her own Head ; the Change of *Religion* ; and the Establishment of the *Church* ; Regulations for the Improvement of *Trade*, and Increase of *Shipping* were not forgot.

We might pursue the same Observation through the whole Course of her Reign, both in Parliament, and out of it ; and shew, in numberless Instances, how she rose to the highest, and descended even to the lowest Circumstances, which in any Degree affected the *Trade* and *Navigation* of her Subjects. We might shew the Advantages she took, in these Respects, not only of the Faults committed by other Governments, but of the Misfortunes of other Countries. In a Word, we might shew how *War* itself, one of the
greatest

greatest publick Calamities, instead of impoverishing, became a Source of Riches to this Nation, by the Manner, in which she made it.

But these Particulars would carry us beyond the Bounds we have prescribed to ourselves. In general, it will not be deny'd that, beside the Spirit of *Industry*, which exercised itself at home, Queen *Elizabeth* raised and push'd to the highest Degree, by the Protection and Encouragement she gave, a Spirit of discovering *new Countries*; making *new Settlements*; and opening *new Veins of Trade*. The Force of this first Impression has lasted long amongst us. *Commerce* has thrived under Neglects, and Discouragement. It has subsisted under Oppressions and Obstructions; and the *Spirit* of it is not yet extinguish'd by That of *Stockjobbing*; though the Spirit of *Stockjobbing* be to That of *Trade*, what the Spirit of *Faction* is to That of *Liberty*. The Tendency of *both* is to advance the Interest of a few worthless Individuals, at the Expence of the whole Community. The Consequence of both, if ever they prevail to the Ruin of *Trade* and *Liberty*, must be, that the *Harpies* will starve in the Midst of imaginary Wealth; and that the Children of *Faction*, like the iron Race of *Cadmus*, will destroy one another.

Before Queen *Elizabeth*'s Reign, the Commerce of *England* was confined and poor. In her Reign, it extended itself over all the known, and even into the unknown Parts of
the

the World. We traded to the *North*, and open'd our Passage into *Muscovy*. We carry'd our Merchandize up the *Duina*, down the *Volga*, and a-cross the *Caspian Sea* into *Persia*.

Our Merchants visited the Coasts of *Africa*; all the Countries of the *Grand Seignior*; and following the Tracks of the *Venetians* into the *East-Indies*, They soon follow'd the *Portuguese* thither by the *Cape of Good Hope*. They went thither through the *South Sea*, and sail'd round the World. In the *West-Indies*, they not only traded, but establish'd themselves in Spight of all the Power of *Spain*.

Before Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign, the Fleet of *England* was so inconsiderable, that even in the Days of her *Father*, if I mistake not, we were forced to borrow, or hire Ships of *Hamburgb*, *Lubeck*, *Dantzick*, and other Places.

In her Reign, it soon grew to such a Number and Strength, that it became terrible to the greatest maritime Powers of *Europe*.

On such Foundations were the Riches and Power of this Kingdom laid by Queen *Elizabeth*; and These were some of the Means she imploy'd to gain the *Affections* of her Subjects. Can we be surprized if she succeeded.

LETTER



LETTER XV.

QUEEN ELIZABETH succeeded in gaining the Affections of her Subjects, not only by the Conduct, which she held *at home*, but by That, which she held in the Management of the national Interest *abroad*.

We have endeavour'd to explain some Particulars of the *former*. It remains that we give the least imperfect Ideas we are able of the *latter*, and that we apply the whole great Example of *this Reign*, to confirm the Doctrines we have advanced.

Queen *Elizabeth* could not have establish'd and preserved, as she did, the Tranquility of her People in the midst of Disturbance, nor their Security in the midst of Danger, if she had not taken some Share in the general Affairs of *Europe*. She took therefore such a Share as the Interest of *England* necessarily required at that Time; and she conducted herself in the Management of it with Wisdom and Address superior to any of her Predecessors.

Her *Sister* had been render'd by Bigotry an egregious Bubble to the Court of *Rome*. Persuaded by her *Husband*, and deceived by her *Ministers*, she was so likewise very fatally in
the

the Quarrel, which broke out between *France* and *Spain*. The Parliament, in assenting to her Marriage with a *foreign Prince*, had imposed such *Conditions*, as were judged sufficient to preserve the Constitution of the Government, and the Independency of the Kingdom.

Philip had sworn to the Observation of these *Conditions*. Such of them, as he had not either Time, or Opportunity, or Temptation to break, were observed; but the others proved too weak to hold him. Thus, for Instance, we do not find that he enrich'd himself at the Expence of *England*. He is said, on the contrary, to have brought hither very great Treasures; and his Father had trusted the Distribution of an immense Sum to *Gardiner*; so that if he bribed the Nation, it was with his own Money, not theirs; but he engaged the Nation in a War with *France*, because *France* broke with *Spain*; notwithstanding the express Condition made by Parliament, * *that the Match should not at all derogate from the League lately concluded betwixt the Queen of England and the King of France, but the Peace should remain inviolate between the English and the French.*

This Sacrifice of the *national* to a *foreign Interest* cost us *Calais*; a Conquest, which the *French* look'd upon as a Compensation for

* *Cumden.*

near two hundred other Places, which they were obliged by the Treaty of *Cambray* to give up to *Philip*. *Boulogne* had been sacrificed in the preceding Reign, not to a *foreign Interest*, but to That of the *Minister*, *Dudley Earl of Warwick*, afterwards Duke of *Northumberland*. The People were willing and able to assert their Right, and to defend their Possession ; but the Situation of the *Minister*, and the Schemes of private Interest, which he was carrying on at home, required that he should avoid, at any rate, a War, even a defensive War. In short *Boulogne*, for which *France* had engaged to give two Millions, was deliver'd up for four hundred thousand Crowns ; and the very *same Minister*, who had opposed with Violence all the publick Considerations, urged by the *Protector* for yielding this Place, yielded it to purchase a *Treaty* necessary for *Himself*, detrimental and dishonourable to the *Nation*.

We have said enough, in a *former Letter*, concerning the wild Conduct of *Henry the eighth* in *foreign Affairs* ; and there is no need of going any farther back. These Examples are sufficient to shew the Opposition between That of Queen *Elizabeth* and That of her Predecessors. She was neither deceived, like them, by her *Ministers* ; nor betray'd by her *Passions*, to serve any other Interest at the Expence of *England*.

It would be easy to prove, from many Instances, how careful she was to avoid every Thing,

Thing, which might even warp the steady Tenor of her Conduct in this Respect. As long as she had no real Interest distinct from That of the Country she govern'd, she knew that no fictitious Interest could be imposed on Her. She kept Herself therefore clear of any such real Interest, and thought that the Crown of *England* deserved her sole, her undivided Care.

Much has been said of her Behaviour in all the Treaties of *Marriage* proposed to Her. We shall not engage in that Disquisition. But This, We think, cannot be controverted; that if ever she was in earnest resolved to marry, she was so when the *Articles of Marriage* between Her and the Duke of *Anjou* were sign'd. It is hardly possible, as *Rapin* observes, to account for her Conduct on this Occasion by any other Principle. Now upon this Supposition, what Motive could determine Her to break *this Match* in so abrupt a Manner? The Reasons urged by *Cambden*, and other Writers in general, prove too much. They serve rather to prove that she should not have enter'd into these Engagements at all, than to account for her breaking them as she did. But among the Reasons, on which *Walsingham* insisted, when he was sent into *France* upon this Occasion, we may observe one in particular, founded on a Fact, which happen'd after the signing of the *Articles*; and which accounts for the Queen's Conduct in this Case agreeably to Principles, on which she

she proceeded in all others. The Duke of *Anjou* had accepted the Sovereignty of the *low Countries*. By this Step, He had engaged himself in a War with *Spain*; and the Queen would not, on his Account, engage her People in it, * *desiring nothing more than that by this Marriage the Realm might be preserved in Peace and Tranquility.*

She might incline to marry this Prince, under all the Limitations and Reserves contain'd in the *Articles*, whilst He had no Dominions on the *Continent*; and yet start backwards and resolve to break the Match, as soon as she saw him actually possess'd of the Sovereignty of the *low Countries*.

Nay, if we should suppose, against historical Probability, that she never design'd to consummate her Marriage, though she enter'd into *Articles*, yet there will still remain no reasonable Way of accounting for the sudden Resolution she took of breaking at this precise Point of Time; unless we suppose, that she thought this Reason the strongest and the most unanswerable of all Those, which could be urged in Excuse of a Measure liable to several Objections, and some very inconvenient Contingencies.

There were few Things, which she had more at Heart than rescuing the *Netherlands* from the *Spanish* Yoke; and there was no

* *Cambden.*

thing in the whole Extent of *foreign Affairs*, to which she gave greater Attention. Even at this Time, she supply'd the Duke of *Anjou* with very considerable Sums, for the Support of his Enterprize; and, about four Years afterwards, she espoused more openly the Cause of these Provinces, by making a Treaty with the *States*, and by sending an Army to their Assistance. But as she would not marry a Prince, who was their *Sovereign*, so she would not accept this *Sovereignty*, when it was offer'd directly to Her. She persisted in avoiding an Engagement, which might in its Consequence carry her farther than the Interest of *England* required; or oblige her to make greater Efforts than were consistent with that easy and flourishing State, in which she resolved to preserve her own People.

Much more might be said; but This may suffice to shew what the first and fundamental Principle was, by which Queen *Elizabeth* govern'd Herself in all *foreign Affairs*. She consider'd the Interest of no Kingdom, no State, nor People, no not even the general Interest of the *Reformation*, as zealous a *Protestant* as she was, nor the Preservation of a *Ballance of Power in Europe*, as great an *Heroine* as she was, in any other Light than relatively to the Interest of *England*. She assisted, or opposed, she defended, or attack'd, just as this Interest directed; and the Degree, to which it was concern'd, was the exact and constant Measure, to which she proportion'd her

her good, and her ill Offices, her Friendship, and her Enmity. She was diverted from this Principle of Conduct neither by Weakness, nor Strength of Mind; neither by Fear, nor Hope; neither by Pusillanimity, nor Courage; neither by Moderation, nor Ambition.

We may conclude this Head, by venturing to affirm that, in the whole Course of her Reign, there was not a Penny of *English Money* spent, nor a Drop of *English Blood* spilt; except where it was necessary to keep off from this Nation some real, visible Advantage.

Queen *Elizabeth's* Policy was deep; and the Means she employ'd were often very secret; but the Ends, to which this Policy and these Means are directed, were never equivocal. Let us now descend into some particular Instances of the Wisdom and Address, with which she pursued this great Principle.

These Particulars may be reduced properly; we think, under two general Heads. The first is This; she watch'd the *Ebbs and Flows of the Power and Interest of Europe; the Vicissitudes and Fluctuations in the Affairs of Peace and War*. We use the Words of a * *late Writer*, but shall make a very different Application of them.

This uncertain, vary'd, shifting Scene was so far from being the Cause of *bad Measures*,

* Vide *Observations on the Writings of the Craftsman*.

or the Excuse for *bad Success*, at the Time we are speaking of, that it was the very Source, from whence *Queen Elizabeth* derived those Opportunities, which she improved so gloriously. A weaker Council than Hers might have been puzzled, and weaker Heads might have been turn'd by so confused a State of Affairs. Unable to steer steadily through so many Difficulties, every Current would have carry'd such Men along with it. Every Blast of Wind would have driven them before it. Perpetually toss'd about, at the Mercy of every Event, they must have lived from Day to Day, or from Hour to Hour.

If the Kingdom had escaped intire Destruction in this forlorn Condition, it must have been by Miracle, and without any Merit on the Part of *Those*, who govern'd; but this entire Destruction would much more probably have follow'd, after a long Series of Calamities; without any other Excuse on their Part, than That of charging the Catastrophe to the Account of *Fortune*, the common Scape-Goat of *unskilful Ministers*.

The Conduct and the Success of *Queen Elizabeth* and her *Ministers*; were very different. She managed *France*, until she had taken such Measures, as left her less to fear from *Scotland*; and she managed *Spain*, until she had nothing left to fear from *France*.

She knew what Designs *Henry the second* built on the Pretensions of his Daughter-in-Law, *Mary Queen of Scotland*; and no one, who

who considers the History of this Time, nay, even as He finds it deduced by *Rapin* himself, will be of his Mind, that she expected to enjoy great Tranquility by the Peace, which she made, soon after her Accession to the Throne, with *France* and *Scotland*.

But the making this Treaty gave Her Time, which was of the utmost Importance to Her to gain, abroad as well as at home, in the Beginning of her Reign. The Manner, in which she made it, gave Her Reputation likewise; and she was wise enough to know of what real Advantage Reputation is; and how much That of a Princee depends on the first Steps He makes in Government.

She practised in this Negotiation a Rule, which she observed to the last. How much soever *Philip* repented her Proceedings at home, it was plain He could not abandon, at that Time, her Interests abroad. The Point of Honour, drawn from the Consideration that *England* had enter'd into the War for the Sake of *Spain*, did not probably weigh much with Him; but the Pretensions of *France* gave Him a just Alarm; and the same Reasons, which are said to have induced Him to save her Life, when she was *Princess*, stood in Force to make Him support Her, now she was *Queen*, against the Power of *France*. Notwithstanding this plausible Consideration, *Queen Elizabeth* resolved to treat for Herself, and by Herself. She was of Opinion, says *Cambden*, that it would not redound to the

Honour of England, or Herself, to be reduced to the Necessity of supporting her Interests by a Dependence on Spain. She exerted the same Spirit, and behaved Herself with the same Dignity, on a very remarkable Occasion, and in a very nice Conjuncture, at the latter End of Her Reign; at the Treaty of *Vervins*.

She despised the Offers made Her by *Henry the fourth*. She resolved to continue the War, and to support alone the States of the *low Countries*, rather than to suffer the Man in the World, who had the greatest Obligations to Her, to treat for Her. — True it is, that she had Reason to be dissatisfy'd with his Behaviour; but besides That, the good Understanding between this Prince and *Philip the second* being promoted by the Court of *Rome*; it is possible Queen *Elizabeth* might think such Negotiators, as were devoted to that Court, not quite so proper to be trusted with the Interests of her Kingdom.

As soon as *Henry the second* was dead, and his Son *Francis the second*, a young and in every Sense a weak Prince, was on the Throne of *France*, she acted with less Reserve and Caution. The Treaty, which had been privately negotiated before with the Malecontents of *Scotland*, was now sign'd; her Army march'd to their Assistance; the *French* were driven out of that Kingdom; the *Reformation* was solemnly and legally establish'd there; and Queen *Elizabeth* was the avow'd Defender of the Liberties, Privileges, and Religion
of

of the *Scottish* Nation.—*Francis the second* lived a very short Time, and died without leaving any Children. The Fear therefore of an Union of the Crowns of *England* and *Scotland* with That of *France*, terrify'd *Philip the second* no longer. Queen *Elizabeth* had therefore the more to fear. The Court of *France* had still the same Bigotry, and the same Hatred to Her; though not the same Pretensions. The Court of *Spain* could be now no more restrain'd, by any political Consideration, from pursuing those Designs against Her, even in Conjunction with *France*, which no other Consideration had hitherto retarded.

The Projects form'd and the Engagements taken between these Powers, at the Congress at *Bayonne*, were not absolute Secrets. She felt the Effects of them every Day, in Conspiracies against her Government, and even her Life. Too weak to defend Herself by Force on so many Sides, she defended Herself by Stratagem; improved every Incident; and took some Advantage of every Turn. She contented Herself to countermine the Intrigues of the Courts of *Rome*, of *France*, and of *Spain*. With the *first* she kept no Measures, because she could have no War. With the *two last* she kept all Measures to prevent one. Though Queen *Elizabeth's* whole Reign was properly a *State of War*, and there was no Point of Time in it, where she was free from all Attacks, private as well as publick, indirect as well as direct; yet the first twenty-five Years

of her Reign may be said, in one Sense, to have been neither a *State of War*, nor a *State of Peace*; because both Sides pretended to look on the *Treaties of Peace* as subsisting; and either disavow'd, or excused the Hostilities reciprocally committed, not constantly, but occasionally committed. If she had fallen into *this State* from That of a *settled Peace*, disentangled from all Pretensions, either of her own upon others, or of others upon her, there would be no Occasion to admire her Conduct. But that she should be able, when she neither had, nor could have a *settled, secure Peace* with her Neighbours, to stand so long on the slippery Verge of *War*, and avoid the Necessity of engaging directly in it, till she was in a Condition of doing so with Success, is justly Matter of the greatest Admiration.— If she had only aim'd to keep off the *evil Day*, it might at last have come upon Her with a double Weight of Misfortune. If she had only gain'd Time to prolong *Suspence*, she might have lost Opportunities; wasted her Strength; tired, jaded and exhausted her People. But This was far from being the Case. She was in *this State* by good, not by bad Policy; and she made the Use she design'd of it. She disappointed, divided, and weaken'd her Enemies. She prepared the Opportunities, which she afterwards improved. She united, animated, and enrich'd her People; and (as difficult as That may seem to be for a Prince in such a Situation) She maintain'd

tain'd her own Dignity, and supported the Honour of the Nation. — To exemplify all these Particulars, would be to write her History; but it is necessary to say something upon them.

Of the *two Powers* abroad, from whom alone she had any Thing to apprehend, and with whom she was principally concern'd, *France* gave her the least and the shortest Trouble. *Charles the ninth* came a *Minor* to the Crown. *Two Factions*, drunk with religious Enthusiasm, and headed by Men of the most desperate Ambition, desolated the Kingdom. The *Queen Mother* blew up the Flames first; and try'd in vain afterwards to extinguish them, by a Deluge of Blood. *Queen Elizabeth*, who had probably encouraged the famous Conspiracy of *Amboise*, which broke out just before the Death of *Francis the second*, continued to abet and support the *Protestant Party*; but still subordinately to such Measures, as her Situation, relatively to *Scotland*, or *Ireland*, or *Spain*, obliged her to keep with *Charles the ninth*. These Measures were sometimes such, and even after the Massacre of *St. Bartholomew*, as the Zeal of the *Huguenots* could hardly forgive her. But she went wisely and steadily on to her own Purposes.

Non ponebat enim Rumores ante salutem.

When *Henry the third* came to the Crown, and the *League* was once form'd, the Crown

of *France* wanted her Assistance, and had it; and as powerful as the *Princes* of the House of *Lorraine* were, they could give her little open Disturbance; unless they prevail'd in their wicked, and almost chimerical Projects in *France*. With these *Princes*, and their Faction therefore she never kept any Measures; as they never kept any with Her. As politick a Prince, as *Philip the second* is esteem'd to have been, he was amused by the Regard, which *Queen Elizabeth* affected sometimes for his Person, and always for the *Treaties* subsisting between them; and he lost the Opportunities, in which he might have attack'd Her with Advantage. The slow Councils of *Spain*, and the slower Execution of them, produced Opportunities, which her Sagacity and Vigour improved. The Support she gave to the *Huguenots* made the *Spaniards* afraid of provoking Her, by too hasty and direct Attacks, to give the same Support to the People of the *low Countries*. She turn'd their Game against them, and acted in the *low Countries* in the same Manner, as they acted in *Ireland*, and even in *England*; but with better Effect. From the Year 1577 she began to favour this Revolt; and in the Year 1585 she made a formal Treaty with the *States*. Such of these Measures as could be conceal'd, she conceal'd. Such of them as could not be conceal'd, she excused, or endeavour'd to justify and reconcile with the *Treaties* between *Spain* and *England*.

As

As the Time she gain'd and the Diversions she gave, by this Management, put it quite out of the Power of *France*, and made *Spain* less able to hurt her; so they alone put it in her Power to settle her Government, and to do all the great Things at home, of which we have spoken in other Papers*. We shall not repeat them here; but shall conclude this Head by observing, in an Example or two, how she maintain'd her own Dignity in other Cases, besides That of *Treating*, which is taken Notice of above, and how she supported the Honour of the Nation, and the Interests of her Subjects.


During the Time she was the most careful to avoid a War with *Spain*, and had the most Reason to be so; even in the Year 1568, whilst those Revolutions, which broke out soon afterwards, were preparing, She would not suffer the least Injury to be offer'd to any of her Subjects with Impunity. Some Vessels and Effects, belonging to an *English* Merchant, had been seized by the *Spaniards* in the *West-Indies*. She did not make War upon This; but she soon found and seized an Opportunity of resenting the Insult. She laid her Hands on very great Sums of Money, claim'd indeed by *Genouese* Merchants, but sent to the *low Countries* and design'd, no Doubt, for the *Spanish* Service there. The Duke of *Alva* seized, in return, the Persons

* *Vid.* The first seven Volumes of the *Craftsman*, printed for R. Francklin,

and Effects of the Subjects of *England*; and she immediately made Reprisals on Those of the *Flemmings*. What Composition was made with the *Genouese* does not, I think, appear; but as the Seizure was to the Disappointment and Loss of *Spain*, so the Composition was probably to the Advantage of *England*; since, at this very Time, *Queen Elizabeth* discharged the Debts contracted by her *Father* and *Brother* to Foreigners. As to the Effects of the *Netherlands*, she return'd the Overplus of the Value, after having repay'd to her own Subjects the full Amount of their Losses. She carved for her People; and would not leave it to a Dispute, *what Reparation* they should have; much less whether they should have any *Reparation*, or not.

Such a Conduct as This, which she held, even whilst she kept Measures with *Spain*, and avoided a War, foretold what might be expected from Her, and what she actually perform'd, when she thought it no longer expedient to keep the same Measures. But This will come, with other Reflections, more properly under the next *general Head*; to which we think that the particular Instances of *Queen Elizabeth's* Wisdom and Address, in the Management of *foreign Affairs*, may be reduced.

LETTER



LETTER XVI.

IF Queen *Elizabeth* consider'd every foreign Interest relatively to the *Interest of England*, She consider'd likewise every Measure to be taken in foreign Affairs relatively to the *Situation of England*. This we establish as the *second general Head*, to which the particular Instances of her Wisdom and Address, in the Management of foreign Affairs, may be properly reduced.

She consider'd Herself as Queen of a Country cut off from the *Continent*, and separated by the *Sea* from all other Countries, except *Scotland*. Her Conduct therefore towards *Scotland* was very different, in many Respects, from That, which she held towards every other Nation. — A due Observation of these different Principles, on which Queen *Elizabeth* proceeded in the *divided State* of our Island, may serve to set, in a stronger and clearer Light, that single Principle, which remains to be follow'd in our *united State*.

The Situation of an *Island* affords great Advantages, when they are wisely improved; and when they are neglected, as great Disadvantages may result from this very Situation. — The Reign, now before us, is a glorious and unanswerable Proof that the Halcyon Days,

Days, so much boasted of, and so seldom found, Days of Prosperity, as well as Peace, may be enjoy'd in an *Island*, whilst all the neighbouring *Continent* is fill'd with Alarms, and even laid waste by War. But our own Histories will shew us likewise, how an *Island* may approach, as it were, too near the *Continent*, and be fatally drawn into that great Vortex. Lest we should ramble too widely in the large Field, which opens itself, let us confine our Reflections to some of those different Means and Objects, either of *Defence*, or of *Offence*, which Nature, improved by Art, presents to People, who inhabit *Islands*, or to People, who inhabit the *Continent*, according to their different Situations. A powerful Navy is of indispensable Necessity to the *former* of These. Without it, They must be poor and exposed. With it, They may be rich and secure. Barriers of *fortify'd Towns*, and great *standing Armies* are of the same Necessity to the *latter*. Without this Security, They lye open to every Inroad, and at the Mercy of every Neighbour. With it, They may be safe from foreign Danger, and even terrible to Those, who live round them. But then as the *Sea* is a Barrier of no Expence, and as a *maritime Force* carries no domestick Danger along with it, but enriches the Community it defends, so a *fortify'd Barrier*, and a *regular Army*, which are necessary to secure a Nation situate on the *Continent* against foreign Danger, carry great domestick Inconveniencies, and

and even Dangers too, along with them. Both of them like Armour, too heavy to be borne, waste the Strength of Those, who are cover'd by them; and an *Army* like a *Sword*, which recoils on the Blow, may wound the *Constitution*, it was meant to defend. — But farther; as particular Families, by uniting together, form'd larger Societies, for their common Defence, and gave Rise to the Kingdoms, and States, which have appear'd in the World; so these larger Societies have, ever since, found it necessary, or advantageous, to unite together in various manners; sometimes by an entire Union, or an Incorporation of different People into one Body politic; sometimes by a partial, or foederal Union of distinct States in one common Cause; and at all Times by *Alliances*, made on particular Occasions, and suggested by a real, or seeming *Conformity of Interests*. This occasional Union by *Alliances* with other States, of which alone we are to speak in this Place, is so necessary to all the Nations on the *Continent*, that even the most powerful cannot subsist without it; and Those, who manage it best, are accounted wisest. Their several Interests are the Objects of their *Alliances*; and as the former are subject to change, the latter must vary with Them. Such Variations, whether occasion'd by the Course of Accidents, or by the Passions of Men, though made by a few, will affect many; because there always are, and always must be, Systems of *Alliances* subsisting

sisting among these Nations ; and therefore, as a Change in some of the *Parts* of one System necessarily requires a Change in all the rest ; so the Alteration of *one System* necessarily requires an Alteration of the *others*.

Thus are They always toss'd from *Peace* to *War*, and from *War* to *Peace*. Perpetual Negotiation is the Life and Soul of their Governments. Their Well-being, nay their Safety at *home*, requires that They should be always busy *abroad*. It is necessary for them to be *Mediators*, *Arbitrators*, or, which is infinitely worse, *Guaranties* ; to be contracting Parties in *preliminary*, *provisional*, or *explanatory Treaties* ; in *defensive*, or *offensive Alliances* ; by which Means, They get over daily Difficulties, by the Multiplication of lasting Incumbrances.

The interfering and clashing of their Rights and Pretensions, and the various Obligations, by which They stand bound to one another, appear to be and are the immediate Causes of all these Disputes and Contentions. But the principal and remote Cause arises from the Proximity and other Circumstances of their Situations. That Necessity, or Advantage, which gave Occasion to the original Engagements, has maintain'd and multiply'd them since ; and the last would not be reasonable, if the first had not been necessary.

Here then arises an essential Difference between those Objects, which are proper to the Policy of an *Island*, and Those, which are
so

so to the Policy of the *Continent*; a Difference greatly to the Advantage of the *former*; the Circumstances of whose Situation not requiring so constant and intimate an Union with other States, either for Defence or Offence, render unnecessary a great Part of the Engagements, which prove such heavy and lasting Incumbrances on the *latter*.

An *Island* under one Government, advantageously situated, rich in itself, richer by its Commerce, can have no Necessity, in the ordinary Course of Affairs, to take up the Policy of the *Continent*; to enter into the System of *Alliances* we have been speaking of; or, in short, to act any other Part than That of a friendly Neighbour and a fair Trader. If an extraordinary Crisis happens on the *Continent*, which may endanger the Safety even of Those, who are separated from it, (such as we saw at the Beginning of the present Century) Self-Preservation will no Doubt determine Men, as it ought, to unite by stricter *Alliances* with those Powers, with whom They are occasionally united by a more immediate Interest; but even in this Case, neither will *Self-Preservation* require, nor good Policy suffer, that *such a People* should enter deep into the Quarrels, or involve themselves intricately, much less continually, in the political Schemes of the *Continent*. We pass over offensive Cases, because it is manifest that the People of an *Island* can have no Interest in making foreign Acquisitions; and that

that therefore it would be absurd in Them to spend their Blood and Treasure in acquiring only for others; or to *attack* any farther than is necessary to *defend*.

We confine ourselves to the Case of Defence before-mention'd; and upon That we say, a People on the *Continent* may have Reason to engage as deeply in Defence of another Country, as if they defended the Walls of their own Towns, or the Doors of their own Houses; because another Country may be the sole Barrier of their own. But This can never be reasonably done by the People of an *Island*, who have another, and a better Barrier than any the *Continent* can form for them. *Such a People* are to look on their Engagements with other Countries, as on Outworks cast up in Haste, which may serve to defeat a weak Attack, or to delay and disappoint a strong one. But it would be the Height of Folly in them; even in one of those extraordinary Conjunctions, which we now suppose, to lay the whole Stress of their Defence here; to spend their Strength improperly; and to forego those Advantages, which Nature has given them.

The Nations on the *Continent* might teach them another Lesson. They are careful to employ every Advantage of their *Situation*; a *River*; a *Lake*; a *Ridge of Mountains*; and shall the Inhabitants of an *Island* neglect the *Sea*? Shall they do by Choice all, which other Nations are obliged to do by Necessity? Surely not; and if at any Time such a Conduct
can

can be proved necessary to certain Purposes, we think it will result, from this Proof, that such Purposes should be laid aside, not that such Measures should be pursued.

These Reflections, with others of the same Kind, present Themselves naturally to Those, who consider the Conduct of Queen *Elizabeth*, and the Events of her Reign. We may therefore conclude that they were, at least, some of the Principles of her Government.

How she form'd, or rather how she protected, and aided a Party, already form'd in *Scotland*, on Principles of *Religion* and *Liberty*, has been observed; as well as the Success of this Measure, by which the Troops of *France* were driven out of that Kingdom, and the Influence of *France* on the Government was either removed, or guarded against. To maintain and improve this Advantage, was the great Affair of her Life. *England* was, with respect to *Scotland*, like a Kingdom on the *Continent*, and Queen *Elizabeth* employ'd, with respect to *Scotland*, all the Policy of the *Continent*.

We find Her busy on that Side in almost every Page of her History; almost always negotiating, and always intriguing. A Friend, an Enemy, a Mediatix, an Umpire, a Guarantee, she play'd every Part, which might keep others from hurting *Scotland*, and *Scotland* from hurting Her. Her Armies were at all Times ready to march, and her Fleets to sail thither. As strict an Oeconomy as she
O practised

practis'd every where else, she was profuse there ; but her Profusion turn'd to Account, and therefore deserves another Name. There may be such Schemes, such Management, and such Success, as may render even the smallest Expence, Profusion ; but Those of *Queen Elizabeth* were sufficient to justify the greatest. The *secret Service* of her Reign was private in *Transaction* and publick in *Effect* ; not equally inscrutable in *Both*.

About the fourteenth Year of her Reign, she had brought the Affairs of *Scotland* to such a Pass, that she seem'd to have nothing to fear from that Quarter. The Plots, in Favour of *Queen Mary*, had been discover'd ; the Insurrections defeated ; and the Duke of *Norfolk* executed in *England*. In *Scotland*, the same Party was broken. The Earl of *Morton*, a Man absolutely devoted to *Queen Elizabeth*, was Regent ; the Castle of *Edinburgh* was taken ; the Civil War was finish'd with compleat Success ; and she enjoy'd great Tranquility ; because, according to *Rapin's* Observation, she could now be only attack'd by *Sea* ; That is, she had now the whole Advantage of an *Island*.

This happy State did not continue long without Interruption. *Morton* lost, and reassumed his Power, was disgraced, prosecuted, and at last beheaded. King *James* had taken very young the Government of his Kingdom ; and young, as well as old, was govern'd by his Favourites. The Party of his Mother in

in *Scotland* did not indeed rise again, so as to give Queen *Elizabeth* any Umbrage. But his general Character and his Behaviour, on some particular Occasions, the Character of his Favourites, and the Intrigues they were known to carry on, obliged her to reassume, if she had ever laid it aside, and to pursue her antient Conduct towards *Scotland*. She pursued it to the End of her Reign; and although King *James*, when he had more Experience, and was better advised, kept such Measures with her, as were necessary to secure and to facilitate his Succession; yet this wise Queen continued to give quite another Attention to the Affairs of *Scotland*, than she gave to Those of any other Country; or would have given to These, if *Scotland* had been divided from *England* by the Sea.

It is impossible to make these Reflections, and not to reflect, at the same Time, on that happy Change, which the *Union* of the two Kingdoms has brought about. We are now one Nation under one Government; and must therefore always have one common Interest; the same Friends, the same Foes, the same Principles of Security, and of Danger. It is by Consequence, now in our Power, to take the intire Advantage of our Situation; an Advantage, which would make us ample Amends for several, which we want, and which some of our Neighbours possess; an Advantage, which constantly attended to, and wisely improved, would place the *British* Nation in

such Circumstances of Happiness and Glory, as the greatest Empires could never boast. Far from being alarm'd at every Motion on the *Continent*; far from being oppress'd for the Support of *foreign Schemes*; we might enjoy the securest Peace, and the most unenvy'd Plenty. Far from courting, or purchasing the *Alliances* of other Nations, we might see Them suing for Ours. Far from being hated or despised, for involving ourselves in all the little Wrangles of the *Continent*, we might be loved and respected by all Those, who maintain the just Ballance of *Europe*, and be formidable to Those alone who should endeavour to break it.

Having made these few Reflections on that Part of Queen *Elizabeth's* Policy, which regarded *Scotland*; it is necessary that we should say something of That, which regarded the Nations on the *Continent*. Now with These it is plain she took the fewest Engagements she possibly could, and shun'd as industriously the Occasions of mingling her Interests and Counsels with theirs, as she sought the Occasions of mingling both with those of *Scotland*.

We believe, upon very good Grounds, that Periods of four or five Years might be pointed out, in which this Nation has been a Party to more *Treaties*, than were made by Queen *Elizabeth* in the Course of forty-five Years; and yet we presume it will not be easy to shew, that this Nation had more imminent
Dangers

Dangers to avoid and more formidable Powers to resist ; or that such Ends were attain'd with greater Glory and Success at These, or any other Periods, than in the Reign of *Queen Elizabeth*. Let us descend into some Particulars.

With the *northern Crowns* she kept in Terms of Amity, and good Correspondence ; and had some Negotiations with That of *Denmark*, concerning the Interests of her Subjects in Trade. The same Interests drew Her into Negotiations with the *Muscovite*, and she found Means to conduct them to her great Advantage.

The Settlement made in *Germany*, a little before the Abdication of *Charles the fifth*, continued. The Protestants were quiet there, and desirous to remain so. The general Interest of Religion did not call upon Her to look that Way ; and it is evident, by the whole Conduct of her Reign, that she thought the particular Interests of her Kingdom very little concern'd in Those of the *Empire*.

How attentive soever she might be to penetrate into the Councils of the Court of *Rome*, and to trace the Intrigues of the *Vatican* from their Source ; she bore no Part whatever in the Affairs of *Italy*.

In short, as all the Measures she took in foreign Affairs were consider'd relatively to the Situation of *England*, she had nothing to do in the much greatest Part of the Business of the *Continent* ; and she was so far from en-

tring into Engagements by *Treaty*, that she was scarce ever concern'd in Negotiations about it. In *France*, *Spain* and the *low Countries* she had more to do; but even there the Part she took was strictly no more, than the Security and Welfare of her own Kingdoms required; and she acted it in no other Manner, than was suitable to the Situation of *England*.

The State of *Scotland*, of *Ireland*, and for some Time of *England* itself, gave her just Reason to apprehend that the *French*, or *Spaniards*, or both might get Footing there. Each of These had, at different Times, Pretensions of their own to her Crown. The Cause of *Mary Queen of Scotland* afforded them, for a long Time, both Pretence and Opportunity; and the united Force of the Roman-Catholick Party was, at all Times, ready to support their Enterprizes. *Spain* was the greatest maritime Power in *Europe*, and able to attempt the Invasion of *England*, even when *Queen Elizabeth* had been above thirty Years on the Throne, and had raised her Navy from the low Condition, in which she found it. In a Word, the whole Coast, from the Streight of *Gibraltar* almost to *Jutland*, belong'd to *France* and *Spain*. Such Circumstances form'd a Conjunction, wherein these two Powers had Advantages against Her, which they could have had in no other; and if she was obliged to act towards Them in a different Manner from what she did towards

wards the other Powers of the *Continent*; it was because she stood exposed to lose, at least in Part, with Respect to Them, the Advantages of her *Situation*.

How she acted towards them, has been observed already. She amused them and eluded their Designs, by the most artful Series of Management. She sought no *Alliances* against them with other Nations; and though she did not fail to abet and support the Insurrections of their Subjects, yet even with These she was cautious of entring into Engagements by *Treaty*. She did it with the *Huguenots* by a Treaty sign'd in 1562, which the Vidame of *Chartres* had negotiated. The Success of the Treaty, and the ungrateful Behaviour of the *Huguenots* to Her, confirm'd her in the Principle of depending little on *Allies*, and much on herself. She chose rather to assist when and where she thought fit, and to assist *gratis*, than to be tied down to the Consequences of constant Obligations, for the notional Advantage of reciprocal Engagements.

In the Year 1577 she began to take so intimate a Concern in the Affairs of the *low Countries*, that the most important Counsels and Resolutions of those States were communicated to Her; and she lent them an hundred thousand Pounds; yet it does not seem probable, that she enter'd so soon into a *formal Alliance* with them, though such an *Alliance* be mention'd by *Meteren*, as well as

Camden, and inserted from the former in the *Collection of Treaties*.

In the Year 1585 the Clouds gather'd on every Side, and threaten'd Queen *Elizabeth* with that terrible Storm, Part of which fell upon Her, and Part of which she averted. She beheld *Philip* Master of *Portugal* as well as *Spain*. She beheld the Duke of *Guise* growing apace to be Master of *France*. She saw these two Princes closely united by Principles, which might continue in Force long enough to compleat her Ruin. She saw the *low Countries* almost quite reduced by the Arms of *Spain*; and the Protestants of *France* in the utmost Danger of being so by the *League*. Dangers from *Ireland*, and Dangers from *Scotland* impended over Her.

In such a Crisis more terrible, as we apprehend, than any, which has threaten'd this Nation since that Time, what was the Conduct of our heroick Queen? Did she immediately prepare to oppose these Dangers, by making *Alliances* on the Continent? Did she purchase Accessions to these Alliances? Did she raise Armies, and pay Subsidies abroad? Did she give Guaranties to every Prince and State, who ask'd them; and, in order to ward against one Danger, sow the Seeds of many? By no Means. She sent indeed Sir *Thomas Bodley*, to the King of *Denmark*, as well as to the Landgrave of *Hesse*, and other Protestant Princes of the Empire, to procure a *League for Defence of their Religion*, says *Camden*;

Camden; but this League does not appear, nor any other Effect of these Negotiations. *As she was very saving of her Money, it is likely, says Rapin, that she did not employ the most proper Means to bring the Princes of Germany into her Interests.* She secured herself by a great Deal of Management on the Side of Scotland. She assisted the King of Navarre, and the Prince of Conde, with Money and Ships; and the *sole Treaty* She made on the Continent was That with the States of the *low Countries*, concluded the 10th of August 1585 at *Nonesuch*. Her chief Dependence was upon her own Ability and Courage; upon the Affection and Zeal of her People. Neither fail'd her. Sure of being attack'd, she began the Attack. Whilst *Cavendish* pillaged the Coasts of *Chili* and *Peru*, she sent *Drake* to the Coasts of *Spain*, with Orders to burn all the *Spanish Ships* he should meet. Her Orders were executed with the Spirit, with which they were given. More than an hundred Vessels, loaded with Provision and Ammunition, were burnt at *Gibraltar*. The *Spanish* Admiral was insulted at the Mouth of the *Tagus*, and the *Spaniards* were taken, or destroy'd, even under his Eyes; an Infamy so great, that the Suffering of it was scarce in Example before that Time. The Riches, coming from the *Indies* to *Spain*, fell into the Hands of the *English*. The Projects of *Philip* were disappointed in the Year 1587; and when the
Invasion

Invasion was attempted in the Year 1588, his Army was block'd up in the Ports of the *low Countries*, and his *invincible Armada* was beat, scatter'd and destroy'd.

We have now gone through all we propose to say at this Time, concerning the Conduct of Queen *Elizabeth*, both at home and abroad ; concerning that Conduct, which, by convincing her People of her Goodness and her Wisdom, procured from them those large Returns of Gratitude, of Duty, of Affection and Zeal, the sole Foundations, on which she rested her Authority and her Security ; and the sole Foundations, on which they can be rested, suitably to the Nature of our Government. The Limitations, necessary to render *Monarchy* consistent with *publick Liberty*, must be many and great ; for which Reason, it has been objected to them that they took off from that Weight of Authority and restrain'd that Fulness of Power, which are many Times necessary to be exerted, even for the Good of the whole Community. If this Objection was well founded, it would be a sufficient Answer, to say that a few accidental Inconveniencies, which may happen, and which may be recompenced too, in Government, deserve not to be prevented, at the Expence of leaving *Liberty* perpetually exposed. But the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth* proves, beyond Contradiction, that a Prince like Her will enjoy, at the Head of the freest People on Earth, all the Authority, and all the Power
necessary

necessary to promote the joint Security, Prosperity and Glory of Prince and People ; so that all the Objections, which can be raised on this Side to the *British* Constitution of Government, will center here ; that it has not provided for strengthening and enlarging the Authority and Power of a weak or a wicked Prince.

A Prince, who never separates the Interests just mention'd, and who pursues them wisely, will have absolute Power in the most limited Monarchy. A Prince, who separates these Interests, turns Government itself into *Faction* ; and the *Spirit of Liberty* will rise against him. An *arbitrary Government* is suited to any Character. A *free Government* requires a great, at least, a good One. In the *former*, all Kinds and Degrees of Power are in the Prince, or flow from him. In the *latter*, his Powers are limited and confined. When he wants to encrease, or extend them, he must derive the Faculty of doing so from his People ; and from hence it follows, that as long as such a Constitution remains entire, and uncorrupted, the Prosperity, nay the Ease, and even the Security of the Government, will depend on the Disposition of the *People* towards the *Prince* ; as the Disposition of the *People* will always depend on the Behaviour of the *Prince* towards the *People*. Queen *Elizabeth* saw these Truths in all their Force. She was both willing and able to proportion her Conduct to them. She never felt there-
fore

fore any Want of Power. She was supported by the *Spirit of Liberty*; and she overcame That of *Faction*. Some of her Successors either did not see these Truths in all their Force, or were unable to proportion their Conduct to them. These Princes therefore felt the Limitations of our Monarchy like Shackles upon them. The *Spirit of Liberty* either opposed, or did not support them; and they nursed up a *Spirit of Faction* to the Ruin of themselves, of their Families, and almost of the Nation.



L E T T E R X V I I .

THE Scene We are now going to open will appear vastly different from That, which We have just closed. — Instead of an uninterrupted, pleasing Harmony of Government, We shall meet with a perpetual, jarring Dissonance; instead of Success and Glory *abroad*, Disappointment and Contempt; instead of Satisfaction, Prosperity and Union *at home*, Discontent, Distress, and at last Civil War will present Themselves to us in all their Horrors.

To consider this melancholy Change, and to shew from whence it proceeded (whether from the *Prince*, or from the *People*) is our present Business. That it was brought about
and

and carry'd on by *Faction*, must not be deny'd. The sole Question will therefore be, *which was the factious Side?* Now to determine This, We need only enquire, *which Side* was for usurping on the *other*; which was for preserving and which for altering the establish'd Constitution of Government. On *this Point* the Question will turn; for in a Country of *Liberty*, in a *limited Monarchy*, whatever some Persons may think, or desire to have believed, it is certain that there may be *Faction for the Crown*, as well as *against the Crown*. The Reason is plain. There may be Conspiracies against *Liberty*, as well as against *Prerogative*. Private Interest may screen, or defend a *bad Administration*, as well as attack, or undermine a *good One*. In short, conspiring against any *one Part of the Constitution*, in Favour of *another*, or perverting, to the Support of national Grievances, the very Means, which were instituted to redress them, are destructive of the whole Frame of *such a Government*, and are the proper Characteristicks of *Faction*.

On which Side *Faction*, thus defined, is likely to be found the oftenest, and to act the most effectually, We shall not stay to examine here. They, who have read the first of these Letters, may remember what is there said, to shew the Difference between the Motives and the Means, which a *Prince* hath of usurping on his *People*; and Those, which the *People* have of encroaching

ing on their *Prince*. We shall only observe, to our present Purpose, that as He, who confines his Notions of *Faction* to Oppositions made to the *Crown*, reasons, in an *absolute Monarchy*, in Favour of the *Constitution*; so He, who confines them thus, reasons, in a *limited Monarchy*, against the *Constitution*; is weak enough to deceive Himself, or wicked enough to attempt deceiving others; and, in either Case, is thus far a Betrayer of *publick Liberty*. — On such Principles as These We said, in our last Paper, *that Government itself might be turn'd into Faction; and that some of Queen Elizabeth's Successors had nursed up a Spirit of Faction, to the Ruin of Themselves, of their Families, and almost of the Nation*. — We presume that This will appear, in the Course of our Enquiries, to be undeniably true; and that there will be as little Room to doubt whether the factious Conduct of the *Court*, in the Reigns of King *James* and King *Charles the first*, gave a Rise to all the Struggles between *Them* and their *People*, as there is Room to deny that the Destruction of our *Constitution*, in Church and State, was the dreadful Consequence of these Struggles. The *Spirit of Liberty* and the *British Constitution of Government*, whose Cause We are pleading, and whose Cause We are sorry there should be so much Occasion to plead, will therefore, We hope, remain clear of all Imputations.

We

We wish that this Justice could be done without opening Wounds, which are hardly yet intirely heal'd, and without arraigning the Conduct of *Princes*, whose Memories have been held in great Veneration by many worthy Persons ; but since This cannot be ; nay, since the opening of these Wounds may contribute to the more effectual healing of them ; and since arraigning the Conduct of *these Princes* hath been render'd the more necessary by the Accounts, which have been given of it, and by the Principles, on which it hath been defended ; We must speak with the same Liberty of *Them*, as We have used in speaking of *Those*, who reign'd before Them.

The *Ægyptians* paid so much Respect to their very limited Monarchs, that when They meant to warn these Princes against *particular Vices*, They commended them for *opposite Virtues*. We cannot persuade ourselves that this Method of reforming, or instructing, by *Panegyrick*, (the usual and most deadly Poison of *other Princes*) had a good Effect on *Those* of *Ægypt*. But however This might be, when these Princes were *dead*, notwithstanding the Respect shewn to them *living* *, They underwent the same Trial as the Custom of the Kingdom had establish'd for all *private Persons*, and funeral Honours

* *Diodor. Sic. l. 2. c. 3.*

were equally deny'd to *Them*, and to the meanest and most guilty of their *Subjects*, when their Memories were condemn'd, on a solemn and strict Examination of the Conduct They had held in Life.

Though We propose to enquire with all this Freedom ; and though We are perswaded that the Result of these Enquiries will be a Confirmation of what hath been advanced by us ; yet are We very far from admitting many of the Objections, which have been made to the Conduct of King *James* and King *Charles the first*. Much less do We approve those cruel Insinuations against Them, which are to be found in several *Invectives*, not *Histories*, dictated by a *Spirit of Faction*, not by the *Spirit of Liberty*. The *Spirit of Liberty* reflects on the Errors of Princes with *Sorrow*, not with *Triumph*, and is unwilling to aggravate what it wishes had never happen'd. — In the Temper, which *this Spirit* inspires therefore, We shall proceed. We shall dwell on no *Facts*, but such as We think uncontroverted ; and shall make no *Reflections*, nor draw any *Consequences* from them, but such as arise naturally and without the least Force. — The Truth would not be so evident, as We presume it is in this Case, if any Thing more was necessary to the Illustration of it.

Amongst the many Advantages, which King *James* had, on his Accession to the Throne of *England*, We might very justly reckon the recent Example of his *Predecessor*.

Her

Her Penetration discover'd the Consequences of that great Change in the *Ballance of Property*, of which We have spoken in *Letters XI* and *XII*; and she accommodated at once the whole System of her Government to it, as We have there observed. — Whatever Doubts *she* might have entertain'd, concerning the Success of her own Measures, before she had experienced the happy Effects of them, King *James* could reasonably entertain none. Experience, as well as Reason, pointed out to Him the *sole Principle*, on which He could establish his Government with Advantage, or even with Safety; and Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign had every Year afforded Him fresh Proofs that *this Principle of Government*, which is easy in the Pursuit, is effectual in the End to all the Purposes, which a *good Man* and a *just Prince* can desire to obtain. But King *James* paid as little Regard to her *Example*, as He did to her *Memory*. In the *last Respect*, He was indecent. In the *other*, unwise. He boasted most ridiculously of an *Influence*, which He never had over her *Councils*. Happy would it have been for Him, for his Family, and for this whole Nation, if *her Example* had really had a due *Influence* over *his Conduct*; or, at least, if *his Example* had obtain'd less Influence over the Conduct of his *Successor*. — Fraught with Learning, not with Knowledge; ignorant of the true Principles of Government;

more a Stranger to our Constitution by his Notions and his Habits of Thinking, than to our Country by his Birth; obstinate, though not steady; misled by Self-Opinion, and confirm'd in Error by superlative Pedantry, King *James the first* seem'd to expect the *Love*, and to demand the *Obedience* of his Subjects, purely because the *Crown* had dropt on his Head. Whereas Queen *Elizabeth* seem'd, both by her Declarations and her Actions, to think Herself intitled to the *first*, and secure of the *last*, for no other Reason, than This; because she wore the Crown to the greatest Advantage of Her People. Her good *Sense* taught her what He had not found in his *Books*; that the Tyes between *Prince* and *People* are not the same with Those between particular Persons in *private Life*. These Persons converse and live familiarly together. Natural Sympathies therefore, more easily to be felt than described, may unite them, without the Motives of Gratitude, or Expectation. Those common, good Offices, which the Heart alone suggests, are often sufficient to maintain such Unions; and a Man, who is neither a *Saint*, nor a *Hero*, may hope to find and keep a Friend. But *publick*, or *political*, or *State-friendship*, by which We mean an intimate and affectionate Union between the *Governors* and the *Governed*, cannot be contracted without Gratitude, or Expectation, nor maintain'd without both. If it could; if Subjects were attach'd to their Prince

Prince by a Kind of Instinct, as hard to be accounted for, and yet as prevalent as the Sympathies We have mention'd ; the Assertors of the *divine Right of Princes*, and of the *universal Obedience* due to them, would have had long ago a more plausible Argument than They have yet produced, in favour of their Doctrines. They would have been able to stop the Mouths of all Gainsayers ; even of *Him*, who required a Miracle to become their Convert ; and who resolved never to believe that *Slavery was of divine Institution*, till he beheld *Subjects born with Bunches on their Backs, like Camels, and Kings with Combs on their Heads, like Cocks* ; from which Marks it might be collected that the *former* were design'd to labour and to suffer, and the *latter* to strut and to crow. But till some such Miracle is wrought, or the Instinct supposed above is born with Men, We think it will remain true that the Union We speak of, between *Prince* and *People*, neither can, nor ought to subsist on any other Terms, than Those of good Government on *one Part*, and of Gratitude and Expectation on the *other*.— This Union may be, and hath been, maintain'd by *absolute Princes* with their People ; because it is not impossible that an *absolute Prince* should be a wise and good Man ; and because some such there have been. But here lies a Difference. The *absolute Monarch* may exert the whole Power of the State. He may govern easily, safely, and with all other Advantages,

vantages, though he neglects to cultivate this Union; or, which is worse, though He breaks it. But the Case of a *limited Monarch* is not the same, for the Reasons, which We touch'd upon, at the End of our last Letter. It is therefore the immediate, the personal, the highest Interest of such a Prince, as it is the Duty of every Prince, to contract this Union and to maintain it inviolate. The Wisdom of our Constitution hath made it so; and, in making it so, hath imitated that divine Wisdom, which appears in the Constitution of the moral World. In This, it may be easily proved from a Consideration of the Circumstances, in which We stand as Individuals, that the general Good of Society is the particular Interest of every Member. Our Creator design'd therefore that We should promote this general Good. It is by Consequence our Duty to do so; and every Man, who believes a wise, all-directing Mind, and who knows that proportioning of *Means* to *Ends* is essential to Wisdom, must subscribe to this Opinion. — And yet, determined by false Appearances of Good, or attracted by the Force of immediate Objects, Men may, and They frequently do, imagine that They pursue their particular and separate Interest, whilst They neglect, or act against, the general and common Interest of Society.

In like Manner, King *James the first* and *those Princes*, who have trod in his Steps, imagined no doubt that They pursued a particular,

ticular, separate Interest of *their own*, whilst they neglected an Union with their *People*, and even made such an Union impracticable, by transgressing, in Pretensions and in Fact, the Bounds, which our Constitution prescribed to them. But the Mistake is equal in both Cases; for in both Cases, *Interest* and *Duty* remain indivisibly united, however they may be separated in Opinion; and He, who sins against *one*, sins most certainly against the *other*; though the natural Consequences of his Actions do not appear immediately, nor on every Occasion, to follow.

These Consequences follow'd in a signal and terrible Manner upon the Occasions, which We have mention'd, and into the Particulars of which We shall descend some other Time. These Examples therefore are compleat. The *Causes* and the *Effects* come together under one View; and if We carry our Observations forward to later Times, We shall see *Causes* of the same Kind laid again, and producing *Effects* of the same Nature; *Effects* always proportionable to them; sometimes *Jealousy*, *Discontent*, *Tumult*; sometimes *open Resistance*, and *Deposition of the Prince*; for though, in all these Cases, the *People* have suffer'd, as well as the *Prince*; yet, in some, the *Prince* alone hath been undone; and thus, by an equal Distribution of Justice, the principal Share of the common Calamity hath fallen on *Him*, without whom no Part of it could have happen'd.

Though these general Reflections, which We have premised, may appear long to some of our Readers, and may seem too nearly ally'd to Reflections already made; yet We hope for Indulgence, on Account of the Importance of the Matter. It must surely be of Use to explain, very clearly, and very fully, from whence the Weakness of our Government, at some Times, and the Disorders and Revolutions of it, at others, have proceeded since *that Æra*, when our Liberties became better secured, and our Constitution capable of greater Improvements, by a new Settlement of the *Ballance of Property and Power*. No Point hath been more mistaken. None hath been more artfully misrepresented.



L E T T E R XVIII.

WE have observed already of how great Advantage the Example of *Queen Elizabeth* might have been to King *James the first*. It might have taught Him to struggle through the most intricate Difficulties. But He had none such to encounter, till He created them by his own Management. — On the contrary, his Accession to the Throne of *England* was accompany'd with all the favourable Circumstances of Ease and Security, which were necessary to form a Conjunction proper

proper for Him ; so that with Abilities, much inferior to Those of his Predecessor, He might have reign'd as gloriously abroad, and as happily at home. — Many of the Difficulties and Dangers, which furrounded Her, were personal to Her. They arose from her *Birth* ; from her *Title* ; and from *That*, which *Mary Queen of Scotland* pretended. They therefore ceased with Her. Many others she had conquer'd by a wise and steady Administration. Many had been worn out by Length of Time ; and many had been so changed by the Course of Events, that King *James* was safe, where she was most in Danger ; and strong, where she was weakest. — His *Title* was not contested ; nor any Opposition, either open or secret, given to his Succession. They, who had founded so high the Right of his *Mother*, could not refuse to acknowledge the same Right in Him ; and the rest of the Nation submitted to it ; for how little Regard soever many of them might pay to this Right in their Hearts, or how great Suspicion soever of his future Conduct might be justly infused into Them by his past Behaviour, the People would have a *King*, and there was no other Prince, in whom the *Protestant Interest* could unite at that Time. — That Riddle of a *Plot*, in which Sir *Walter Raleigh* was involved, does not deserve to be mention'd, as an Exception to the national Unanimity We speak of. — True it is that, in other Respects, the Nation was far from

being united, either by a Conformity of Opinion, or by an Acquiescence of Those, who differ'd from the Establishment. — It was, no Doubt, a severe Misfortune, and such it continues to this very Hour, that the great and glorious Work of the *Reformation*, being carry'd on at different Times, and in different Places, was carry'd on likewise without a general Concert. The several Churches reform'd Themselves, according to the different Circumstances They were in, and according to the different Characters of the *Few*, who led the *Many* in each of them. The Separation of them all from the Church of *Rome* was intire; but, in *some*, it was thought proper to *reform*; in *others*, to alter the *whole Model*; in *some*, many Things were retain'd, which had been in Practice before the *Reformation*; in *others*, a total Opposition to every Instance of Conformity with the Church of *Rome* seem'd to be the sole Standard of Christian Purity. — This Variety of Opinions and Establishments amongst the *Reform'd* was a great Evil in itself; but this Evil was aggravated by a Circumstance of the most fatal Consequence. The *Reformers*, and especially Those, who came latest, as our excellent Mr. * *Hooker* observes, by enforcing too peremptorily their particular Modes of *Reformation*, brought the People in many Cases to

* Eccl. Polity, *Pref.*

receive and respect, as divine Laws; even those Orders and that Discipline, which Expediency or other political Motives had suggested. Now, the natural Tendency of this Persuasion was not only to render all Comprehension, or Reconciliation amongst the *reform'd Churches*, impracticable; but to make the Divisions, in any particular Church, incurable. — Thus, when Queen *Elizabeth* compleated that Establishment of a Church, which *Edward the sixth* had begun, many dissented from it; and the Scruples of private Conscience were pleaded against Submission to the publick Authority of the State. — If Regard had been paid to all, who petition'd the *Queen*, or admonish'd the *Parliament*, in the Heat of these Times, it seems probable that no Establishment at all could have been made; and if none had been made, an *ecclesiastical Anarchy* must have ensued. — How far the Number of *Separatists* might have been lessen'd by more Compliances with the *learned* and *moderate* amongst them, (for *such* there certainly were) We shall neither presume to determine, nor go about to enquire. It is sufficient for our present Purpose to observe, that although these Seeds of Disturbance had been sow'd before the Accession of King *James*; yet no Disturbance had happen'd, nor was any likely to happen at that Time. The Measures, which had been pursued, and the Temper, which had been observed in Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign, tended to diminish

diminish the religious Opposition by a slow, a gentle, and for that very Reason an effectual Progression ; and, in the mean while, to prevent such Consequences of it, as might disorder, or weaken the Government. — By the *Laws*, which were made, the several, dissenting Sects were discouraged and kept in Awe ; but by the Execution of these *Laws*, They were not exasperated. They were punish'd, not provoked. They felt the Weight of the Government, as often as They attempted to disturb it, but They never felt the Oppression of *Party* ; and when They were treated like *Factions*, They had not the Pretence to complain that they were treated so by a *Faction*. — Upon this Foot there was even Room to hope, that when the first Fire of these Mens Zeal was spent, reasonable Terms of Union with the establish'd Church might be accepted by such of them as were not intoxicated with Fanaticism. Such as These were Friends to *Order*, though They disputed about it, and could have the less Pretence to reject with Obstinacy That, which had been settled by *Queen Elizabeth*, because They knew that their *own Discipline* had been establish'd where it prevail'd, as the Church of *England* had been, by the *supreme Authority* ; that it had been made a *Law of the Country* ; that the People had been bound by Oath to the Maintenance of it ; and that *Calvin* himself had been a most rigorous Extractor of Conformity to it. — If such as
These

These had been once incorporated with the *establiſh'd Church*, the remaining *Seſtaries* would have been of little Moment, either for Numbers, or Reputation ; and the very Means, which were proper to gain *These*, were likewise the moſt effectual to hinder the Increase of *Them*, and of the *other Seſtaries* in the mean Time. — Upon the whole Matter, We think it very plain that King *James the firſt*, beſides the Advantage of coming to the Crown, after all the Difficulties and Dangers of compleating the *Reformation*, and eſtabliſhing a new Church were over, had an eaſy and ſecure Opportunity of preventing any bad Conſequences, which might be apprehended from the Diviſions of his Proteſtant Subjects ; and that the Improvement of this Opportunity, conſiſted in giving neither Alarm to the *well-affected*, nor Pretence to the *factious*.

The Deſigns of the *Roman-Catholick-Party*, againſt the Conſtitution in Church and State, were carry'd on with as much Rage, but not with as much Strength as ever. The *Hydra-Heads*, which ſprouted continually out of that Body in the *former Reign*, had been lopt ſo often, that they appear'd more rarely ; and if the Venom of *that Principle*, which produced them, was not abated ; yet many of the Springs, which fed and nourish'd it, were exhausted. The *Guiſes*, *Mary Queen of Scotland*, *Philip the ſecond*, were dead. The *Reformation* was eſtabliſh'd ; not only in out-ward

ward Form, but in the Hearts of Men. It was grown up to be a Part, and a favourite Part, of the Constitution. The *Spirit of Liberty* had blended our *civil* and *religious Rights* together, and was become equally jealous of both. Let us add (for We may add it with great Justice) that the Church of *England* was, by the Sobriety, Wisdom and Sanctity of her Institution, establish'd on a Rock; that this Rock was defended by the greatest Number of excellent Men, which any Christian Church could boast of; and from all This let us conclude, that as she was able to resist the Attacks of *those Sects*, which private Conceit, mistaken Zeal, some Enthusiasm, and perhaps some Faction had nursed up in her own Bosom; so she was better able than any other Protestant Church to defend Herself, and the State too, against the Fallacies, the Seductions, and the Violence of *Rome*. The Policy of *this Court* saw it, and neglected nothing to prevent the Consequences. Seminaries had been erected at *Doway* and other Places abroad, for the Education of *English* Youth in Popery. *Gregory the thirteenth* had given the Direction of That, which was erected at *Rome*, to the *Jesuits*; and upon that Occasion *these Incendiaries* crept into *England*. If We may believe some Accounts, they mingled themselves amongst the Clergy of the Church of *England* and the *Puritan Ministers*. That they took all Methods to foment our Divisions is probable; and

and that They were not Men, who would stick at any, may be certainly collected from that Account of their Conduct here, and of the Doctrines they taught, which is contain'd in the Complaints exhibited against them by the Rest of the * *Popish Clergy*.

Thus was the Spirit of the Church and Court of *Rome* kept up here, even at the Time of the Accession of King *James*; a Spirit, which might serve to bring about an Assassination, or any barbarous and desperate Stroke, (like That of the *Gun-Powder-Treason*) which a few Enthusiasts were capable of executing; but not to subvert the *Reformation*, and introduce *Popery* anew. The Efforts of *this Party* now were like the last Convulsions of a strong Body, mortally wounded; frightful to behold; sufficient to hurt others; but Tokens of Death, not Symptoms of Recovery. — King *James* had it therefore in his Power to keep down with Ease a *Party*, which Queen *Elizabeth* had subdued with Pain; and whatever Impression the bloody Designs they had often form'd, and sometimes brought to Effect, might make on his Mind; certain it was, and the Event made that Certainty undeniable, that no Degree of Favour to them, except the utmost, could effectually secure Him against their Attempts; and that the least Degree of Fa-

* *Thuan. lib. 126.*

your shewn, or Encouragement given them, would be productive of the greatest national Mischief.

We have dwelt the longer on these Points of *religious Divisions*, because We think a clear and just Notion of them absolutely necessary to fix a right Opinion, concerning one of the principal Causes, which were laid in this Reign, of all the national Calamities, that follow'd. — We shall mention the other Advantages, which attended King *James the first*, as *briefly* as We can ; not because They were small, (for, on the contrary, They were exceedingly great) but because They are more notorious, and have no need of being so much develop'd, in order to be made sensible.

Thus, for Instance, the different Condition, in which He found the *Navy*, the *Commerce*, and the *Wealth* of the Nation, as well as the Revenues of the *Crown*, from That, in which Queen *Elizabeth* had found them all at her Accession, is known in general by every one, who hath dipt into History. Without entering into more Particulars therefore than We have done already, We may venture to conclude that He reap'd the Benefit of her Oeconomy, and was a rich, as well as a powerful King. We know very well that when the Session of Parliament was open'd by Commission in 1610, by the Earls of *Suffolk* and *Salisbury*, one of the Reasons urged, for demanding Money of the *Com-*
mons,

mons, was grounded on a Debt of Queen *Elizabeth*, which was said to have absorb'd 350,000 l. due on the last Subsidies granted to Her. If this Fact was true, all that resulted from it is; *first*, that Queen *Elizabeth* left a Mortgage on the Lands of the Crown, and Money enough to discharge it; *secondly*, that King *James* parted with his Money to recover his Lands; and We shall not oppose any Person, who will charitably believe that this Prince would have paid the Debts of his Predecessor, though they had not been thus secured, out of the Money she left in her Coffers; because to have done otherwise, would have been a manifest Violation of all the Rules of Religion, Honour and common Morality. But We much doubt whether even this Averment of the Lords, who open'd the Session, will have any great Weight, when it shall be consider'd that their whole Discourse was too *ministerial* to be *sincere*; and that some of the Reasons, by which they accounted for the King's Want of Money (such, for Instance, as the Charge of protecting his Wife and Children from being *robb'd* on the Road to *London*) were really Burlesque.

The Advantages, which this Prince had in the Situation of *foreign Affairs*, both at his Accession to the Throne, and during the greatest Part of his Reign, were remarkably great; and We doubt whether it is possible to find more than *one Conjunction* equally favourable since that Time. — *Philip the third*

third was on the Throne of *Spain*; a Prince of small Capacity, and less Application; govern'd by his Favourite, and his Favourite detested by the People. Before the End of King *James's* Reign He died; and *Philip the fourth*, his Son, succeeded; a Youth of sixteen Years old, and govern'd as absolutely by *Olivarez*, as his Father had been by the Duke of *Lerma*. The Declension of the *Spanish* Monarchy hasten'd on apace, under these Princes. It is said that *Philip the third* refused to support the *Roman-Catholick-Party*, in the Beginning of the Reign of King *James*; which is the more probable, on Account of the early and precipitate Steps made by *this Prince*, towards a Peace with *Spain*. The Defeat of *Don John d' Aquila* in *Ireland*, and the intire Reduction of *Tyrone*, which happen'd a little before the Death of Queen *Elizabeth*, discouraged the *Spaniards* from making any more Attempts of that Kind. They turn'd their Eyes from these Islands to the Continent; to the *low Countries* and to *Germany*, where they continued, during the Course of many Years, to consume their Remains of Strength, in abetting the ambitious Projects of that Branch of the House of *Austria*.

As King *James* had nothing to apprehend from the Enmity of *Spain*, so he was secure of the Friendship of *France*. *Henry the fourth* was now establish'd on that Throne. He was in Peace indeed with *Spain*, but intended not
to

to be so long. We are very far from believing that *this Prince* could seriously entertain so chimerical a Project as That of making an intire new Settlement of *Europe*, by dividing it into *fifteen States*, which *Parefixe* and other Authors have related, upon the Faith of the Compilers of *Sully's Memoirs*; but, without Doubt, He had great Views of checking the Ambition, and reducing the Power of the House of *Austria*. It was therefore his Interest to live well with the King of *Great Britain*; and accordingly He sent the Marquis of *Rosny*, afterwards Duke of *Sully*, to to renew the Treaties with King *James*, as soon almost as this Prince was seated on the Throne of *England*. When *Henry the fourth* was stabb'd by *Ravaillac*, a Minority follow'd in *France*, and the Counsels of that Court were, for many Years, chiefly employ'd about their own Affairs; so that nothing could happen on that Side, even after this great Change, to give the least Disturbance to King *James*.

The States of the *low Countries* were no longer in the same distress'd Condition. Their *Commonwealth* had taken Form; their *naval Force* was increasing; and their *Commerce* extending itself every Day. *Ostend* kept the *Spanish Forces* at Bay for more than three Years; and when *Spinola* made himself Master of that Heap of Ruins, the *Dutch* thought Themselves sufficiently recompensed by the Acquisition, which they had made, in
Q
the

the mean Time, of *Sluyce* and other important Places. The Truce of eight Months between *Spain* and the *States* was sign'd in 1607. It was prolong'd afterwards; and in the Year 1609, the Truce of twelve Years was concluded at *Antwerp*; by which the King of *Spain* was forced to acknowledge the Liberty and Independency of the *united Provinces*. Thus was that *Commonwealth* establish'd, to be a great and lasting Accession of Strength to the *Protestant Interest*; and King *James* might have reap'd the Benefit of an useful Alliance, where Queen *Elizabeth* had no other Advantage than That of defending the oppress'd, and diverting the Forces of a common Enemy.

The Affairs of the *North*, indeed, were in great Confusion about the same Time. The Crown of *Sweden* belong'd to *Sigismund* in Course of Descent; but *Sigismund* was a *Papist* and King of *Poland*. For both these Reasons, He had been excluded, and his Uncle *Charles* prefer'd to the Throne by the States of *Sweden*; who provided, by the Act of Settlement, not only that their Kings should be of the *Religion* of the Country, but that none of the Princes of the royal Family should accept *another Crown*, nor any *foreign Dominions*. Their Experience, it seems, had shewn Them the Necessity of such Limitations. This gave Occasion to those long and cruel Wars, which follow'd between *Sweden* and *Poland*. Others succeeded between

tween *Sweden* and *Denmark*; but the Scene of them all was so remote, and the Interests of this Country so absolutely unconcern'd in the Events of them, that He, who should have advis'd King *James* to take any Part in them, would have pass'd, in those Days, for a very *bad Politician*.

The indolent *Rodolphus* slept on the Throne of the Empire till the Year 1614. His Brother *Matthias* succeeded Him; and their Cousin *Ferdinand* succeeded *Matthias*. During the Reign of *Rodolphus*, there were Troubles in *Hungary*, in *Transylvania*, in *Bohemia*, and in several Parts of the *Empire*. Most of them were caused, all of them were fomented, by *religious Divisions*. During the Reign of *Matthias*, these Troubles increased. They grew up to Maturity, as the Accession of *Ferdinand* to the Empire approach'd. The *Bohemians*, long oppress'd, and long provoked, took Arms at last in 1618. Many Causes conspired to render all Accommodation impracticable. Amongst the principal were the Designs, which all the Branches of the House of *Austria* had laid and begun to execute against *Liberty* and the *Protestant Religion* in *Germany*; the Character of *Ferdinand*, violent, cruel, a Bigot, though artful; and, to speak impartially, the Ambition of *Frederick*, Elector *Palatine*. If this Ambition had been the sole Motive to engage King *James* in these Quarrels, We must think that He could not have answer'd to his own

People the engaging in them, as popular as the *Palatine*, his *Wife*, and his *Cause* were in *England*. But these Quarrels were of another Importance. *Frederick* lost not only the Crown of *Bohemia*, but his *own Patrimony*. The *Protestant Religion* and the *Liberty of Germany* were well nigh sacrificed to the Bigotry and Ambition of the *Emperor*; so that the Interest of *this Nation*, as well as the *King's Family Interest*, was very much concern'd to prevent these Consequences; and yet, even upon this Foot, We must likewise think that it would not have been long popular in those Days, when the Memory of *Queen Elizabeth's* Policy was fresh in the Minds of Men, to have maintain'd great Armies on the Continent, and to have fed with Subsidies so many hungry Princes, who had, at least in the Beginning, nothing less at Heart than the common Interest.

This difficult and dangerous Situation of Affairs on the Continent, in which We allow that King *James* ought to have taken some Part, may be thought, perhaps, to form an Exception to what hath been said, concerning those Circumstances of Advantage, of Ease, and Security, which accompany'd the Reign of *this Prince*; but there will be Room to think so no longer, when it shall be consider'd that King *James* had Time and Means to prepare for this critical Conjunction. The Distress in *foreign Affairs* began with *Queen Elizabeth's* Reign; and she was in Danger abroad,

abroad, before she was settled on her Throne at home ; but *He* had reign'd near *eighteen Years* before any Thing happen'd on the Continent, which could give Him a just Occasion of acting vigorously in that Scene. Besides, when this Occasion did happen, He had it in his Power to have acted with great Glory to *Himself*, and effectually for the Service of *Those*, whom it was his Interest to support, without taking any other Part than That, which becomes a *King of England*, in Opposition to That, which becomes a *Prince on the Continent*, and agreeably to the Principles of his *Predecessor's* Conduct. This will appear evidently true, when we come to consider the Part He did take ; and We shall insist upon it the rather, because We observe with how much Affectation the *Case*, We are now speaking of, hath been quoted as parallel to the *present Situation of Affairs* ; and how impertinently it hath been taken for granted, that King *James the first* was condemn'd in his own Time, and hath been condemn'd since, for not doing what these *Time-serving Politicians* recommend ; That is, for entangling Himself in the *Affairs of the Empire*, as if He had been a *Prince of the Empire* ; and for not acting on every Appearance of Danger, or even of Inconveniency to any little State of *Germany*, in such a Manner as is agreeable neither to the *Interest*, nor *Situation of our Island*.

Q 3

What

What hath been said may be sufficient to shew how few the Difficulties were, compared with the Advantages, which King *James* had to encounter both at home and abroad; and how fortunate a Conjunction was prepared for Him by the Wisdom of his *Predecessor*, and by an happy Combination of Circumstances. — What Use he made of these Advantages, what Conduct He held, and what Consequences it had, must be the Subject of another Discourse.



L E T T E R X I X .

BY what hath been said, in former Letters, We think it appears that from the Time our Constitution settled on the Foundation, on which it remains still, there hath been not only no Possibility of governing this Nation with Strength and Dignity, without the Concurrence of the People in their *representative Body*, nor with Ease and Safety without their Concurrence in their *collective Body*; but that this Concurrence hath depended, and does and must always depend, on the Union of Interest and Affection between the *King* and his *Subjects*.

We beg Leave to repeat that *Queen Elizabeth* saw This to be a sure, and the only sure Principle, on which she could establish her Govern-

Government under *such a Constitution*; that she very wisely took the Government on the Terms of the *Constitution*, and the *Constitution* as she found it; that instead of struggling through Trouble and Danger to bend the *Constitution* to any particular Notions, or Views of her own, she accommodated her Notions, her Views, and her whole Character to it. — Let us observe, by the Way, that This is no more than what every *Prince* ought to do; and what every *free People* will expect and exact too, if Need be, that He should do. He is made for *their Sakes*, not *They* for *his*. He is raised to maintain, not to alter the *Constitution*.

Now King *James* begun and continued, through the whole Course of his Reign, to govern without any Regard to this Principle; nay, in absolute Defiance of it. He chose *other Expedients* of Government, and trusted to so many *broken Reeds*. Without any Talents to procure the Esteem, He awaken'd the Jealousy and never courted the good Will of his People; but, instead of it, endeavour'd to instil into their Minds what was rooted in his own, a very good Opinion of *Himself*, and a very mean Opinion of *Them*. He endeavour'd to persuade Men, who felt that the *Balance of Property* was on their Side, and that *They* held a great Share of the *supreme Power* in their Hands, that though *They* had *this Property*, yet *They* had no Right, or a very precarious one, to *this Power*. He meant, by

the Force of *new-fangled Opinions*, to attach the Nation to Him, as *Queen Elizabeth* had done by the Tyes of *Affection* and *Confidence*; or He meant to govern without the *Concurrence of the Nation*; or He meant *nothing*. The *first* was chimerical, the *second* was wicked, and the *third* was stupid.—*Elizabeth* had been jealous of her *Prerogative*, but moderate in the Exercise of it. Wiser *James* imagined that the higher He carry'd it, and the more rigorously He exerted it, the more strongly He should be seated in his Throne. He mistook the Weight for the Strength of a Scepter; and did not consider that it is never so likely to slip, or to be wrench'd out of a Prince's Hands, as when it is heaviest. He never reflected that *Prerogative* is of the Nature of a *Spring*, which by much straining will certainly relax and often break; that in *one Case* it becomes of little, and in the *other* of no Use at all.

As absurd as the Notions and Principles of Government were, by which King *James* hoped to establish his Authority, He found Numbers to adopt them; for Numbers are at all Times liable to be deceived, ready to be tempted, and prone to be corrupted.—New Systems of *Law* and *Policy* were not only received, but propagated. Some Men were heated by *Opposition*. Others were educated in *Prejudice*. The plainest Rights of the *People* were call'd in Question. The least justifiable Pretensions of the *Crown* were
 establish'd

establish'd as true Axioms of Government, and certain Principles of the *English* Constitution. What Father *Paul* observes to have happen'd in the *Church*, happen'd here in the *State*. Our Court, like That of *Rome*, by affirming and denying boldly, and by insisting peremptorily, brought many Things to be received as *certain*, which had been never *proved*, and many others to be look'd on as *problematical*, which had been often *demonstrated*. Thus were *those Divisions* created, which could alone render the *others* fatal. Disputes about the Use of the *Surplice*, or the *Cross in Baptism*, would not have unsheath'd all the Swords in the Nation. *Puritanism* neither did, nor could make such deadly Wounds; but when they were once made, *Puritanism* fester'd in the Sore, and render'd them mortal. King *James* conjured up, by using Tricks of Government, that Storm in which his *Successor* perish'd. His *Successor*, (for We will finish the Sketch We have begun) a religious and a just Prince, came a *Party-man* to the Throne. His *Prejudices*, confirm'd by *Habit*, fortify'd by the *Flattery* of his Courtiers, and provoked by the *Opposition*, which his Father and He met with, carry'd Him to continue an Invasion on the *People's Rights*, whilst He imagined Himself only concern'd in the Defence of *his own*. The *Faction of the Court* tainted the *Nation*, and gave Life and Strength, if it did not give Being, to the *Factions in the State*. If the
Spirit

Spirit of Liberty could have prevail'd in Time against the *first*, there had been no Danger from the *others*. But the long and obstinate Resistance of the *first* gave Time, and Opportunity, and even Assistance to the *others* to extinguish *this Spirit*. *Cavaliers* and *Roundheads* divided the Nation, like *Yorkists* and *Lancastrians*. No other Option was left at last. To reconcile these Disputes by *Treaty* became impracticable, when neither Side would trust the other. To terminate them by the *Sword*, was to fight not for preserving the *Constitution*, but for the *Manner of destroying it*. The *Constitution* might have been destroy'd, under Pretence of *Pre-rogative*. It was destroy'd under Pretence of *Liberty*. We might have fallen under *absolute Monarchy*. We fell into *absolute Anarchy*. The Sum of all is This. We were destroy'd by *Faction*; but *Faction* prevail'd at Court near forty Years before it prevail'd amongst the *People*. It was the original Principle on *one Side*. It was an Accident on the *other*. *Churchmen* and *Royalists* attack'd the *Constitution*. *Puritans* and *Commonwealths-Men*, and, above all, a motley Race of *precise Knaves* and *enthusiastick Madmen* ruin'd it. But the *last* could never have happen'd, if the *first* had not; and whoever will dispassionately trace the Causes of that detestable *Civil War*, will find them laid in the Conduct of King *James the first*, as early as his Accession to the Throne of England.

Having

Having given this general Idea of the *two Reigns*, which follow'd That of *Queen Elizabeth*, it is Time to examine whether this Idea of them can be supported by a Series of uncontroverted Facts. — Let us descend into some Particulars.

A Prince, that is invited, or comes newly to a Kingdom, says Wilson, must have his Chariot Wheels smooth shod; and surely if ever Prince had Motives and an Opportunity to render Himself popular, King James had both. Essex, Southampton and others (even Cecil, a principal Minister of the late Queen) had held a Correspondence with Him, for their own private Interest; but the Millions, who submitted to his Accession, submitted to it upon Trust, and were determined by the Nature of the Conjuncture, not by any Knowledge of the Persons, who compos'd this new royal Family. It was not therefore enough for them to be placed in and about the Throne. Their true Interest required that the Hearts of the People should be gain'd to them; and that Popularity should supply that Spirit in their Favour, which seldom fails to operate in Favour of those Princes, who are born and bred amongst the People They are to govern. The Opportunity of doing This lay fairly before King James. He was received with Transports of Joy, and all Ranks of Men made their Court to Him. — If He look'd on this national Behaviour (for so it was) to be the Effect of a Desire in the People to endear Them.

Themselves to Him, and to unite closely with Him ; This should have suggested to his Mind the Ease, with which He might acquire Popularity, by improving the Disposition, and captivate the good Will of a People, so desirous to be pleased with their King. If He look'd on this *national Behaviour* as the Effect of Levity, Inconstancy and Love of Change, it should have taught Him to apprehend how soon this *Honey-Moon* would pass away ; how soon the Stream of *popular Favour* might turn against Him ; and how soon They, who seem'd to have forgot *Queen Elizabeth*, might return to regret Her. — But That, which a *Scotsman* foretold, happen'd. This Behaviour of the *English* spoil'd a good King ; or made a bad King worse. It was natural for a *vain Man* to believe what his *Flatterers* told Him, and what He, his own *greatest Flatterer*, told Himself ; that these Applauses and Transports of the People were due to his *eminent Merit*, and were an Homage paid for the Honour He did Them in *accepting their Crown*. — He took therefore much State. He did not indeed make his Journey, as *Henry the seventh* made his Entry into *London*, in a *close Chariot* ; but He forbid by Proclamation the Concourse of the People to Him. * *He dispersed them with Frowns, that We may not say with Curses.* —

* Wilson.

Such different Turns of Thought can *Vanity* inspire. *Some* will be respected, like *eastern Monarchs*, unseen within the Shrine of their Court. *Others* grow fond of publick Triumphs ; delight in noisy Acclamations ; and are pleased to drive, like *Indian Pagods*, over a prostrate Crowd.

As much as King *James* neglected to gain the *Publick*, even at the cheap Price of *Affability*, He sunk into low Familiarity with his *Favourites*, and was profuse of Riches and Honours to *particular Men*. He bestow'd, at first, on a *Few*, and afterwards on *one Man*, that Affection, which He had promised the *whole Nation*, in some of the plausible, common-place Discourses, which He held at certain Times. There is no need of mentioning the particular Instances of a *Profusion* He acknowledged Himself. The Estates He gave to his *Courtiers* impoverish'd the *Crown* ; and, as it always happens, the *People* were forced to pay for those very *Grants*, at which They murmur'd. *Honours* He bestow'd in so lavish a Manner and with so little Distinction, that They ceased, in some Sense, to be *Honours*. To know the *British Nobility*, it was become almost necessary to have *Nomenclators* like Those, who attended the Candidates at *Rome*, to tell them the Names of the *Citizens*. The Jest went so far, that an Advertisement of * *an Art to*

* Wilson.

help weak Memories to a competent Knowledge of the Names of the Nobility, was pasted up at Paul's.

Thus King *James* began, and thus He continued his Reign. That *Experience*, which He said, in his first Speech to his Parliament, would teach Him *not to be so easily and lightly moved in granting*, taught Him nothing. What a Contraste does this Conduct make with the Affability of Queen *Elizabeth*; with the Oeconomy and Reserve she used, in disposing of her *Treasure*, and in conferring *Honours*? — But King *James* stood in Need of Helps, to the Want of which she was superior. *A good Government, says one of our best Writers, makes a good People.* When a Prince hath turn'd the *Spirit of a Nation in his Favour*, He need not be solicitous about gaining *particular Men*; but when He hath turn'd *this Spirit against Him*, He must employ all Arts, even the lowest, to *detach particular Men from the Body of the People*, and to make them act by Motives of *private Interest* against the *publick Sense*. This is *Faction*; and therefore whenever a *Court* is industrious to seduce, to inviegle, to corrupt *particular Men*, We may securely conclude, without waiting for any other Sign, that such an Administration stands on a *factious*, not on a *national Bottom*. — But to return to King *James*.

Whilst He neglected the *Affection* and sought the *Reverence* of the Publick, He lost
one,

one, and was disappointed of the other. His *private* and his *publick* Character both fell into Contempt. *Learning* was the Part, upon which He valued Himself. *This* He affected more than became a *King*, and broach'd, on every Occasion, in such a Manner as would have misbecome a *Schoolmaster*. His *Pedantry* was too much even for the Age, in which He lived. It would be tedious to quote the Part He took in the Conference at *Hampton Court*; and in the theological Wrangles between the *Gomarists* and *Arminians*; or to go about to prove, by some Instances, what appear'd in all his Words and Actions; what is universally allow'd; and what the *unkingly Volume* He left behind him testifies. — Let us only observe that the *Ridicule*, which arose from hence, and which fix'd on Him, was just; because the Merit of a *chief Governor* is wisely to super-intend the *whole*, and not to shine in any *inferior Class*; because *different* and, in some Cases perhaps, *opposite Talents*, both natural and acquired, are necessary to move, and to regulate the Movements of the *Machine of Government*; in short, because as a *good Adjutant* may make a *very bad General*; so a *great Reader*, and *Writer* too, may be a *very ignorant King*.

There were many other Circumstances, which concurr'd to lessen *this Prince* in the Eyes of his Subjects and of all Mankind; as We shall have Occasion to observe frequently in the Course of these Remarks. — In the mean

mean Time, We shall observe here that the *State* He affected and the *pompous Titles* He was so fond of, served to render his *Puflanimity* (which, with his *Vanity*, made up the main of his Character) more conspicuous, and his *Person* by Consequence more contemptible. — The Hostilities between the *English* and *Spaniards* continued, when Queen *Elizabeth* died. This great Queen, not content to have done Herself and her Subjects Justice, on many signal Occasions, put it likewise into their Power to do themselves Justice, by granting *Letters of Reprisal* on the Subjects of *Spain*. King *James* was so fond of *Peace*, That is, so afraid of *War*, that without staying to be solicited on this Head, or to be complimented on his Accession to the Throne by the King of *Spain*, He *revoked these Letters* in a few Weeks after He came into *England*. He disarm'd his Subjects, before He had provided for their better *Security*. He stopt them in the Course of doing Themselves *Justice*, before He was sure of obtaining Reparation for their *past Losses*. The Impressions, which such a Proceeding must make on the Minds of a *trading People*, are easily felt. He, who had *revoked these Letters* in such a Manner, was not likely to *grant them* on any other Occasion. What Protection therefore, and much less what Encouragement to Trade could be expected from a *Prince*, who began his Reign by sacrificing This, the most valuable Interest
of

of his People, to a *foreign and hostile Nation*; to the mean Arts of *false Policy*, and even to his *Fears*? — Again; one of the first *Embassies*, which King *James* sent abroad, was That of the Earl of *Hertford* to *Brussels*. A *Dutch Man of War* meeting the Ship, which carry'd the *Ambassador*, refused to *strike* *; and having offer'd this Affront to the *united Crosses*, which had never been offer'd to That of *St. George*, went off with Impunity. It is said that the *Ambassador*

* N. B. This Fact stands in History, as it is here related; but having look'd into Sir *William Monson's naval Tracts*, We find it differently told. He says nothing of *striking*, or *not striking* the Flag; but confesses that an *Affront* was offer'd by *two Dutch Men of War*. He adds, that He sent for the *Captains* on Board his Ship; that He threatned to *right Himself upon them*; but that He dismiss'd them at the Intreaty of my Lord *Hertford*. on their excusing Themselves, and promising to punish the *Offenders*. How severely *these Offenders* were punish'd may be collected from hence. One of *these Captains*, says Sir *William Monson*, was He, who since that Time committed a foul Murder upon his Majesty's Subjects in Ireland, that were under Protection. — If We had no other Proofs of the Indignities offer'd to our Nation by the *Dutch*, from the Time of the Accession of King *James the first*, than the Memorials of *this Gentleman*, They would be sufficient. He complains of these Indignities very much, and mentions several. In this very *Tract* He affirms that the *Hollanders* took and burnt our Ships and murder'd our Men for trading to the Ports of *Flanders*, whilst They suffer'd their own Countrymen, even in our Sight, to trade thither. The Truth is, that our Nation was insulted with Impunity, during this *pacifick Reign*, not only in *Europe* but in every other Part of the World; not only by the *Dutch*, but by other Nations; and that our Government fell from the highest Esteem into the lowest Contempt. If therefore the *Instance* We have quoted should be disputed, on the Representation of this Fact by Sir *William Monson*, an hundred others, and several of them more flagrant, might be soon produced.

R

hinder'd

hinder'd the *Captain* from asserting the Honour of the *British Flag*. But *two Things* are certain ; *one*, that Queen *Elizabeth* would have severely punish'd her *Officer*, and have exacted ample Reparation from the *States General* ; the *other*, that King *James* did neither. This *Commonwealth* had been raised by Queen *Elizabeth*, and was still in want of the Support of *England*. The *Sovereignty of her State* had not been yet acknowledged by any of the Powers of *Europe*. How much the pacifick Temper of King *James* was capable of bearing had not yet become so apparent, as He made it in the Course of his Reign. From all which it is easy to collect that if he had demanded *Satisfaction*, He must and would have received it. But the *good Prince* was afraid, where no Fear was, and bore dishonourably what He might have resented safely ; nay, what He ought to have resented in any Circumstances, and at any Hazard. We are not to wonder if so poor a Conduct as This soon brought King *James* into Contempt, mingled with Indignation, amongst a *People*, eagerly bent on *Commerce*, and in whom high Notions of *Honour* and a *gallant Spirit* had been infused, by the Example of Queen *Elizabeth*, and encouraged during the whole Course of a long Reign.

These Things and several others of the same Kind, which I omit, might however have been borne. The *Ridicule* might have appear'd less in the Eyes of Men accusom'd
to

to it. The *other Faults* might have been excused, or soften'd at least, by Hopes of *Amendment*. But there are *some Things* behind, which no *Excuse* would alleviate, nor any *Patience* endure. We shall now bring them forward, and shall speak of them under *three Heads*. — The Pretensions set up, and the Attempts made against the Freedom of this Constitution. — The Management of Parties. — The Conduct of our national Interests abroad, against the Sense of the Nation.



L E T T E R XX.

A Fundamental Principle, on which King *James* affected to establish his Authority, was That of an *hereditary Right to the Crown*. This sacred Right, according to the political Creed, which He imposed, was not to be contested, much less to be set aside; and yet this sacred Right was a meer Chimæra; contradicted by the general Tenor of Custom from the *Norman Invasion* to his Time; by the declared Sense of his immediate Predecessors; by many solemn Proceedings of Parliament; and by the express Terms of Law. — Two Families (for the Race of *Planta-*

genet was grafted on the *Norman Race*, and They may be reckon'd properly as one) had furnish'd, indeed, all our Kings ; but This constituted no *hereditary Right*. When a Prince of the Royal Family, but in a Degree remote from the Succession, comes to the Crown, in Prejudice of the next Heir, *hereditary Right* is violated as really as it would be, if an absolute Stranger to this Family succeeded. Such a Prince may have another, and We think a better Right ; That, for Instance, which is derived from a Settlement of the Crown, made by the Authority of *Parliament* ; but to say He hath an *hereditary Right*, is the grossest Abuse of Words imaginable. This We think so plain, that We should be ashamed to go about to prove it ; and yet there are Men, in this Age of *Paradoxes*, either dull enough, or prostitute enough, to assert *hereditary Right*, even in the Case above-mention'd.

Our Kings, of the *Norman Race*, were so far from succeeding as *next Heirs to one another*, and in a *regular Course of Descent*, that no Instance can be produced of the *next Heir's succeeding*, which is not preceded and follow'd by Instances of the *next Heir's being set aside*.—Thus *Edward the first* succeeded his Father *Henry the third* ; but his Father *Henry the third* and his Grandfather *John* had both been raised to the Throne, in plain Defiance of *hereditary Right* ; the Right of *Arthur*, Nephew to *John*, and the Right of *Arthur's Sister*,

Sister, Cousin-German to Henry. — Edward the second succeeded his Father *Edward the first*; but *Edward the third* deposed *Edward the second*; the Parliament renounced all Allegiance to Him; and *Edward the third* held the Crown by a Parliamentary Title, as much as *William the third*. — If We go up higher than this *Æra*, or descend lower, We shall find the Examples uniform. Examples, sufficient to countenance this Pretension of *hereditary Right* to the Crown of England, are to be found no where. — But We hasten to King *James*; who raised or, if you please, revived this Pretension, so needlessly for Himself, and so very unprofitably for his Posterity.

The *British Race* began in *Henry the seventh*; and from Him alone King *James* derived that Right, which He asserted in such pompous Terms; that *undoubted Right* to the Throne, as He call'd it in his first Speech to Parliament, which *God by Birthright and lineal Descent* had, in *Fulness of Time*, provided for Him. Now surely, if ever any Prince came to the Crown without the least Colour of *hereditary Right*, it was *Henry the seventh*. He had no Pretence to it, even as Heir of the House of *Lancaster*. His Wife might have some, as Heir of the House of *York*; though her *hereditary Title* was not free from Objections, which the Character of *Edward the fourth* render'd probable; but the Title of his *Wife* had no Regard paid to

it either by *Him*, or the *Parliament*, in making this new Settlement. He gain'd the Crown by the good Will of the *People*. He kept it by the Confirmation of *Parliament*, and by his *own Ability*. The notional Union of the *two Roses* was a much better Expedient for *Quiet* than Foundation of *Right*. It took Place in *Henry the eighth*; it was continued in his Successors; and this Nation was willing it should continue in King *James* and his Family. But neither *Henry the eighth*, nor his Son *Edward the sixth*, who might have done so with much better Grace, laid the same Stress on *hereditary Right* as King *James* did. One of them had Recourse to *Parliament* on every Occasion, where the Succession to the Crown was concern'd; and the *other* made no Scruple of giving the Crown by *Will* to his *Cousin*, in Prejudice of his *Sister's Right*. This *Right* however, such as it was, prevail'd; but the Authority of *Parliament* was call'd in Aid by *Mary*, to remove the Objection of *Illegitimacy*, which lay against it. *Elizabeth* had so little Concern about *hereditary Right*, that she neither held, nor desired to hold her Crown by any other Tenure than the Statute of the 35th of her *Father's* Reign. In the 13th of her own Reign, she declared it by Law *high Treason*, during her Life, and a *Præmunire*, after her decease, to deny the *Power of Parliament*, in *limiting and binding the Descent and Inheritance of the Crown, or the Claims to it*; and whatever private Motives

tives there were for putting to Death *Mary*, Queen of *Scotland*, her claiming a *Right*, in Opposition to an *Act of Parliament*, was the Foundation of the publick Proceedings against Her.

Such Examples, as We have quoted, ought to have some Weight with King *James*. A Prince, who had worn the Crown of *Scotland*, under so many Restraints, and in so great Penury, might have contented Himself, one would think, to hold That of *England*, whose Pensioner he had been, by the same Tenure, and to establish his Authority on the same Principles, as had contented the best and greatest of his *Predecessors*; but his Designs were as bad as Those of the very worst Princes, who went before him.

Happily for *Great Britain*, He wanted the Capacity of *Henry the seventh*; the Resolution of *Henry the eighth*; and the favourable Opportunities, which They had the Luck to find, or the Art to contrive, of raising *Prerogative*, acquiring *Wealth*, and encroaching on *Liberty*.

We observed, in discoursing on the Reign of *Henry the seventh*, that He had laid the Foundations of an exorbitant Power, before the Nation was well aware of what He intended. — King *James*, on the contrary, shew'd his whole Game from the first. Besides the Pleasure, which his Vanity found in boasting of an *absolute, independent Right to the Crown, inherent in Himself*, He imagined

that the Transition would be easy, and so indeed it proved amongst many, from *This* to some other useful *Apothegms*. He hoped to get, and he did get, an *Act of Recognition of his Right of Succession*; for We cannot persuade ourselves, with *Rapin*, that He was indifferent on this Point; and though *this Act*, as well as the *Oath of Supremacy*, which had been establish'd long before, and That of *Allegiance*, which was establish'd soon after, is in itself, as it hath proved in Effect, but a feeble Prop to support the Pretence of *hereditary Right*; yet King *James* certainly look'd on it as an Admission of his Claim, and meant a real Advantage, where the *Parliament* very probably meant nothing more than a Compliment. — *This Prince* brought with Him the true Spirit of a *Missionary*; and, by preaching a *new Doctrine*, endeavour'd to establish a *new Power*. From the Notion of *independent Right* was deduced the Notion of *independent Authority*; a *Right* superior to *Law*; an *Authority* unbounded by it; a *Right*, which could not be proved; an *Authority*, which might not be defined. — The Inference from both These was obvious. *This independent King* must be accountable to *God alone*. He could not be accountable to *Man*.

If this excellent System of *Policy* could have been generally imposed, his sacred Majesty might have batten'd, with great Ease and Delight, in the full Sunshine of *arbitrary Power*;

Power ; and that He should succeed in imposing it, his *own Vanity* and the servile Flattery of his *Ministers* had made him to expect. True it is, that the Language he held was not so plain, nor the Efforts he made so direct and violent, in the Beginning of his Reign, as They grew soon afterwards ; but yet, if We consider the Multitude of his *Proclamations* ; the Nature of some ; the Stile of all ; the Obedience He exacted to them ; the *Acts of Power*, which He exercised ; Those, which He essay'd ; and many other Particulars of his Conduct, which for Brevity We omit ; We must of Course conclude that He thought himself sure, at that Time, of laying the Foundations, since He prepared to erect so great a Superstructure. He was deceived. Instead of making his Impositions pass on the People, He only awaken'd their Jealousy. He had, in his own Age, and He hath, in ours, the Demerit of beginning a Struggle between *Prerogative* and *Privilege* ; and of establishing a Sort of Warfare between the *Prince* and the *People*. But the *Spirit of Liberty* baffled all his Designs. The *Spirit of Liberty* was not enervated by *Luxury* in those Days. It was not only alive, but vigorous and active. It rose in the Nation, as That of *Faction* rose at Court. The *same Principle*, which comply'd with Queen *Elizabeth*, resisted King *James*. The *Opposition* began as soon as the *Invasion* ; and *Tyranny* was, at least, nipt in the Bud.

King

King *James* made one Attempt, indeed, in the Beginning of his Reign, which bid fairer for Success than any of those, which He made afterwards ; and which, if it had succeeded, would have done the great Work of his Reign by Means more silent and more dangerous ; more soft in Appearance, and more deadly in Effect. We mean the Attempt He made on the Privileges of the *House of Commons*, in the Case of *Elections*. In the *Proclamation*, for calling his *first Parliament*, He assumed a new and unjustifiable Prerogative, by his Manner of prescribing to the *Electors* and to the *Elected* ; and by subjecting both to severe Penalties, if they fail'd, not only against the *Laws and Statutes*, but against the *Purport, Effect and true Meaning of his Proclamation*. In the Course of the Session, He endeavour'd to put *this Prerogative* in Execution, by insisting, *first*, that the *Commons* should confer with the *Lords* ; and when This was refused, that They should confer with the *Judges*, on the Merits of an *Election* and *Return* for the County of *Buckingham*, which They had already heard and decided. If the *King* had prevail'd in this Attempt of *garbling the House of Commons*, He would have prevail'd very probably in That, which he made some Time afterwards, of *imprisoning and punishing the Members of it*. Thus He might have intimidated Those, by *one Prerogative*, whom He could not exclude by the *other*. Such an *Influence* as must have resulted

resulted from hence, join'd to That, which the *executive Power* gives unavoidably to every King, would soon have render'd the *House of Commons* as dependent upon him, as the *House of Lords*, at that Time, appear'd to be; for if *Money gets Money*, (which will not, we suppose, be deny'd in this *stockjobbing Age*) it is no less true, and perhaps no less visible, that *Influence begets Influence*. Now We apprehend that, in this Case, the Barrier of *Liberty* had been totally destroy'd, and that King *James* would have virtually been in Possession of *arbitrary Power*; for whether the *Will of the Prince becomes a Law*, by Force of *Prerogative*, and independently of *Parliament*; or whether it is made so, upon every Occasion, by the Concurrence of *Parliament*, *arbitrary Power* is alike establish'd. The only Difference lies here. Every Degree of *this Power*, which is obtain'd *without Parliament*, is obtain'd against the *Forms*, as well as against the *Spirit* of the Constitution; and must therefore be obtain'd with Difficulty, and possess'd with Danger. Whereas in the other Method of obtaining and exercising *this Power*, by and with *Parliament*, if it can be obtain'd at all, the Progress is easy and short; and the Possession of it is so far from being dangerous, that *Liberty* is disarm'd, as well as oppress'd, by *this Method*; that Part of the Constitution, which was instituted to oppose the Encroachments of the *Crown*, the Male-Administration of *Men in Power*, and every

every other Grievance, being influenced to abet these Encroachments, to support this Male-Administration, and even to concur in imposing the Grievances.——National Concurrence can be acquired only by a good Prince, and for good Purposes; because publick Good alone can be a national Motive. But King James was not ignorant that private Good may be render'd a superior Motive to particular Men, and that it is morally possible to make even Parliaments subservient to the worst Purposes of a Court. Richard the second, by influencing the Elections, and Queen Mary, by corrupting the Members, had created such a Dependence of the Parliament on the Court, that the first had well nigh establish'd, in Spight of all other Opposition, his absolute Power; and that the latter was able to subvert what her Father and her Brother had done; to govern with the utmost Cruelty; and to sacrifice the Interests of the Nation to Those of an Husband, whom she took against the general Inclination of her People.——If therefore King James could have created the same Dependence, He might have promised himself the same Success. He might have govern'd in great Quiet and Safety, with the Concurrence of Parliament, tyrannically at home, and ignominiously abroad. He might have beggar'd the Nation, as he beggar'd himself, and have given an absolute Dominion over both to one insolent and incapable Minister. But this Concurrence could

could not be obtain'd ; because the *Dependence of Parliaments upon the King* could not be created. By asserting their *Privileges*, They prevented any direct and open Influence of the Crown. Had King *James* been rich ; (and it was in his Power to have been so) had *Luxury* and the Offspring of *Luxury*, *Corruption*, both which he introduced, prevail'd in the Body of the *People*, an *indirect* and *private Influence* might have been establish'd ; this Nation might have been enslaved by the least-beloved and most-despised of all her Kings. But the King continued poor, and the Nation honest ; this *indirect* and *private Influence* was either not attempted, or attempted without Effect ; and We are persuaded that no *Advocate* for it could have been found, even in this Reign, or the next. There were Men wicked enough to ascribe such Powers to the *King*, as would have destroy'd effectually the Powers of Parliament ; but there was no Man absurd, as well as wicked enough, to allow those Powers, which are given to Parliament by the Constitution, and to argue for an *Expedient*, which must of Course render them ineffectual, or pervert them to Purposes opposite to Those, for which They were instituted. Thus *Liberty* was preserved, by preserving the *Independency of Parliaments*. The Proceedings of the *Commons*, in the whole Course of the Affair We have mention'd, were extremely moderate. They went farther, not only in Expressions

and

and outward Demonstrations of Respect and Submission, but in real Compliances, than could have been expected, or that was perhaps strictly right; and when an Expedient was fallen upon to draw the *King*, with some Reputation, out of the Contest, They gave Way to it, although by admitting a *Writ for the Election of a Member*, in the Room of one, whose Election They had allow'd, They suffer'd a Precedent to be establish'd, which might be turn'd against them. But the *Spirit of Liberty*, though easily alarm'd, is slow to resent even great Provocations, and to act with Violence, even against the worst Princes. Repeated Injuries, imminent and extreme Danger can alone bring Things to such a Pass; and *no King* of this Nation was ever distress'd by his *People*, without receiving frequent Warnings, as well as accumulating insupportable Grievances. King *James* felt some Part of this Distress in Process of Time. He deserved it perhaps already. The *Commons* however contented Themselves, in an Address to Him, to assert their *Privileges*, and to complain of this Invasion of them, amongst *other Grievances*. — The Proceedings of Parliament were carry'd on, in subsequent Sessions, with the same Moderation and Temper. In That, which follow'd the Discovery of the *Gunpowder Treason*, the *Oath of Allegiance* was imposed; and this Pledge of Fidelity, for the future, was the sole Hardship, (for such the Court of *Rome* and a great Number of that Com-

Communion esteem'd it) which the *Roman-Catholick Party* drew on Themselves by so execrable an Attempt. The *Parliament* comply'd, on this Occasion, with the *King*, probably against their *own Sentiments*; since nothing could be more different than *his Notions* and *theirs*, concerning the Conduct to be held with *Papists*, and even concerning *Popery* itself; and since the Favour He shew'd, not to say the Court he made, to *this Party* had already created great Uneasiness, and began to be a most unpopular Part of his Government.

— He had no *War* on his Hands, and his Revenues were at least as considerable as Those of the late *Queen*. The *Commons* however gave him one of the greatest Supplies, which had ever been given in Parliament; and upon this Occasion it may not be improper to observe, in Confirmation of what We have advanced already, that the natural Bent of the *People*, to live well with their *Kings*, is so strong that *Parliaments*, under no other Influence than This, will neglect nothing to gain them; nay, that a Prince like *King James*, disliked, distrusted, despised, may prevail on his *Parliament*, for a Time, and till all Hopes of gaining Him are lost, to do as well as bear in his Favour, what would not be attempted in a better Reign, nor succeed perhaps, if it was attempted.

His Design of uniting the two Kingdoms of *England* and *Scotland* fail'd. It was too great an Undertaking for so bad a Workman.

We

We must think that the general Arguments against it were grounded on Prejudice; on false and narrow Notions. But there were other Reasons, drawn from the Jealousies of that Time, and from the Conduct of the *King*, who had beforehand declared all the *Post nati*, or Persons born since his Accession to the *English* Throne, naturalized in the two Kingdoms; and These were, without Doubt, the true Reasons, which prevail'd against the *Union*. — The next Time the Parliament assembled, to proceed on Business, was in the Year 1610, and by that Time the general Discontent of the Nation began to shew itself in loud and universal Murmurs. Some *Monopolies*, the rigid and impolitick Proceedings of the *High-Commission Court* and *Star-Chamber*, and many other Causes combined to raise them. But no particular Grievance either had, or deserved to have, so great an Effect as the continual Endeavours, which were used to establish Practices and Principles, absolutely destructive of the general Constitution of the *English* Government. — Such was the Attempt made by *Bancroft*, Archbishop of *Canterbury*, when he presented the *twenty-five Articles*, commonly call'd *Articuli Cleri*, and petition'd the *King* to grant Prohibitions upon them. — Such again were the Books, publish'd by *Cowel* and *Blackwood*, asserting that the *King* is neither bound by the *Laws*, nor by his *Coronation-Oath*; that He hath a Right to
make

make *Laws* and impose *Taxes*, without the Consent of *Parliament*; and that the Nation was reduced to a State of Slavery by the *Norman* Conquest. — Such, to conclude this Head, were the many *Acts*, which the *King* himself had done, and the many *Declarations*, which He had made; nay, such was the *Declaration* he made in this very *Parliament*, when he affirm'd that although *all Kings, who are not Tyrants, or perjured, will bound Themselves within the Limits of their Laws; yet as it is Blasphemy to dispute what God may do, so it is Sedition in Subjects to dispute what a King may do, in the Height of his Power.* — These Doctrines were new, ungrateful and shocking to *English* Ears; yet the *Parliament* kept in Temper, and bore such Language, from this *fearful, bullying Prince*, as the fiercest of his Predecessors, since *Richard the second*, had never presumed to hold. They took no Notice of *Bancroft*, nor pursued any farther Measures against *Cowel* and *Blackwood*, after these *Libels* had been call'd in by Proclamation, and the reading of them had been forbid. Nay, there was a *Subsidy* granted, in this very Session, with as little Pretence as there had been for granting the *former*. — All this Temper, Submission and Generosity of the *Parliament* were lost on the *King*. They would not connive at *Grievances*, nor sacrifice *Liberty*; and Those were the only Terms, upon which an Union with Him was to be obtain'd. —

From the Year 1610 to 1614, He held no *Parliament*; and it is evident that He would never have call'd another, if his *Ministers* could have supply'd his Profusion by all the illegal and oppressive Means, which they used to raise *Money* on the People, and which We forbear to enumerate, because the most *partial Writers*, who have endeavour'd to excuse them, have not presumed to deny them. — Even under this Necessity, he did not take the Resolution of calling a new *Parliament*, till He was prevail'd on by his Favourite, *Somerset*, who had form'd a Scheme for influencing the *Elections*, and, at the Head of several other *Undertakers*, flatter'd *Himself* and his *Master*, that He could get such *Members* chosen *, *as should comply solely to the King's Desires*. But this Project proved abortive. *The English Freedom cannot be lost*, (says *Wilson*; and may his Saying prove true to all future Generations!) *by a few base and tame Spirits, that would unmake Themselves and their Posterity, to aggrandize ONE MAN*. It happen'd to King *James*, as it happen'd to his *Son*. Disgrace at *Court* proved a Recommendation in the *Country*; and the Faces, which appear'd in this new *Parliament*, made the Countenance of the *Court* to droop.

* *Wilson*.

From this Time began that Conduct, on the Part of the *Court*, and on the Part of the *Parliament*, which continued to be held, with very fatal Uniformity, till it ended in a *civil War*. That the *People* had Reason to be jealous of the Designs of the *Court*, hath appear'd and will appear still more flagrantly in the Sequel; but that the *Court* had, at this Time, nay even in the Month of *May* 1640, when King *Charles* dissolved the last Parliament He had it in his Power to dissolve, any Reason to be jealous of the *Parliament*, or the *People*, We deny; and are able to justify our Denial by *Fact* and *Authority*; even the Authority of my Lord *Clarendon*. — But the *Father* and the *Son*, and especially the *former*, having no End in calling their *Parliaments* but to get *Money* from their *People*, and to evade, rather than refuse, the Redress of *Grievances*; the Art of the *Court* was constantly employ'd, under Pretence of the Urgency of Affairs, and in the Parliament of 1614, without any Pretence at all, to get the *Subsidies* first dispatch'd. The *Commons*, on the other Side, who knew for what they were call'd together, and who expected that little Time would be allow'd them to enquire into *Male-Administration* and to represent *Grievances*, when they had once given the *Money*, insisted for the most Part (for there happen'd Occasions, in which They did not insist) that the Consideration of *Grievances* should precede, or at least go

an equal Pace with That of the *Supply*. This was the Rock, on which so many *Parliaments* spilt. This alone occasion'd the Dissolution of That We are speaking of, and made King *James* resolve, though he could not support his Resolution to the End of his Reign, to govern by his *Prerogative* alone, and without the Assistance of his *Parliament*; That is, to avow *absolute Power*.



L E T T E R X X I .

IN our last Discourse, concerning the Pretensions set up, and the Attempts made by King *James* against the Freedom of the *English* Constitution, We carry'd these Remarks down to the Year 1614. We chose to stop there, because it seems to be the very diametrical Point of Opposition, or a Point very near to That, between the Government of *this Prince* and the Government of Queen *Elizabeth*, which We have so largely insisted upon. — The Distrust between *Him* and his *People* was now intirely form'd. His *offensive* and their *defensive* Pretensions were now fully explain'd. An Union of Affection between *Him* and his *People*, which the *latter* still desired and had long courted, was now grown desperate. An Union, unworthy of a free People, a factious Union between the *Parliament*

liament, and the *Court*, founded in the Dependence and Submission of the *former*, and so much affected by the *latter*, was after many Trials become evidently impracticable. The King, as He had managed Affairs, could never govern *with Parliament*, nor *without it*; and those Powers, which are design'd to be mutual Helps, were turn'd to be mutual Clogs on one another; not by any Deviation on the Side of the *People*, or of their *Representatives*, from the true Line of Government; but by a manifest and almost continual Deviation from it, on the Side of the *Crown*.

Thus were those great Disorders in Government and that national Confusion raised, which in a few Years more destroy'd the whole Constitution. In short, that melancholy Scene, which had been preparing ever since the Accession of King *James*, was open'd about this Time, and continued open with few Variations, every one of which was for the worse, till that Tragedy began, wherein the noblest as well as the meanest Blood in the Nation was shed so profusely, and with the Beginning of which We purpose to conclude *these Remarks*.

We have charged the Whole, and We think very justly, to the Account of King *James*; who attempted to govern *England* by foreign, not by *English* Maxims; nay, by such as He was unable to govern his own Country. Sure We are, that no Part of it can be laid to the Constitution, or People of *England*.

The Constitution was the same in his Time as in the Time of Queen *Elizabeth*; and the People claim'd, under *Him*, no other Privileges, nor Powers, than They had enjoy'd under *Her*. It was his Fault, not theirs, if by treading in the same Path, which had kept them united with *Her*, They were divided from *Him*. These are Points, on which We think it proper to insist a little more in this Place, in order to cast a greater Light on the Particulars, which follow, and to avoid any prolix Repetitions, when We come to wind up the whole.

King *James* had open'd the Parliament, which met in 1614, by asking Money for the Portion and other Expences of his Daughter's Marriage to the *Electoꝛ Palatine*, and promised the *Commons* Leave and Leisure to enquire into *Grievances*, when They had comply'd with this Demand; but Distrust, the Bane of all Harmony, prevail'd amongst *Them*, as it is plain even from this conditional Promise that it prevail'd with *Him*, and They resolv'd to begin the Work of the Session by a Representation of *Grievances*.

A principal Article in this Roll was the Growth of *Popery*, encouraged no doubt by several Passages in the Conduct of King *James*, and particularly by two; his employing not only suspected, but known *Roman-Catholicks* in Offices of the highest Trust and Consequence; and his avow'd Design of marrying his Son to some Princess of that Religion.

Religion. Shall We say, in the Stile of King *James*, that it was *Presumption in the Commons* to meddle in such *deep Matters of State*? Shall We not rather think it was *Presumption in the Prince* to determine a Matter, of this Importance to the publick Welfare, to the present and to future Generations, without the Advice, nay against the Opinion of the *great Council of the Nation*? Shall We not rather applaud the Wisdom and Foresight, as well as the Virtue of those Men, who discover'd the Fruit in the Seed; whose Minds foreboded all the mischievous Consequences of such an Alliance, and who did their utmost to prevent the true, original Cause of our greatest Misfortunes?

Under another Head of *Grievances*, complain'd of at this Time, were the *Monopolies*, and many illegal Exactions of Money from the People. The *Parliament* had the more Reason to lose no Time, and to spare no Endeavours in putting a Stop to these Encroachments on *Liberty*, because the longer They lasted, the more familiar They grew. The *Court* improved in the Practice of them. The *People*, who submitted to them by Force, might have been brought to submit to them by Custom, and the *King* might become able in Time to supply his Wants *without the Assistance of Parliament*; a Case almost as desperate as That of his being able to supply them when, in what Manner, and in what Proportions He thought fit, *by the Assistance*

of *Parliament*. We say almost as desperate, on the Principles touch'd in our last Letter; for, in the first Place, if King *James* could have supply'd his Wants without *Parliaments*, He would certainly have call'd none, and the Condition of this Nation had been worse than That of *Spain*, of *France*, and of other Nations, whose Examples have been, absurdly enough, quoted to justify these arbitrary Methods of raising Money, and to induce Mankind to submit to them. In *France*, for Instance, the People must suffer; but they may complain. Their Mouths are open; That is, their *Parliaments* may represent; and even remonstrate; nay, they have gone so far, as to refuse with Success to register and give the necessary Forms of a Law to an Edict of the Prince, which they judg'd oppressive to the People. But if King *James* had prevail'd, He would have govern'd without even these Shadows of a *Parliament*. The People must have suffer'd and could not have complain'd. Their sole Mouth, the Mouth of *Parliament*, would have been stopp'd, and Redress of Grievances being no longer attainable by the Applications of their representative Body, which would have no longer exist'd, they must have submitted tamely and silently, or have sought a Remedy in their collective Body, which can only act by Resistance, and Force. This Situation would have been bad enough, God knows; yet not so bad as the other; for, in the second Place, if the *Parliament*

liament had been made *dependent* on the *Crown*, (no Matter by what Kind of Influence; whether by the Distribution of *Honours*, the Translation of *Bishops*, the corrupting the *Electors* and the *Elected*, or the other Methods King *James* took) the Mouth of the People had not been stopp'd indeed; but it had been form'd to speak another Language than That of the Heart.—The *People* must have suffer'd, and the *Parliament* must have rejoiced.—If *They* had felt an increasing Load of Debt, the *Parliament* must have testify'd great Satisfaction at the Diminution of it.—If *They* had felt the Decay of Trade, and the Growth of national Poverty, the *Parliament* must have boasted of the Wealth and flourishing State of the Kingdom.—If *They* had seen the Interest and Honour of the Nation, as they saw it too often, neglected or sacrificed, the *Parliament* must have exulted in the Triumphs of both.—In short, such a *depending Parliament* must not only have connived at the Grievances of their Country, but have sanctify'd Them too. They must not only have borne the Rod, but have kiss'd it too; not only the Rod of their *Prince*, but the Rod of some *upstart Minister*, who ow'd his Elevation to his Dishonour, and his Favour to his Shame.—But as the Integrity of *Parliament* secured the Nation from any Danger of *this Kind*; so the Necessities of the *King* were the great Security against any Danger of the *other*.—

Was

Was the *Parliament* therefore to blame, who opposed strenuously every Innovation set on Foot, to lessen this Security?

A *third Grievance*, which the *Parliament* desired to have redress'd, was that incredible Waste, which King *James* made of the *Revenues of the Crown*. These Revenues were, at that Time, so much more than sufficient for all the ordinary Occasions of the Government, that Queen *Elizabeth*, who had so many extraordinary Occasions of Expence, who paid so many old Debts, without contracting new, and atchieved such glorious Enterprizes abroad, as well as at home, did not receive in Grants from her People above * *four Millions* in more than *forty Years*. — If King *James*, who had no extraordinary Occasions of Expence, who paid no Debts, who atchieved no glorious Enterprizes any where, had neither ask'd Money, nor raised it without asking, the squandering his Revenue had not probably come under Debate in *Parliament*; but, since He expected that the *People* should provide for his Debts, and supply his Necessities, it was just that the *Representatives of the People* should examine how They were contracted, The immense

* We do not want to be told that the Value of *Money* was very different at that Time from what it is now; but though We admit of the highest Calculations, this Sum will appear surprisingly small for so many Years, when compared with the Profusion and Extravagance of some latter Reigns.

Estates, which were made in these Days at Court, the known Corruption not only of *inferior Agents*, but of *principal Ministers*, and even of *Those*, who were at the Head of the *Treasury*, made such an Examination the more necessary, and provoked and excited the more to it. The House of *Commons* would have thought that They had betray'd their Trust, if They had neglected so important a Part of it. By the Proceedings, as well as Declarations of the *Parliaments*, in these Times, it is plain that they thought they had not an arbitrary, but only a conditional Power, over the *Purse* of the Nation, though the Strings of it were in their Hands; that They were to tax the *People* in no greater Proportion than was strictly necessary to support the Honour and Interest of the Nation, and the Dignity of the Crown; that They could make no Judgment, concerning this Proportion, if They had not a full Communication of the Nature of the *Service*, for which extraordinary Aids were demanded; and if They did not examine, before They granted these Aids, how the ordinary Revenues and any precedent, extraordinary Grants had been apply'd. Such Maxims as These will not be condemn'd, we presume. They have been always profess'd and frequently pursued, from the Time We speak of down to the Age, in which We live. Since the Reign of King *William the third*, our Princes have indeed stood on a different Foot. They have had

had a *distinct Revenue* assign'd to Them for their particular Use. The *annual Expences* and the *Debts of the Nation* have been separately provided for by Parliament; and yet not only the Management and Application of these *annual Grants*, but also the immense Property of the *Creditors of the Publick* have been left to the *Crown*, as the Management and Application of *those Revenues* were, which belong'd properly to the *Crown*, and by Deficiencies, on which the *Crown*, not the *Nation*, was immediately affected. It is no Wonder therefore if our *Parliaments* have thought Themselves obliged, since this great Alteration, sometimes by *Committees*, and sometimes by *extraordinary Commissions*, to inspect more narrowly into Revenues, which are still managed by the Officers of the *Crown*, though They make no longer any Part of the Estate of the *Crown*; and We persuade ourselves that no honest Man would be sorry, if the Wisdom of our *present Representatives* should think fit to make any Inquisitions of the same Nature; but even before this Alteration, before the Settlement of a *civil List*, and when our Princes stood on the same Foot as King *James the first*, with Respect to their private and publick Revenue, the Maxims We speak of were pursued on many Occasions, and always with the universal Applause of the *People*. In the Reign of King *Charles the second*, for Instance, our *Whig-Patriots* endeavour'd not only to detect and punish

Frauds

Frauds and Abuses, by Enquiries into the Management of the publick Money, but to prevent them likewise, by appropriating what they gave to the Uses, for which it was given; and thus much We think may suffice, to clear the Conduct of the *Parliament* of 1614. from any Imputations on this Head.

Let us mention, in this Place, one Grievance more, which We have touch'd upon in another. A *former Parliament* had taken some Notice of it, and *this Parliament* would probably have taken more, if the *King* had allow'd Them Time. The Doctrines, which establish'd the unbounded and ineffable Prerogative of the *King*; which reduced the Privileges of *Parliament* to be no longer an *antient and undoubted Right and Inheritance*, but derived them from the *Permission and Toleration of the Crown*, and declared them liable to be *retrench'd* at the Will of the Prince; and which by necessary Consequence changed at once the Nature of the *English Constitution*, from That of a *free* to That of an *arbitrary Government*; all these Doctrines, We say, or the Principles, on which They were establish'd, had been already publickly and frequently asserted by King *James*. They were the Language of the *Court*; and a *Party* had been form'd in the Nation, who made Profession of them. They were maintain'd in Conversation. They were pleaded for in *Print*; and they became soon afterwards

wards the Disgrace and Prophanation of the Pulpit.

We have sometimes compared, in our Thoughts, these Usurpations of King *James* over the Privileges of his *People* to Those of the *Popes*, which gave that Prince so much Offence, over the Rights of the *Emperors*, and indeed over the civil Rights of Mankind. *Charlemagne* had made these Priests Princes. They continued for about two hundred and sixty Years, to submit, in the main, to those Rules, which the *imperial Constitutions* and *ecclesiastical Customs* had establish'd ; after which They started, at once, out of these Bounds. They would be *limited Pontiffs*, no longer, but *arbitrary high Priests*, like the *Dairo* of *Japan*, something more than human, and *civil* as well as *ecclesiastical Tyrants*. They scorn'd to go to *Tyranny* by Degrees, but carry'd their Usurpations at one Leap to the utmost Pitch of Extravagance. *Alexander the second* deny'd the Right of the *Emperors* to chuse, or to confirm the Election of a *Pope*. His *Successor* took the Investitures from them. *Henry the fourth* asserted the *imperial Rights*, in Opposition to this Invasion ; but *Gregory the seventh* asserted, in Opposition to *Him*, that *Rome* was the Capital of the World ; that the *Pope* was independent of all Powers on Earth ; that *Kings* and *Emperors* were liable to be deposed by the Plenitude of his Authority. The *Pope* was believed by many, on his Word ; and there were

were more, who found their private Account in seeming to believe Him. *Factions* were raised to maintain these Principles. They were consecrated by the *Church*. They prevail'd in those Days. More than *five Centuries* were not sufficient to abolish the *Practice*, and more than *six* have not been sufficient to extirpate the *Principle*. True it is, that these *Popes* had several Advantages, which King *James* had not ; and, amongst others, the Minority of *Henry the fourth* at the Time, when They began this monstrous Usurpation ; whereas when King *James* set up his Pretensions, and talk'd, and writ of *Prerogative*, in Terms as ridiculous and full of as much Bombast as Those, which the Briefs and other publick Acts of *Hildebrand* contain'd, the *Commons of England* were grown up to a full Maturity of Property and Power. Shall We condemn them for endeavouring to preserve the *Principles of Liberty*, that They might preserve the *Spirit* of it, and by preserving the *Spirit*, deserve and secure the Continuance of so great a Blessing ? Should an *English Parliament* have sat quiet and silent, in humble Dependence on the *Prince*, whilst Slavery in Speculation, as well as Practice, was making such large Advances ; whilst the Laws of the Land, the Laws of Nature, and Those of God Himself were perverted to impose a Yoke of base and servile Prejudices on the Understandings and Consciences of Mankind ? We think not. Sure We are that

our

our *Parliaments* have been always watchful to censure and explode, in Time, such Doctrines as might, even by Induction and Consequence, weaken the Foundation of *Liberty*. The Instances of this Kind are so well known and some of them so recent, that We need not quote them. But, in order to justify still farther the Sense and Conduct of our Forefathers, let us appeal even to the present Sense of Mankind. We all know that there are *mercenary* and *abandon'd Wretches* amongst us, who have dared to plead for a *Dependence of the Parliament on the Crown*; not for that *Dependence of the several Parts of the Government on one another*, which our Constitution hath form'd, and on the Preservation of which the Freedom of our Government intirely rests; but for the most *indirect*, the most *iniquitous*, as well as *dangerous Dependence* imaginable; for a *Dependence*, to be created by *Corruption*, which must always produce Effects as infamous as its Cause. *Corruption*, We say, hath been defended, nay, recommended (for We will repeat the Assertion) as a necessary Expedient of Government. The Representation of the Country by the *independent Gentlemen* of the Country hath been saucily and awkwardly ridiculed; as if a *Bill*, to prevent all Persons, who have neither *Places* nor *Pensions*, from sitting in Parliament was proper to be pass'd, and those salutary Laws, which are in Force for preventing Persons, who have *Places* and *Pensions*,

sions, from sitting there were as proper to be repeal'd. Nay, *these Incendiaries*, who go about to destroy our Constitution, have not blush'd in the same Breath to admit that *standing Armies* have been generally the Instruments of over-turning *free Governments*, and to affirm that a *standing Army* is necessary to be kept up in ours; if you ask Them against *whom*, They answer you very frankly, against the *People*; if you ask them *why*, They answer you with the same Frankness, because of the *Levity* and *Inconstancy* of the People. *This is the Evil*; an *Army* is the *Remedy*. Our Army is not design'd, according to these *Doctors of Slavery*, against the *Enemies* of the Nation, but against the *Nation*. We are confident that the *present Army* is incapable of being employ'd to such Purposes and abhors an Imputation, which might have been justly cast on *Cromwel's Army*, but is very unjustly insinuated against the *present*.

Now let us suppose that the Time was come, when the Parliament should think fit to censure and put a Stop to the Influence of such Writings as These; would any honest Man, if He laid his Hand upon his Heart, disapprove their Proceedings? On the contrary, would not every Man, who wish'd that the Constitution of this Government might be preserved, applaud such Measures and bless the Representatives of his Country for their Zeal against the Betrayers of it?

T

Upon

Upon the whole Matter, We think it very plain that the Alarm, which was taken at the Propagation of these infamous Doctrines, in the Reign of King *James the first*, is abundantly justify'd not only by the Examples of *other Parliaments*, but by the general Sense of Mankind in all Ages.

Whenever the Fundamentals of a free Government are attack'd, or any other Schemes, ruinous to the general Interest of a Nation, are pursued; the best Service, that can be done to such a Nation, and even to the Prince, is to commence an *early* and *vigorous Opposition* to them; for the Event will always shew, as We shall soon see in the present Case, that Those, who form an Opposition, in this Manner, are the truest Friends to Both, however They may be stigmatized at first with odious Names, which belong more properly to Those, who throw the Dirt at Them.

If the *Opposition* begin late, or be carry'd on more faintly, than the Exigency requires, the Evil will grow; nay it will grow the more by such an Opposition, till it becomes at length too inveterate for the ordinary Methods of Cure; and whenever That happens; whenever Usurpations on national Liberty are grown too strong to be check'd by these ordinary Methods, the People are reduced to this Alternative. They must either submit to *Slavery* and *Beggary*, the worst of all political Evils; or They must endeavour to prevent

vent the impending Mischief by *open Force* and *Resistance*, which is an Evil but one Degree less eligible than the other. But when the *Opposition* is begun early and carry'd on vigorously, there is Time to obtain Redress of Grievances, and put a Stop to such Usurpations by those gentle and safe Methods, which their Constitution hath provided; Methods, which may and have often proved fatal to *wicked Ministers*, but can never prove fatal to the *Prince* Himself. — He is never in Danger but when these *Methods*, which all arbitrary Courts dislike, are too long delay'd.

The most plausible Objection to such Proceedings, and by which well-meaning Men are frequently made the Bubbles of Those, who have the worst Designs, arises from a false Notion of *Moderation*. True *political Moderation* consists in not opposing the Measures of Government, except when great and national Interests are at Stake; and when That is the Case, in opposing them with such a Degree of Warmth, as is adequate to the Nature of the Evil, to the Circumstances of Danger attending it, and even to Those of Opportunity. To oppose upon any other Foot; to oppose Things, which are not blameworthy, or which are of no material Consequence to the national Interest, with such Violence as may disorder the Harmony of Government, is certainly *Faction*; but it is likewise *Faction*, and *Faction* of the worst

Kind, either not to oppose at all, or not to oppose in earnest, when Points of the greatest Importance to the Nation are concern'd.

The Truth of all this Reasoning will be confirm'd by what remains to be said of King *James* and King *Charles the first*. — If there had not been an *early* and *honest Opposition*, in Defence of national Liberty, against King *James*, his Reign would have sufficed to establish Him in the Seat of *arbitrary Power*. — If the *Opposition* had been more generally back'd with the Weight of the *Nation* in due Time; if the *Court* had not been able to divide Men against their general Interest, upon Principles of *Prerogative* and *Liberty*, King *James* must have comply'd in Time; the *Constitution* would have been re-settled on its right Foundation; his Family would have been preserved; all our national Calamities would have been prevented; and the Sins of the *Court* might have been expiated by the Punishment of one or two of the *Ministers*. — But a *Prerogative Party* having been nursed up from the Beginning, and gain'd Strength in the whole Course of King *James's* Reign, the Strength of the Nation was divided, and the Contest continued so long between the *King* and the *People*, that *Resentment* and *Passion* and *Prejudice* and *Faction* took Place on all Sides. The soft and gentle Methods of Cure, which our Constitution had provided, became impracticable. A provoked People sought their Remedy

medy in *Resistance*. A *civil War* follow'd. The *English* Government was subverted, instead of being reform'd.

What hath been said will serve to justify the Conduct of the *Parliament*, as well as the general Alarm, which the *Nation* had taken in 1614. These were the Crimes, the heinous, unpardonable Crimes, for which King *James* dissolved this *Parliament*, with so much Indignation, after They had sate but a few Weeks, and had not Time given Them to pass even one Law. These were the Crimes, for which He confined to the *Tower* and *other Prisons*, and punish'd in *other Ways*, so many of the most active Members. Lastly, These were the Crimes, which made Him resolve, what He had before attempted, to govern *without Parliament*. — The particular Consequences of these Measures will appear in our next Letter, when We come to consider *his Conduct of our national Interests abroad, against the Sense of the Nation*; in which Period of Time, the *foreign Affairs* are so intermix'd with *parliamentary* and *domestick Affairs*, that We shall not divide them, but speak of them together, having first very briefly made our Observations on his *Management of Parties*.



LETTER XXII.

IN Letter XVIII, We have spoken of the State of *Parties* at the Accession of King *James*. We are now to make our Observations on his *Management of them*. It is necessary We should do This, in order to give a compleat and just Idea of his Government; and yet so much hath been said on the Subject by Writers of all Denominations, and even by ourselves, that there remains but very little to be added, either for Curiosity, or Instruction.

We might observe how He drew Himself into some Trouble, if not Danger, and exposed Himself to the Necessity of shedding some Blood, in the very first Months of his Reign, by espousing the Passions of a *Party*; by disgracing and proscribing Men, who had no Crime at that Time towards Him but their Attachment to the late Queen; by avowing the Cause of the Earl of *Essex*, whose Designs had been, no doubt, as treasonable, at least, and as chimerical too, as Those, into which He drove *Grey*, *Cobham* and *Raleigh*, or which were imputed to Them.

Several other Anecdotes, concerning *Factions at Court* and *Parties in the Nation*, might be collected and remark'd upon. But
We

We shall pass them over, and confine ourselves to observe, in a very few Instances, how He adapted his particular *Management of Parties* to the general and main Design of his *Policy*; what Strength He acquired; what Strength He lost by this Conduct; and what Contests He entail'd on Posterity.

There were no *Parties*, at this Time, in the Nation, but such as were form'd on *religious Differences*; and it had been a great Object of the Policy of Queen *Elizabeth*, to keep *all Parties* within those Bounds. We know the Maxims, on which she proceeded, by a Letter of Sir *Francis Walsingham*, writ expressly on this Subject. She thought that *Consciences were not to be forced, but won and reduced by Truth, Time, Instruction and Persuasion*; and that *Causes of Conscience lose their Nature, when they exceed their Bounds and grow Matter of Faction*. — By keeping to these Maxims, she succeeded. The *Parties in the Church* made none in the *State*: They were obliged to live in due Subjection to Laws, wisely made and moderately exercised. They were never punish'd, whilst They continued in this Subjection; much less, were They provoked, or encouraged to go out of it. The Powers of the *Church* were apply'd to the Support of the *Establishment*, not render'd subservient to any factious Designs of the *Court*; and ecclesiastical Violence was restrain'd from confirming the Obstinacy of Those, who dissented, by Persecution of

them, or from increasing their Numbers, by Persecution of others.

Directly opposite to this Conduct was That of King *James*. — In haste to shew his Parts, He had a Conference between the *Bishops* and the *puritan Ministers* at *Hampton-Court*, in a few Months after his Accession; where He made Himself a principal Party in the Dispute. His *Courtiers* flatter'd Him, and Archbishop *Whitgift*, who died soon afterwards, and probably doated then, declared Himself *verily persuaded that the King spake by the Spirit of God*. But surely such a Conference, however it might frighten and silence, could neither instruct, nor persuade; and the King was so far from trusting, like his Predecessor, to the *Force of Truth* and the *Aid of Time*, that in this very Conference He threaten'd to employ another Kind of Force, if He did not meet with Compliance in a Time to be limited. The Bishops were at first to *admonish paternally* and to *confer amicably*; but lest They should not succeed by *preaching, writing and living* Men into Conformity, (the sole Means They ought to desire; or, if They desired others, the sole Means they ought to be suffer'd to employ) They were to have Recourse to *Compulsion* afterwards. — The same Spirit reign'd in the first Speech, which *this Prince* made to his Parliament; for there He not only mass'd together, imprudently as well as unjustly, all the Dissenters from the establish'd Church under

under the general Denomination of *Puritans* and *Novelists*, but He declared them all *insufferable in any well-govern'd Commonwealth*; so that He put them all out of his Protection, even though They confined Themselves within those Bounds, to which *Causes of Conscience* may reasonably extend, and proscribed them for their *Opinions*, not their *Practices*.

On these Principles He proceeded, and what We have said here may suffice, upon this Head, for his whole Reign. — The Consequence of this Conduct was that *those Sects*, who were not dangerous at first, became so at last. They became so, in some Degree, from the Moment the Declarations We have mention'd were made; for nothing is found more true in Nature and Experience than This; that They, who are oppress'd by Governments, will endeavour to change them; and that He, who makes Himself terrible to Multitudes, will have Multitudes to fear. — But This was not all. — As He made *these Sects* his Enemies, so He gave them great Advantages of Popularity and Strength. — The *first* of these Advantages, which We shall take Notice of, arose from the great Indulgence He shew'd to the *Roman Catholicks*, and the favourable Sentiments of *that Religion*, which He express'd on all private, and many publick Occasions. We need not descend into the particular Instances; for though We give little Credit to *Deageant's Memoirs* in general, and none to what He says of a *Letter*,

Letter, written by King *James* to the *Pope*, acknowledging Him *Vicar of Christ* and *Head of the Church*; yet is there a Multitude of other Proofs, too notorious and too well supported to be deny'd. — We think it plain, upon the whole Matter, that several Passages in his Conduct, both before and after his coming into *England*, were unworthy of a *Protestant King* at any Time, and were equally impolitick at this Time; when the Zeal of *Papists* to attack, and of *Protestants* to defend the *Reformation* was at the highest Pitch; and when even the least Condescension, on either Side, would have been thought little less than Apostacy. Fear for his *Person*, and little Notions of *Policy* were probably the Motives, which determined this Part of his Conduct; but whatever the Motives were, the Effect was certainly This. He made the Cause of the *Court* to pass amongst many for the Cause of *Popery*; and it was not hard by Consequence for the *Puritans*, who were oppress'd by the *Court*, to make their Cause pass for That of the *Reformation*. We are far from thinking that This was properly the Case on either Side; but the Appearances were strong enough to fix such Prejudices in the Minds of Men, already prepared by Jealousy and Suspicion. This Advantage, so foolishly given, operated strongly against the *Court*, both in *this Reign* and the *next*. In *This*, it was apply'd to no ill Purposes. In the *next*, it was very wickedly improved;

proved; but They, who gave it first, and who continued to give it afterwards, are justly to be reputed the Accomplices of Those, who improved it so wickedly, how much soever They stood in Opposition to one another.

A second Advantage of Popularity and Strength, which King *James* gave to the *Puritans*, was This. He rank'd amongst *their Party*, nay He drove into *that Party*, as much as He was able by severe Usage, all Those, who stood up in Defence even of *civil Liberty*. The Aversion, which He express'd to the *Puritans*, form'd a Kind of League between *Him* and the warmest of the *establish'd Clergy*; and when These were once become a *Court Party*, We are not to wonder if *others* grew as warm as These, and if the greatest Part of that Body of Men united in a Cause, which flatter'd their *Passions*, and open'd the Road of *Preferment* to them. *No King no Bishop*, was the Language of the *Court*. *No Bishop no King*, was That of the *Church*. Had the *Monarchy* and the *Hierarchy* been attack'd, this united Zeal in a common Cause would have been commendable and successful too; for the Nation was not now, nor for a long Time afterwards, so distemper'd, that any *Faction* could raise its Head with Effect against the just Prerogative of the *Crown* and the establish'd Rights of the *Church*. But the Truth requires We should say, that *this Union* was form'd to offend and invade, and to extend Both beyond

yond the Bounds prescribed to them by the *English* Constitution. It was great Blindness in the *Clergy* not to see that to enlarge the Bottom of the *Court*, They narrow'd *their own*; that They fix'd a *Center of Union*, wherein all their divided Enemies would meet and unite with many, who were then Friends to the *Church*, but might come, as it happen'd afterwards, from being against the *Clergy* to be against the *Church* itself. It was a great Misfortune to the *Nation*, that the *Clergy* did not see these Truths in Time; since if They had seen Them, They might have been happy Instruments of preventing that Mischief, which follow'd soon after the Time We speak of, and that Division of Interests between the *Crown* and the *People*, which was created by King *James*, and hath proved so fatal to his Posterity. — But to return. — By a contrary Conduct, by espousing and sanctifying the Principles and by promoting the Measures of King *James*, the *Clergy* became Part of the *Faction of the Court*, and shared very unjustly the Imputation of favouring *Popery*, but very justly That of advancing *Tyranny*. This was a second Advantage, which King *James* gave to the *Puritans*. He varnish'd their Cause with Popularity, and He increased their Numbers. He made *Puritans* in his Time, as *Jansenists* have been since made in *France*, and *Jacobites* in *Britain*, by calling Men so and by treating them as such. — They must have been

been sharp-sighted, indeed, of whom my Lord *Clarendon* speaks, and who could discern *the Rebellion contriving from, if not before, the Death of Queen Elizabeth*; but They must be quite blind, who do not discern the Seeds of Rebellion sowing in every Part of the Conduct of King *James*, and particularly in This, which We have now touch'd; the *Management of Parties*.

These Evils were aggravated, and the Consequences of them were precipitated by *his conducting our national Interests abroad against the Sense of the Nation*.

During the first Period, into which We divide this Reign (That is, to the Year 1614) King *James* meddled little and, to say the Truth, had little Occasion to meddle in *foreign Affairs*. — The *Treaty*, which He made with *Spain* in 1604, had been much censured, and Sir C. *Cornwallis*, in a Letter to the Lord *Cranburne*, asserts *that England never lost such an Opportunity of winning Honour and Wealth unto it, as by relinquishing the War against an exhausted Kingdom and a Prince held in little Veneration for suffering Himself to be wholly govern'd by a Man generally hated*. This *Treaty*, however, was not probably so bad as it had been represented, and the Commerce open'd with *Spain* became a Source of inexhaustible Riches to our Nation; but still there was something preposterous and mean in the Conduct of King *James* abroad, even whilst He had so little

little to do there, and so safe a Part to act. He courted that very Power, the Power of *Spain*, whom Queen *Elizabeth* had broke, and who would have courted Him, if He had known how to put so much as *Dignity* in his Proceedings. He disoblighd the *Dutch*, whose Power had been raised by Queen *Elizabeth*, and who must have continued to depend on Him, if He had known how to be either a *Friend*, or an *Enemy*; and yet He bore most ignominiously from this very People the greatest Injuries and Affronts imaginable. He had neither the Courage to chastise this *infant State*, nor the Sense to protect it. Their Treaty with their old Masters, the *Spaniards*, began in the Year 1607; was continued in 1608; and ended, in 1609, in a Truce of twelve Years. During the whole Course of this long Negotiation, King *James* shew'd his Partiality in Favour of the *Spaniards*; and though He sign'd, about this Time, two Treaties with the *States* as *Sovereigns*; yet He made no Scruple, upon some Occasions, of declaring them *Rebels*. — The Death of the Duke of *Cleves*, and the Disputes about that Succession, presented to *Henry the fourth* an Opportunity He waited for; and He was ready, when *Ravaillac* stabb'd Him, to attack the House of *Austria*, whose Power in *Germany* began once more to give Umbrage, though *Rodolphus the second* was still on the *Imperial Throne*. King *James* left his Troops with the *Dutch*, notwithstanding

withstanding the Truce. They were employ'd in this Quarrel; and We cannot think Him to blame for taking no farther Part in the Hostilities. His Views were, and They ought to have been, at this Time, and in this Respect, very different from Those of that heroic King of *France*. But in the new Scene of *German Affairs*, which open'd a few Years afterwards, and which continued, during the last Period of his Reign, (That is, from the Year 1614) nothing could be more scandalous than his taking no Part at all, except his taking the Part He did take. — That He should have made Himself a *Principal* in that terrible War, which broke out in *Germany* in 1618, and which lasted thirty Years, We cannot persuade ourselves; neither do We believe that any Man, who does not take up his Opinions on Trust, but examines this intricate and perplex'd Part of the History of the last Century with Care, will be of another Mind; and yet King *James* must have made Himself a *Principal* in this War, if He had engaged in it, as He was advis'd by some to engage, and as He hath been blamed by many for not engaging. — The Censures, under which He hath pass'd on this Occasion, would have been juster, if Those, who have made them, had distinguish'd better between the *Patrimony* of his Children, by defending the *Palatinate*, and promoting their *Grandeur*, by seconding their *Ambition*; between contributing to support the *Protestant Interest* abroad,

abroad, and taking on his Shoulders a Load, which it was neither reasonable nor possible that He should bear; between that Conduct, which He ought to have held, as King of *this Island*, and That, which He might have been obliged to hold, if his Dominions had lain on the *Continent*. Our Writings will not pass, We believe, for Apologies in Favour of King *James*; and yet We shall explain this Point a little less to his Disadvantage, perhaps, than it hath been usually taken.

If King *James* had follow'd the Advice of Those, who would have had Him enter into an immediate War to maintain the *Elector Palatine* on the Throne of *Bobemia*, He must have exhausted and ruin'd this Nation to support it. He must have furnish'd Subsidies to *Bethlem Gabor* and the Prince of *Anspach*; He must have fed the War in *Hungary*; fomented the Revolt in *Austria*; paid the Army of the *Princes of the Union*; opposed the Duke of *Bavaria* in *Bobemia*, and *Spinola* in the *Palatinate*. — Let us consider in Opposition to whom, and in Concert with whom, He must have carry'd on this vast Undertaking. — On *one Side*, the whole *Popish* Interest, in the *Empire*, was closely united, and the Cause of *Ferdinand* was the common Cause of the Party. The *Popish* Interest, out of the *Empire*, conspired in the same Cause. The King of *Poland* assisted the *Emperor* in *Hungary*. Troops from *Italy* and a great Army from the *Netherlands*

therlands acted for Him in *Germany*. The Purse of the *Pope* and That of the King of *Spain* were open to Him. Even *France*, who ought in good Policy to have opposed the House of *Austria*, was induced, by the Bigotry of her Court and, perhaps, by the private Interest of *Luines*, to declare for the *Emperor* against the King of *Bohemia*. —

On the *other Side*, the *Protestant Interest*, in the *Empire*, was far from being closely united, and farther still from making the Cause of *Frederick* the common Cause of the Party. Even the *Princes of the Union* had different Views; many of them lean'd to the *Emperor*; none of them could be intirely depend-
ed upon; and the *Elector of Saxony*, the most powerful of the *Protestant Princes* of the *Empire*, was so far from uniting with the others, that He was first privately, and afterwards openly, but all along very steadily on the Side of *Ferdinand*. Out of the *Em-
pire*, some Assistance might have been ex-
pected from the King of *Denmark* and the
Dutch; but even their Accession must have
been purchased; at least, it must have been
made useful, at the Expence of *Britain*.
What other Allies could King *James* have
hoped for; and who can see, without smi-
ling, in that godly Prelate, Archbishop *Ab-
bot's* Letter to Sir *Robert Naunton*, the Name
of the *Duke of Bouillon*, together with *Tre-
mouille*, a rich Prince in *France*, mention'd
upon such an Occasion? — Short and im-

U

perfect

perfect as the Account We have given is ; Those, who know the State of *Europe* at the Time we speak of, know that it is true ; and if We were to look no farther than the Representations made by *Juliana* of *Nassau* to her Son, against his accepting the Crown of *Bohemia*, We should discover in them, with the true and fatal Reasons why King *James* did not assist *Frederick* at all, unanswerable Reasons why he ought not to have taken upon Him the *Bohemian* Quarrel in the Manner He must have taken it, if He had taken it upon Him at that Time. That King *James* should have prepared for this Storm, which was long in gathering ; that He should have labour'd to unite and to fortify the Protestants of *Germany*, before it happen'd ; and to comfort and succour and protect them, after it happen'd ; that He had many fair Opportunities of doing This, without engaging farther than the Interest of *Britain* allow'd ; and that He neglected them all, We admit and are able to shew. — He might have put Himself on such a Foot in *Europe*, as to have mediated at least (which was the only Part He attempted to act) successfully for the *Bohemians*, and to have screen'd his Son-in-Law from the Vengeance of the *Emperor*, and the Ambition of the Duke of *Bavaria*. But He put Himself on such a Foot, and He acquired such a Character, that He had no Credit among the Protestants, nor much Influence over his Son-in-Law,

Law, and that the *Roman Catholick Party*, sure of amusing Him, neglected and despised Him. He might have declined taking the *Bohemian Quarrel* upon Him, and yet not have made his Court to the *Emperor* and the *King of Spain*, by disavowing and condemning *Frederick*, and even by suffering them not only to drive *this Prince* out of *Bohemia*, but to take the *Palatinate* from Him and his Family, and give a Wound, almost mortal, to the whole *Protestant Cause* in *Germany*. Nay, He did worse. By *foolish Embassies* and *ridiculous Negotiations*, He gave Time and furnish'd Advantages, which could not have been had without his Assistance, to the *Popish Party*. By the same Means He check'd, He weaken'd, He discouraged, and more than once disarm'd the *Protestant Party*. In short, not only the *Principles* of his Conduct were wrong, but the *Measures* of it compos'd such a Series of *Blunders* as We seldom find in History; because it is hardly possible, in the Course of Nature, that *such Characters*, in *such Situations*, should appear above once in a Century.

It may be objected, perhaps, by some of the *Writers*, who adorn and instruct the present Age, that King *James* was universally and justly condemn'd for not taking the *Bohemian Quarrel* upon Him, as well as for not defending the *Palatinate*; and that He must have pursued, in the *last Case*, the same Measures as We think Him justify'd for not pursuing in

the *former*. We shall not refute this Objection by shewing, as it would be easy for us to do, in various Particulars, the prodigious Difference between the *two Cases*; the insuperable Difficulties he would have encounter'd in *one*, and the many Facilities he would have had in the *other*. The Deduction would be too long and extensive for the narrow Limits of these Essays. But We shall content ourselves with making two Observations, sufficient to satisfy any reasonable Man, and which will shew, at the same Time, what different Notions of the Part this Nation ought to take in *foreign Affairs*, were entertain'd by our Forefathers, from Those, which We, their wiser Offspring, have pursued. When King *James* took the Resolution of calling the *Parliament*, which sat in 1621, the Battle of *Prague* was lost and *Bobemia* too with it.

* See *Russb. Coll.*

The * Affections of the *People* were raised, but it was for the Recovery of the *Palatinate*; and in this *Point* the Sense of the *Parliament* went along with the Affections of the *People*. On the *other Point*, the Sense of the *Parliament* had not been express'd, there having been no *Parliament* held from the Year 1614 till this Time. But what this Sense would have been, may be easily collected, from the Advice given in the *Petition and Remonstrance of the Commons*, at this Time. As zealous as They were to engage even in a War, for recovering the *Palatinate*, They were not enough transported

ported by their Zeal, or enough byas'd in favour of any *foreign Interest*, to forget the true Interest of *Britain*. They advised the King to a War; but They advised Him *not to rest upon a War in those Parts only, which would consume his Treasure and discourage his People*. They advised that the Bent of this War might be against that Prince, (the King of Spain) whose Armies and Treasures had first diverted and since maintain'd the War in the Palatinate. On which Side now was the Sense of the Nation; and how impertinent are They, who have quoted *this Sense*, to authorize our taking Part in every German Quarrel, by paying *Subsidies*, maintaining Armies, and involving ourselves in all the Affairs of the Continent? How monstrous is the Absurdity and Impudence of * *Those*, who have asserted that the Case of the People of the Palatinate, invaded by a powerful Enemy, who pretended to nothing less than the Conquest of them, is Parallel to That of the People of *Hanover*, invaded by Nobody, and over whom no foreign Power pretends to any Dominion! — The *Parliament* pointed out to King *James* a Measure effectual for supporting the *Protestant Interest* abroad; but such a Measure as this Nation might pursue by exerting her *natural Strength*. — The Power of *Spain* supported the *Emperor* and

* See Observations on the present State of Affairs.

the *Popish League*; an Army of *Spain* conquer'd the *Palatinate*; and yet the Artifices of *that Court* deluded King *James* to such a Degree, that He dream'd of recovering the Patrimony of his Children by the good Offices of the *Spaniards*, and was incapable of pursuing, in earnest, any other Measures, even at the Time when *Spinola* was stripping them of this Patrimony and reducing them to seek their Bread in another Country. To this Dependence on *Spain* He sacrificed not only *Them*, but his *own Honour*, the Affection of his *Subjects*, the Prosperity of his *Kingdoms*, and the Security of the *Protestant Religion*. It was this magick Charm, which the *Parliament* endeavour'd in vain to dissolve, by pressing Him to a War with *Spain*, which his *maritime Force* could have carry'd on principally; which would have stopp'd that Source, from whence the *Popish Party* in *Germany* derived so many Supplies; and which would have render'd the *Protestant Party*, by Consequence, a more equal Match for the *Emperor*. — But This was not the *sole wise* and *honest View*, which the *Parliament* propos'd, by pointing out and insisting on *this Measure*. There was *another*, which touch'd them more nearly, and which They had more at Heart. We shall mention it in our next Discourse, and it will lead us from our Observations on *this Reign* to those few on the *next*, with which we intend to close, at least for the present.

present, all our Remarks on the History of England.



LETTER XXIII.

ANOTHER Object, besides recovering the *Palatinate*, which the Parliament had in View, when They press'd King *James* to break with *Spain*, was preventing the Marriage of the Prince of *Wales* to the *Infanta*. He had been banter'd and abused by the *Spaniards*, when He treated a Marriage between his eldest Son, Prince *Henry*, and *Anne* of *Austria*; and yet no sooner did the Duke of *Lerma*, in the Year 1616, make some Overtures of marrying the *Infanta Mary*, second Daughter of *Philip the third*, to Prince *Charles*, but this *Solomon* of ours catch'd at the Bait, which was thrown out to Him, and hung fast on the Hook for seven Years together.

The Scheme of farther Usurpations in *Germany* was already laid, by the House of *Austria*; and the Character of *Ferdinand*, who was to succeed *Matthias*, and who did succeed Him three Years afterwards, gave Hopes of pushing these Usurpations with Vigour and Advantage. — The Part of *Spain* had been great in promoting these Designs. It was essential to their Success that it should

be so likewise in the Execution of them. No Opposition, of any Moment, was to be apprehended from *France*, where the Principles of *Despotism* and of *Bigot-Popery* prevail'd more than ever, and who had concluded, in the Year 1615, a double Marriage with *Spain*. The Truce of twelve Years, made with the *Dutch* in 1609, would enable the *Spaniards* to support the *Popish League* from the *low Countries*, as in all Cases They might do from *Italy*; and if They could keep the King of *Great Britain* from diverting the Forces of *Spain* in the mean Time, there was Reason to hope that these united Powers might conquer both the *Palatinates*, as well as *Bohemia*, and break the Force of the *Protestant League* in *Germany*, before the Expiration of the Truce and the Renewal of the War with the united Provinces of the *low Countries* should create another Diverſion. — This was a principal Part of the Plan laid by the House of *Austria* and the other *Roman Catholick Princes*, for oppreſſing the *Proteſtants* and invading the Liberties of *Germany*. To the eternal Infamy of King *James*, it ſucceeded even beyond the Hopes of Thoſe, who laid it. — The Hints, which *Digby* gave Him in the very Beginning of this Negotiation, might have put him on his Guard, and a thouſand Things, which happen'd in the Courſe of it, would have undeceived, provoked and determined any other Man. His Preſumption, his Fear and, above all, his perverſe System
of

of Policy prevented any Effects of these Kinds. We forbear entering into the Particulars of what He did for *Spain*; of what he suffer'd *Spain* to do; and of all the Indignities, which He received from every Branch of the House of *Austria*, during these Transactions. Most of them have been observed, and are sufficiently known; and it would be an unnecessary Work to point out some few Instances more, which have not been, perhaps, taken Notice of, or explain'd as much as They deserved. We shall spare ourselves and our Readers this disagreeable Recollection, and only observe in general the Plan, upon which King *James* appears to have acted; as We have observed what the Plan was of Those, who made so fatal an Use of his Weakness. His silly Pride could not be satisfy'd, unless He match'd his Son with a Daughter of *Spain*, or *France*. He had been disappointed formerly on that Side and lately on This. He was resolv'd at any Rate not to be disappointed a third Time. The immense Sum, which had been promised for the *Infanta's* Portion, tempted Him the more, because for several Years he would call no *Parliament* to grant Him *Supplies*, and He found it hard to raise them, even in small Proportions, without a *Parliament*. He imagined vainly, that this Alliance with *Spain* would give Him great Consideration abroad; and wickedly, that it would afford him Means of raising and extending his Prerogative at home. He saw the
 Mischiefs,

Mischiefs, which accrued to the *Protestant Interest* abroad, either as immediate, or as remote Effects of his Conduct; either in Consequence of what He did, or in Consequence of what He neglected; and We are willing to believe that He felt, in some Degree, Those, which fell on the *Family*, into which He had marry'd his *Daughter*. But the Interest of the *Protestants* in general touch'd Him little. Abroad, as well as at home, He chose rather by Condescensions and Submissions to court his *Enemies*, than to unite his *Friends* among one another and to attach them to Himself. In his Zeal for the imaginary Rights of Princes, He could not forgive the *Electoꝛ Palatine* for taking Arms against the *Emperoꝛ*; and whilst He look'd on Him as a *Rebel*, forgot that He was his *Son*. If He remember'd it at any Time and felt any Concern, the Sentiment was surely very faint; since We find that the distant and uncertain Prospect of making some tolerable Composition for this *unhappy Prince*, by the Intercession of *Spain*, was always sufficient to calm his paternal Solitude. He saw without doubt, at least during the Life of *Philip the third*, who did not die till the Year 1621, that *Spain* was not much in earnest to give Him the *Infanta*; but He seem'd resolved to overcome all Difficulties and to determine the Councils of *Spain*, and even of *Rome*, in his Favour, by Dint of Concessions. The Truth is, He went so far in his Concessions

cessions at last, that these Councils seem'd to be determined. Those of *Spain*, at least, were so most certainly in the Year 1623, even before the Voyage of the *Prince* into *Spain*; and the *Articles* sworn to both by *Him*, when He was there, and by his *Father* here, amounted to little less than a direct Establishment of *Popery*. That this Charge is just will, We think, appear evident, when it shall be remember'd, without entering into more Particulars, that by *these Articles* the *King* and *Prince* of *Wales* engaged for the Suspension, and even Abrogation of all Laws made against *Roman Catholics*; that they engaged never to consent to the making any *new Laws* of the same Kind; and that, as the Children to be born of this Marriage were to be educated by their *Mother*, till *ten Years* of *Age*, in Compliance with the *King* of *Spain's* Demands; so the *Prince* was prevail'd on to promise that He would lengthen this Term till *twelve Years*, according to the Desire of the *Pope*.

Thus was King *James* amused till the Beginning of the Year 1623, when the *upper Palatinate* and the Dignity of *Elector* were taken from *Frederick* and conferr'd on the Duke of *Bavaria*, by the Diet of *Ratisbon*; or, to speak more properly, by the Prerogative of *Ferdinand*, who acted in the Diet as dogmatically and as absolutely as King *James* endeavour'd to act in his *Parliaments*. When this Point was gain'd by amusing King *James*,
and

and the *Protestant Interest* was broken in Germany; the *next Point* was to be carry'd by concluding with Him and making the *Match* on such Terms, as might secure an immediate Toleration and open the Prospect of a future Establishment of *Popery* in this Kingdom. — The *Parliament* of 1621 beheld Part of this Scene and apprehended, upon very just Grounds, the Sequel. They saw the fatal Consequences of the Negotiation, whilst it was in Suspence, and They dreaded Those, which would follow the Conclusion of it. To stop the *first* and to prevent the *last*, there was but one Expedient; the forcing King *James* into a War, for recovering the *Palatinate*. This They endeavour'd with all their Might; but He meant nothing less, and had call'd a *Parliament* purely to get Money from his People, on Pretence of a *War* he was resolv'd not to make. Some Money he got by this Trick; but when he had squander'd it away in trifling Negotiations and a ridiculous Shew of War, He could get no more; so that *this Parliament* ended as others had done, and even with greater Dissatisfaction between the King and the People, both on Account of his conducting foreign Affairs against the Interest and Sense of the Nation, and of his attacking more openly than ever the Privileges of *Parliament*. The *Parliament* remonstrated, petition'd, protested. The King dissolved the *Parliament* in a Rage; imprison'd several Members of
the

the *House of Commons*, and even some of the *House of Lords*. He resumed his Project of governing *without Parliaments*, since He could not govern as ill as He had a Mind to govern *with them*. But this Project was not pursued above two Years; for what his *Parliament* could not obtain from Him, an *unworthy Favourite* did obtain. Motives of private Interest, and perhaps of a worse Nature, made that great Turn in Affairs, which so many Motives of a publick Nature and of national Interest had never been able to make. In short, a *Cabal at Court* prevail'd on this *Prince* to alter his Conduct in those very Points, on which the *Parliament*, seconded by the Clamours of the whole Nation, had been never able to prevail. — We shall not attempt to guess, as many have done, at the secret Reasons, which determined *Buckingham*, nor at Those, by which He determined the *Prince of Wales* to undertake the romantic and, in every Light, ridiculous Journey into *Spain*, to carry the Treaty of *Marriage* to a Conclusion; then to break it off again in so abrupt and ungracious a Manner; and to become so earnest for engaging in a War with *Spain*. Whatever these Reasons were, the Reason given for breaking the *Match* was not the true one. The Restitution of the *Palatinate* had been very coolly press'd, not to say neglected, even whilst the *Prince* was at *Madrid*; and yet after He came from thence, the King of *Spain* had sign'd an *Act*,
by

by which He engaged for this Restitution; so that on the Principles, on which this Negotiation had been conducted, there seem'd to be no Reason for breaking it off given by *Spain* at the Time, when it was broken. But the *Parliament*, which King *James* call'd upon this Occasion, proceeded, like the *last*, on other Principles than the *Court* had done, and was therefore, very consistently with these Principles, ready to seize the Opportunity offer'd, by advising the King to break the *Match*, and enter into a War for recovering the *Palatinate*, and by giving Him very large *Supplies* for this Purpose. — We cannot, upon this Occasion, subscribe to the Censure pass'd by my Lord *Clarendon*, how much soever We esteem his *History*, and honour the Memory of that noble *Historian*; for, in the *first Place*, the *Supplies*, given by this last *Parliament* of King *James*, were not only very large, as We have just now said, but They were such as the King was contented with, and thank'd the *Parliament* for, in his Answer to the *Speaker of the House of Commons*. Secondly, We cannot agree that it was the *Parliament*, properly speaking, who prevail'd on the King, and engaged Him in the *War*. The *Parliament* advised Him to it, indeed; but nothing can be more manifest than This, even by my Lord *Clarendon's* own Account, that the Measure was resolved on before, and that it was the Measure of the *Prince* and of *Buckingham*, which the King, however

however unwillingly, adopted. The *Parliament* in Truth did no more than advise Him to break a *Treaty*, which He had already broken; and Those, who reflect on precedent Passages, will easily concur with us that if This had not been the Case, it would not have been in the Power of the *Parliament* to break the *Match*; much less to engage the *King* in the *War*. Thirdly, if subsequent *Parliaments* did not support those great *Mountains of Promises*, as They are call'd, which this *Parliament* raised, We shall venture to affirm that it was the Fault of the *Court*, not of the *Parliaments*.

This last *Article* requires to be set in a very clear Light, because it opens to us a Source of Causes, from whence a great Part of the Mischiefs, which follow'd in the next *Reign*, arose; or by which, at least, They were aggravated and precipitated. — First, therefore, We observe that the Measures of the *Court* were so foolishly taken for pushing the *War*, that if *Parliaments* had given by Millions, and given with as little Stint in those Days, as They have given since, their Grants must have been ineffectual to any good Purpose. Just before the Death of King *James*, an Army had been raised for the *Palatinate War*, under the Command of the famous *Mansfeldt*. The *French* first and the *Dutch* afterwards refused Passage to these Troops, or even to suffer them to land. The Cry of the *Court* was loud against the Perfidy of *France*;

as it had been against the *Emperor* and *Spain* in their Turns. This will be always the Case, when *silly Ministers* bungle themselves into Difficulties, of which others make their Profit; or when They knavishly engage a national Quarrel for some private, indirect Interest, and inflame the People to resent imaginary Injuries. But the Truth is, that King *James* had Nobody to blame but Himself, when He took general and ambiguous Answers for sufficient Engagements, and did not see that *France* would refuse Passage to these Troops for the same Reasons as made Her decline entering, at that Time, into a League against the House of *Austria*.

Another Blunder committed, about the same Time, by this wise King, and that wise Minister, his *Scholar*, *Buckingham*, must be mention'd. He was to take Possession of *Frankendal*, which had been deposited in the Hands of the *Infanta Isabella*. The *Infanta* agreed to yield the Place to Him, and to give Passage to his Troops, who were to compose the Garrison, according to her Engagements; but refused to answer for their Passage over the *Lands* of the *Empire*, to which she was not engaged. Then, and not till then, He made this Discovery in Geography, that his Troops must march over the *Lands* of the *Empire* to get from the *low Countries* into the *Palatinate*. Such Blunders as These were sufficient to disgust the *Parliaments* of that Age, and to make them backward in supplying

ing a *War* thus managed: Much more Reason had They to be so, when they saw the *same Managers* and the *same Management* continue in the *next Reign*. This Disgust at the Management of the *War*, however, would not have produced so many fatal Consequences, if it had stood alone. But We observe, in the second Place, that the Parliaments, which met after the Accession of King *Charles*, became incens'd, as They discover'd more and more that the Account given by the Duke of *Buckingham*, in the Reign of King *James*, and on which the Resolutions of that Parliament had been taken, was false in almost every Point. A System of *Lies* dress'd up to deceive the Nation, and imposed on the *Parliament*, could neither remain undiscover'd, nor escape the Resentment and Indignation it deserv'd, when discover'd. Besides, that Parliament and the Nation too, when They express'd so much Joy at the Breach with *Spain*, flatter'd Themselves that, by preventing the Marriage with the *Infanta*, They had prevented all the Dangers, which They apprehended from *that Marriage*; whereas it appear'd soon afterwards that They stood expos'd to the very same Dangers by the Marriage concluded with *France*; nay, to greater; since the Education of the Children by the *Mother*, That is in *Poper*y, had been confined to *ten Years* by the *former Treaty*, and was extended to *thirteen* by the *latter*. In short, it cannot be deny'd, and

X

my

my Lord *Clarendon* owns, that as the Infolence of *Buckingham* caused the War with *Spain*, so his Lust and his Vanity alone threw the Nation into another with *France*. *Spain* was courted first without Reason, and affronted afterwards without Provocation. Ships were lent to the King of *France* against his *Protestant Subjects*; and the Persecution of his *Protestant Subjects* was made the Pretence of a Rupture with Him. Thus was the Nation led from one extravagant Project to another, at an immense Charge, with great Diminution of Honour and infinite Loss to Trade, by the Ignorance, private Interest, and Passion of *one Man*. The Conduct therefore of the *Parliament*, who attack'd *this Man*, was perfectly consistent with the Conduct of *that Parliament*, who had so much applauded Him; and one cannot observe without Astonishment the Slip made by the *noble Historian* We have just quoted, when He affirms that the *same Men*, who had applauded Him, attack'd Him, *without imputing the least Crime to Him, that was not as much known* when They applauded Him, as when They attack'd Him. Now it is plain that many of the Crimes imputed to Him, in the Reign of King *Charles*, when He was attack'd, could not be known, and that many others had not been even committed in the Reign of King *James*, when He was, upon one single Occasion, applauded.

To

To the Disgusts, taken at the Management of *foreign Affairs*, must be added Those, which were daily given by the Court in the Management of *domestick Affairs*. Real, not imaginary, Grievances arose and were continued in every Part of the Administration. Some of These King *Charles*, like his *Father*, was obstinately bent to maintain, and his Right of imposing them was asserted. Others were disguised and excused rather than defended; but in redressing even These, He shew'd such a Reluctance that He comply'd without obliging, and increased the Disgust of his People, even whilst He granted their Requests. We have said, in a former Discourse, that King *Charles* came a *Partymen* to the Throne, and that He continued an *Invasion* on the People's Rights, whilst He imagined Himself only concern'd in the Defence of his own. In advancing this Proposition, We were far from meaning a Compliment at the Expence of Truth. We avow it as an Opinion We have form'd on reading the Relations publish'd on all Sides, and to which, it seems to us, that all the authentick Anecdotes of those Times may be reconciled. This Prince had suck'd in with his Milk those absurd Principles of Government, which his *Father* was so industrious and, unhappily for King and People, so successful in propagating. He found them espoused, as true Principles both of *Religion* and *Policy*, by a whole Party in the Nation, whom He esteem'd

Friends to the Constitution in *Church* and *State*. He found them opposed by a *Party*, whom He look'd on indiscriminately as Enemies to the *Church* and to *Monarchy*. Can We wonder that He grew zealous in a Cause, which He understood to concern Him so nearly, and in which He saw so many Men, who had not the same Interest, and might therefore be supposed to act on a Principle of Conscience, equally zealous? Let any one, who hath been deeply and long engaged in the Contests of *Party*, ask Himself, on cool Reflection, whether Prejudices, concerning Men and Things, have not grown up and strengthen'd with Him, and obtain'd an uncontrollable Influence over his Conduct. We dare appeal to the inward Sentiments of every such Person.—— With this habitual Bias upon him King *Charles* came to the Throne; and, to compleat the Misfortune, He had given all his Confidence to a *mad Man*. An *honest Minister* might have shewn Him how wrong his Measures were; a *wise one* how ill-timed. *Buckingham* was incapable of either. The Violence and Haughtiness of his Temper confirm'd his *Master* in the Pursuit of these Measures; and the Character of the *first Minister* became That of the *Administration*. Other Circumstances, which often happen, happen'd likewise in this Case. The *Minister* was universally hated; the *King* was not: To support the *Minister*, it was necessary that the *Prerogative* should be strain'd, and violent

violent and unpopular Means should be employ'd. To support the *Government*, nothing of this Sort was necessary. Nay, the very contrary Measures were necessary to reconcile the *King* to his *People*, and to stop in Time that Alienation of their Minds from Him, which began even then to appear. In this Difference of Interests, Those of the *Crown* were sacrificed to Those of the *Minister*. King *Charles*, who had encouraged Parliamentary Prosecutions, in his Father's Reign, would not suffer them in his own. He dissolved his *Parliaments* and broke almost all the few Ties of Union, which remain'd between *Himself* and the *Nation*, that He might screen some of the *most unworthy Men*, who ever disserved a *Prince*, or dishonour'd a *Court*. — Before the Death of *Buckingham*, irreparable Mischief was done. *The Distemper of the Nation was so universal*, according to my Lord *Clarendon*, *that all wise Men look'd upon it as the Prediction of the Destruction and Dissolution, that would follow*. This Prediction was soon verify'd. The *King* executed what He had often threaten'd. *Parliaments* were laid aside. The very Mention of them was forbid ; and He continued to govern without any for *twelve Years*. During this Interval, the Distemper lurk'd indeed ; but it grew more malignant ; and if a national *Serenity* appear'd about the Time, when the *King* went into *Scotland*, it appear'd just when the Poison work'd most effectually

fectually and began to seize the Heart. Jealousies about *Religion* and *Liberty* were now at their Height. The former, as far as They affected the King and his *Protestant Ministers*, were ill-founded; but for that very Reason, it would have been easy to cure them; and if They had been cured in Time, as We think, on my Lord *Clarendon's* Authority, that nothing could have led the *Scots Nation* into Rebellion, so are We persuaded that a great Motive and Spur to the Rebellion in *England* would have been taken away. The latter were certainly but too well founded. The King had, in a Manner, renounced the *Constitution*; and instead of governing with the Assistance and Concurrence of a *Parliament*, He govern'd by *illegal Acts of Power*, which the *Council*, the *Star-Chamber* and the *High Commission* exercised. — There was something still more dangerous to *Liberty* in Practice. Not only the Government was carry'd on without Law, or against Law, but the Judges were become the Instruments of *arbitrary Power*, and that Law, which should have been the Protection of *Property*, was render'd, by their corrupt Interpretations of it, so great a Grievance that the Foundations of Right were, to the Apprehension and Understanding of wise Men, says my Lord *Clarendon*, never more in Danger to be destroy'd.

Whilst Things were in this Situation here, King *Charles* lighted up another Fire in *Scotland*,

land, by resuming the Project of modelling *that Church*, which King *James* had begun. Archbishop *Laud*, who had neither Temper nor Knowledge of the World enough to be intrusted with the Government of a *private College*, conducted this Enterprize and precipitated the publick Ruin. The *Puritans* of *England* soon united in a common Cause with the *Puritans* of *Scotland*; and the *Army*, which the *latter* had raised, march'd into *England*. Many of Those, who had appear'd against the *Court*, and even some of Those, who were on the Side of the *Court*, favour'd, in different Manners, the *Scots*, and hoped to apply this Force and to improve this Incident so as to restrain the *Prerogative* within known, perhaps narrower Bounds, and to strengthen the Barriers of *publick Liberty*. — That This might have been brought about and that the *civil War*, which follow'd, might have been prevented, appear'd very manifestly in the Temper and Proceedings of the *Parliament*, which met in *April* 1640, when all had been done, which could be done, to destroy the *Constitution*; for if the *King* had been able to continue to govern *without Parliaments*, the *Constitution* had been destroy'd; and when calling a *Parliament* was visibly the Effect of *Necessity* and *Fear*, not *Choice*, the *Parliament*, which was call'd, shew'd wonderful Order and Sobriety in their whole Behaviour. If some Passion had appear'd in their Debates, it might have been well excused

in an *House of Commons* assembled at such a Time ; and yet scarce an *angry Word* was thrown out. The few, that escaped from some, were either silently disliked, or openly disapproved. The *King*, even in this Crisis of Affairs, preserved the same Carriage He had formerly used towards them, and shew'd too plainly that He regarded them only as *Tax-layers*. In a Word, about a Month after their Meeting, He dissolved them, and as soon as He had dissolved them, He repented, but He repented too late, of his Rashness. Well might He repent ; for the Vessel was now full, and this last Drop made the Waters of Bitterness overflow. — Here we draw the Curtain, and put an End to our *Remarks*, by observing, *first*, that if the *Spirit of Liberty* had once relax'd in the Space of almost forty Years, *Liberty* must have been swallow'd up by *Prerogative* ; *secondly*, that after these long Contests between the *King* and the *People*, and when the *latter* had received the utmost Provocations, the *Spirit of Liberty* was not transported into any Excess ; determined to defend the *People*, but unwilling to offend the *King*. The *King* (and He alone could have done it) forced the Affairs of the Nation, as He had put his own long before, into the Hands of a *Faction*. The true Friends of the *Constitution* were divided, and divided, were too weak to prevail on either Side. The *Spirit of Faction*, not the *Spirit of Liberty*, is answerable for all, which follow'd ; and who

who is answerable for reducing the Contest, on *both Sides*, to be the Contest of *Faction* may, We think, be sufficiently collected from what hath been said in these Discourses.



LETTER XXIV.

S I R,

SINCE you have gone through the Task, which you undertook at my Desire, and have carry'd your *Remarks on the History of England*, as far as you judge them necessary at this Time, I think myself obliged to return you Thanks for your Trouble, and to say something to you, concerning the Clamour raised and the Conduct held, upon this Occasion, by *Those*, who not content with the Merit of being your *Adversaries*, have declared Themselves such at last to the very Being of the *British Constitution* and to the Principles, on which the *present Establishment* is built, and on which alone it can stand secure.

Before I left the Town, nay as soon as my *first Letter* to you appear'd, the whole Possessors of *ministerial Scribblers* was summon'd. Their Numbers were augmented; perhaps their Pen-sions. Their Strength, indeed, continued much

much the same ; but their Fury redoubled. At my Return to *London*, I am inform'd that these *weekly Swarms* have continued to buz about ever since ; that the *Insects* have been dispersed by every Flap of your Pen ; but, that, like *true Insects*, They have still gather'd again and renew'd their Din. — I say, that I am inform'd of This ; because, among other Circumstances, which compose the Ease and Quiet of a Country Life, We are sure of not being infested there by these mighty Swarms of *little Creatures*. As their Lives are short, the Extent, in which They ramble, is narrow, and few of them take their Flight beyond the Bills of Mortality.

The Manner, in which *these Writers* have supported the Dispute between *You* and *Them*, and the Explanations, to which They have been push'd, confirm all the Suspicions, which it was natural to entertain, when so great an Alarm was taken at the first direct Avowal of an Attempt to revive the *Spirit of Liberty*, and to recall to the Minds of Men the true Notions of the *British Constitution*. They were so earnest to discourage the Prosecution of such a Design ; They were so eager to find Fault, where so little Fault was to be found, that They catch'd at every Word, in which They imagined the least Slip had been made, though the Subject would not have been affected, nor the Merits of the Cause have been alter'd, if these Slips had been real, and had
pro-

proceeded from my Ignorance, as the Objections proceeded from theirs.

I should not so much as mention This, if it was not necessary to shew that your real Crime, as well as mine, towards the *Persons*, who encourage and direct *these Authors*, is our starting the *Subject*, not our *Manner* of treating it. Their Anger appear'd, the Clamour of their Party was rais'd, and all the Powers of Scurrility and Calumny were call'd forth to their Aid, before any of those Pretences were found out, which they afterwards so meanly and so immorally employ'd against us. To prove This beyond the Contradiction of any Man of Sense and Candour, it will be only necessary to appeal to the whole Scope of my *first Letters* to you, which rais'd the Storm; for what do *those Letters* contain besides general and inoffensive Reflections on the Nature of *Liberty* and of *Faction*, and on the Necessity of keeping the *Spirit of Liberty* alive and active, even in Times of apparent Security? Your Writings were justify'd, indeed, in *these Letters*; but so they had been in *others*, and on many precedent Occasions. The Charge of *Jacobitism* was refuted, indeed, with the Contempt it deserved, and *factious Designs* of another Kind, were pointed out; but *factious Designs* had been imputed to the *same Persons* before and upon the *same Grounds*. It remains then that this *new Alarm* was taken, as I just now said, at the general Design of *those Papers*; and if
That

That was sufficient to give such an Alarm; sure I am that you are more than justify'd for all you writ before this Dispute begun, and for all you have publish'd in the Course of it.

The *old Gentleman*, who defended you in the *former Letters*, thought you deserved the Acknowledgments of every honest Man for attempting to revive *this Spirit*, even supposing you to have no other Reason than your Observation that a *contrary Temper* prevail'd. How much is this Reason inforced, how much more do you deserve the Acknowledgments of every honest Man, if it is become evident not only that a *supine Temper*, contrary to the Activity of *this Spirit* had prevail'd; but that a *contrary Spirit* hath been raised and that *Principles*, destructive of all *Liberty*, and particularly adapted to destroy That of the *British Government*, are avow'd, taught and propagated? If I pronounced too hastily, in my *second Letter*, that the *Mask was pull'd off*, surely We may now say, upon Knowledge, not Belief, *that the Mask is fallen off from your Adversaries, in the Scuffle*. I shall not repeat what is said in your Discourses, nor add any Thing to them. You have there quoted the *Doctrines of Slavery*. You have shew'd the direct and indirect Tendency of them all; and you have remark'd that *some* of them have been taught even by *Those*, who have in the same Breath admitted the *Consequences* of them. Nothing less there-
fore

fore than a *constant* and *vigorous Opposition*, of which you have set us the Example, will be able to stop the Progress of those *pernicious Doctrines*. The *Principles*, which King *James the first* establish'd, were not more absurd than *These*. Their Tendency was more obvious; but, for that Reason, They were less dangerous. If *those Principles* prevail'd very far by Time and Encouragement, and had like to have prevail'd farther; why should not *These* have the same, or greater Success? It may be said, perhaps, that the Authority of the *Crown* help'd the Progress of the *former*, which is not our *present Case*. To this Distinction I shall submit very readily; but if *these Principles* have gain'd some Ground already (and that they have gain'd some cannot be deny'd) without *this Authority* to inforce them; is there not Reason to fear that they may gain more, and is not every Degree They gain a Degree more of Danger to this Constitution of Government? Surely, Sir, there can remain no Doubt in the Breast of any Man, who hath given the least Attention to the Disputes between *You* and *your Adversaries*, whether *They* or *You* are on the Side of *Liberty*; and therefore it is an Aggravation of their Guilt, that They have endeavour'd to make *your Writings* pass for an Opposition to the *present happy Establishment*, and *their Cause* for That of the *Crown*. You and I have sufficiently declared ourselves, and answer'd Them, on the first *Head*. If They had

had been able to produce an Instance, where, departing from your *Subject*, you had given occasion to draw any odious *Parallel*, the Intention of drawing such a *Parallel* might, with some Colour, have been imputed to you; but since they have not been able to do This, and have been defy'd to do it, the Reproach and Infamy of making such *Parallels*, as well as the scandalous Immorality of imputing Them to *others*, must lye at their Door.

Let us see how well their Pretensions are supported on the *second Head*, and whether We cannot prove, without any forced Constructions of their Words, or arbitrary Interpretations of their Meaning, that the open and secret Abettors of these *Writers* are either Enemies of the *present Establishment*, or have some *private Interest* more at Heart than the true Interest of this *Establishment*.

This *Establishment* is founded on the Principles of *Liberty*; on the very Principles you have maintain'd. It was made by the People of *Great Britain*, to secure the Possession of their *Liberty*, as well as their *Religion*. Had contrary Principles prevail'd; either Those, which tend to subvert the Constitution, by raising *Prerogative*, and which were justly objected to some of the *Tories* formerly; or Those, which tend to subvert it, by undermining *Liberty*, and which are as justly objected to some of the *Whigs* now; this *Establishment* could never have been made. Who are *Enemies* and who are *Friends* therefore to
publick

publick Liberty and to the *present Establishment*? Are *You* their Enemy, who defend not only the general Principles of *Liberty*, but the particular Principles and the particular Ends, on which and for which *this Establishment* was made? Are your *Adversaries* Friends to *either*, when They only seem to admit some general Notions of *Liberty*, that they may promote with greater Effect, on particular Occasions, the Doctrines of *Slavery*; and when they endeavour to destroy the Principles and to defeat the Ends of the *present Establishment*? The *Revolution* and the *Acts of Settlement* have secured us against the Dangers, which were formerly apprehended from *Prerogative*. To what Purpose are *Measures* and Principles of *Policy* daily pleaded for, which would expose us to greater Dangers than *These*? Why are such incessant Pains taken to shew by what Means *Liberty* may be undermined and our *Constitution* destroy'd even now, after all We have done and all We have suffer'd to secure *one*, and to improve the *other*? I shall not give particular Answers to these Questions; nor offer to assign the private Interest, which the Persons, who are guilty of This, may have at Heart; for I will, upon no Occasion, even seem to follow the Example of your *Adversaries*; nor presume to deliver my Suspicions; though real and well-grounded, as the Intentions of other Men. This alone I will repeat; that They, who argue and hire others to argue in this Manner,

Manner, do in Fact promote some Interest, which is repugnant to the Ends, for which the People of this Nation establish'd the *Protestant Succession* and the *present Settlement of the Crown*. They have not yet attack'd the *Religion*, but They manifestly attack the *Liberty* of their Country; and as much as these Two are interwoven together, though it be true that whenever our *Religion* is in Danger, our *civil Liberty* must be so likewise; yet it is as true that *Religion* may be safe and *civil Liberty* in Danger.

I have nothing more to add upon this *Head*, before I proceed to That, which shall conclude my Letter, except my Desires that you will persist, and my Hopes that you will succeed in the *Cause* you have undertaken; the *Cause* of your *Country*; the *Cause* of *Truth* and of *Liberty*. The Means you employ are Those of *Argument* and *Persuasion*; the lawful, and the sole lawful Means, which can be employ'd to rouse an indolent, to inform a deceived, to reclaim a corrupt, or to reconcile a divided People. Let the *Faction* continue to assert, as They have had already the Impudence and the Folly to do, in one of their *ministerial Pamphlets*, that the Faults they are pleased to ascribe to the People of *Great Britain* * *render an ARMY necessary*. Instead of endeavouring to *persuade* and to

* See some Observations on the present State of Affairs.

win, let them endeavour to *force* and *corrupt* their Countrymen. The *Spirit of Liberty* abhors such Means, and the *Cause of Liberty* would be dishonour'd by them. If this Nation was as *corrupt* and *depraved* as it is said to be by *Those*, who do their utmost to *corrupt* and *deprave* it; if our Country was in that *declining State*, and the *Freedom of our Government* as near its Period as *They* affirm, there would remain no Part for any honest Man to take except That of sitting silently down and perishing in the common Shipwreck; but surely. This is not yet our Case, nor will it become our Case, unless We are induced to believe it so; unless We make our Ruin irretrievable by struggling no longer against it. There are Men, many We think who have not bow'd the Knee to *Baal*, nor worship'd the *brazen Image*. We may therefore hope that there is still a Blessing in Store for us. In all Events, Mr. *D'Anvers*, you are sure of one Advantage, which no Violence, no Injustice can take from you; the inward Satisfaction of having served your Country, to the utmost of your Power, by those *lawful Means*, which the Constitution of its Government allows, and by *no others*.

If I hear in that Retreat, to which Age, the Circumstances of Fortune and, aboye all, the Temper of my Mind determine me, that you succeed, I shall rejoice in the common Joy: If I hear that you fail, my Concern for you will be lost in the common Calamity.

edT

Y

The

The Article, with which I propose to conclude my Letter, is of such a Nature that I cannot omit it, on this Occasion, with any Regard to Truth, Justice, Honour and the Sentiments of a most reasonable Indignation. The *Writers*, who are employ'd against you, have received, with an unlimited Commission to rail, particular Instructions to direct their *Billingsgate* chiefly at *two Gentlemen*. The Art of blackening Characters, by private Closet Whispers, hath been always practised, when Power and Confidence have been given to the *Insolent* and the *Base*. Perhaps, it may have been thought proper, at this Time, to confirm the Effect of such Insinuations by an Eccho from the *Press*; and to prevent a general national Clamour from sounding in *some Ears*, by raising an artificial Clamour round about them; but whatever the Design may have been, sure I am that this Strain of Malice could not have been employ'd against Men, who value it less, or who hold in greater Contempt both the Contrivance and the Contrivers. This *They* may do, because *They* are falsely and maliciously accused; but *He*, who is the Object of a just Clamour and of national Hatred, and who cannot turn his Eyes on Himself, without confessing to Himself that He is a principal Cause of the Grievances of his Country, must tremble at a Clamour, which He knows ought, and which He hath Reason to fear will, sooner or later, prevail against Him.

The

The Calumny against *one* of the Gentlemen, mention'd above, is confined to *two Heads*; that He hath *left his Friends and Party* and that He is *urged to oppose the Minister by the Stings of disappointed Ambition*. How ridiculous is the Charge, and on whom can such Stuff impose? Hath he changed his Notions of Right and Wrong in Matters of Government? Hath He renounced the Principles of good Policy, which He formerly profess'd? His greatest Enemy is desy'd to shew that He hath; and yet unless This can be shewn, nothing can be more impertinent, or more silly than the Imputation of leaving his *Friends and Party*. If He pursues the same general Principles of Conduct, with which He first set out, and is in Opposition now to some few of *Those*, with whom He concurr'd then, *They* have left Him, because They have left the *Principles* They profess'd. He left *neither*. For Instance, He inveighs against *publick Profusion* and *private Corruption*. He combats *both* with a constant Inflexibility, which might have done Honour to a *Roman Citizen*, in the best Times of that Commonwealth. Hath He left his *Friends* in doing This? No; *They*, who oppose Him in it, have left both *Him* and *Virtue*; and *such Men*, though They have sometimes had the Honour to concur with *Him*, could never be his *Friends*.

Is the *latter Part* of the Charge better founded? Is it not a manifest begging of the

Question, and a begging of it on the least probable Side? He assisted a *Minister* to rise to Power. He opposes *this Minister* in Power. Ergo, *Spight* and *Resentment* are his Motives. May not the *Abuse*, which He apprehends *this Minister* makes of his *Power*, may not *Measures*, which He fears are wicked, knows are weak, and sees obstinately pursued, be his Motives? May not *dangerous Ambition*, *insatiable Avarice* and *insolent Behaviour* be his Provocations? May not *this Gentleman* think Himself the more obliged to contribute to *this Minister's* Fall, for having contributed so much to his Elevation? Let me ask farther, *whom* We shall soonest suspect to have been actuated by Sentiments of *private Interest*; the *Person accused*, or his *Accuser*? *Whose Circumstances* most demanded, *whose Family* most required an Increase of Wealth and Fortune; Those of the *Accused*, or Those of the *Accuser*? Who hath given greater Proofs of *Avarice* to gather and *Profusion* to squander; the *Accused*, or the *Accuser*? In *whom* have We seen stronger Evidences of that *vindictive Temper*, which prompts to *personal Spight* and *Resentment*; in the *Accused*, or the *Accuser*? — If we may form any Judgment of the *Gentleman accused*, there is not the least Colour of Reason to suppose that his *Opposition* proceeds from a Spirit of *Ambition*, or a Design of pushing himself into the *Administration*. He hath already possess'd *two very considerable*

Employ-

Employments in the State; one of which He voluntarily laid down, as by his Conduct in *Parliament*, against some Measures of the *Court*, He forced the *Ministers* to take the *other* away, having behaved with unspotted Integrity in *both*;—and if I am rightly inform'd of his Resolution by Those, who seem to know him very well, it will hardly be ever in the Power of the greatest Man in *England*, or of the best Friend he has in the World, to persuade him to accept of a *Third*.

—There is an Ambition, with which *these Spreaders of Calumny* and their *Masters* are intirely unacquainted; the Ambition of *doing good* and the receiving the Reward in *Fame*. He, who hath *this Ambition*, can never be disappointed in the *other*; and if any Man, in our Age and Country, hath Reason to be satisfy'd with his Success in the Pursuit of *this Ambition*, it is the *Gentleman*, of whom We speak.

Whenever the *Defamation*, which hath been *display'd* against the *other Gentleman* is examined with the least Knowledge of Facts, or the least Impartiality of Judgment, it will appear equally false, and perhaps still more scandalous; for, in *this Case*, the *Slanderers* take an ungenerous and mean Advantage, which They have not in the *other*; the Advantage, which his singular Situation gives them. They, who would have declined a Contest with Him, whilst He was in a Con-

dition to answer for Himself, have not blush'd to declaim against Him in another Condition. They have experienced, in *his Case*, that the *unfortunate* are not *friendless*. They may live, perhaps, to experience, in *their own*, that the *guilty* are so. — Another Advantage, which *these Slanderers* take against *this Gentleman*, arises from the various Scenes of Life, through which He hath pass'd ; some distant in Place ; some secret in their Nature. Here Calumny hath more Room to assert, and Innocence less Opportunity to defend. Common Honesty, in some Cases, and even Decency, in others, shut the Mouth of the Man, who carries these Qualities about Him ; and even more in his *own Cause* than in That of *another Person* ; but Calumny is subject to none of these Controuls ; and We speak on our own Knowledge, when We affirm that, in the *present Case*, the false Imputations, which the *Accusers* bring, are screen'd from absolute Detection by nothing but the Honour of the *Accused*.

Let us take Notice of some of the Crimes, (for Crimes and heinous Crimes They would be, if the Facts were, in any Degree, true) which are laid to the Charge of this *Gentleman*.

His *Ingratitude and Treachery* to the late Duke of *Marlborough* and the Earl of *Godolphin* stand first in the Roll. I believe no Man acknowledges more sincerely than He
the

the superior Merit of these *two illustrious Men*, or wishes more ardently that They were now alive, and had the Conduct of the Affairs of *Great Britain*; but I know no *Obligation of Gratitude or Honour*, which He lay under to continue in their Administration, when the *Measures* of it were *alter'd*. They might have Reasons, perhaps good Reasons, for *altering their Measures*. He could have none in Point of *Honour*, whatever He might have had in Point of *Interest*, for complying with *that Alteration*. Some of the Enemies of *this Gentleman* came into the World on *such a Foot*, that They might think it Preferment to be the *Creatures of any Men in Power*. He, who came into it upon *another Foot*, was the *Friend*, but not the *Creature* of these *great Men*, and He hath had the Satisfaction of proving Himself such on different Occasions and without Ostentation, at least to *one* of them, at a Time, when the *Creatures of great Men* usually renounce them; at a Time, when They could do Him neither Good nor Hurt. That he came to Court, on the Call of the *late Queen*, in opposition to *Them*, and exerted Himself in her Service, when They served Her no longer, will not be objected to Him by any Man, who thinks more Allegiance due to the *Prince* than to the *Minister*. If the *present Minister* hath a Mind to avow a contrary Doctrine, He hath my Consent; but

then let Those, who engage with Him, remember on what Terms they engage. —

On the same false Principle is another *Accusation* brought. *This Gentleman* had no Patron, or Patroness, but the *late Queen*. He neither *projected*, nor *procured the Disgrace* of her *last Minister*, nor knew that it was resolved, whatever He might suspect, till He heard from Herself that it was so. Much more might be said on this Article; but We chuse to pass it over for many Reasons and, among others, for This; that whilst We defend the *living*, We are unwilling to say any Thing, which might be drawn by *these Slanders* into an Insult on the *dead*.

The last Charge of *Ingratitude*, brought against *this Gentleman*, is hard to be answer'd seriously. Thus much however shall be said truly and seriously. He acknowledges, with the deepest Sense of Gratitude possible, the Clemency and Goodness of his *late Majesty*; but sure He hath Reason, if ever Man had Reason, to disclaim all Obligation to the *Minister*. The Mercy of the *late King* was extended to Him unask'd and unearn'd. What follow'd many Years afterwards, in Part of his Majesty's gracious Intentions, was due solely to the *King*. That They were not fulfill'd, was due solely to the *Minister*. His Ambition, his causeless Jealousy and private Interest continued a sort of *Proscription*, with much Cruelty to the *Person* concern'd,
and

and little Regard to the Declarations, which his *royal Master* had been pleased so frequently to make.

That *this Gentleman* was engaged in the Cause of the Pretender, is true. That He served Him unfaithfully, is false. He never enter'd into *these Engagements*, or any Commerce with Him, till He had been attainted, and cut off from the Body of his Majesty's Subjects. He never had any Commerce, either direct or indirect, which was inconsistent with *these Engagements*, whilst He continued in them; and since He was out of them, He hath had no Commerce, either direct or indirect, in Favour of *that Cause*. On such an Occasion as This it is decent, not arrogant to challenge all Mankind. I do it therefore, in the Behalf of *this Gentleman*, to produce one single Proof, in Contradiction of any one of these general Affirmations. For the Truth of some, I may appeal even to *Those*, who have been in the Service of his late, and are in That of his *present Majesty*; and particularly to a noble Lord, who by the Post He was in, when most of these Transactions pass'd, must have had the best Opportunities of knowing the Truth of Them, and by whose Testimony I am willing that the Gentleman I defend should stand or fall; a Decision to which, I am sure, He will Himself be ready to submit his Life and, what is more, his Honour.

TH

I make

I make you no Excuse for the Length of my Letter. The Justice I have done, or endeavour'd to do, to *Those*, who have been vilely calumniated, and particularly on the Occasion of *your Writings* and of *mine*, will be a sufficient Excuse of itself,


I am, SIR, &c.

F I N I S.



I make

THE



T H E I N D E X.

A
A *Njou* (Duke of) why *Q. Elizabeth* broke off the Match with him Page 174
Armies (standing) the Danger of them 95, 100, 158. Remarks on the Recommendation of them 271
Augustus (the Roman Emperor) some Remarks on his Reign and Conduct 46

B
B *acon* (Lord) his Observations on *Q. Elizabeth's* Reign 153
Balance (of the *British* Constitution) in what it consists 82
Barons (*English*) how They lost their Power 109, 129, 134, 135
Bohemia (*Frederick*, King of) how his Cause affected *England* 226—Farther Remarks on that Affair 227, 297
Boulogne; how lost to *England* 173
Britain; the Freedom of its original Constitution 51 — How it was settled on its present Foundation, after the *Norman* Conquest 55 — How *Q. Elizabeth* consulted the Interest of *Britain* 171, 187
Buckingham (*Villars*, Duke of) some Account of his Conduct 299—His Character Page 306

C
C *æsar* (*Julius*) the Error of his Murderers 26

Calais; how lost to *England* 173
Charles (the first, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Conduct, 231 — Farther Remarks on his Reign 303
Charta (*magna*) sign'd by *K. John* and *Henry the 3d* 55
Church (of *England*) the Excellency of her Institution 218
Clarendon (Earl of) Remarks on his wrong Censure pass'd on the Conduct of the Parliament in the Year 1621, 300
Clergy (*English*) how They lost their Power 120, 129, 136 — Their Conduct, in the Reign of King *James the 1st*, condemn'd 281
Commons (of *Great Britain*) by what Means they acquired their present Power in the State 109, 129, 134
Commonwealths; how Liberty is secured under them 14
Constitution (*British*) its original Freedom 51 — How it was settled on its present Foundation, after the *Norman* Invasion 55 — How only it can be destroy'd 80 — The Nature of the *British* Constitution farther explain'd Page 82
Continent; the Advantages of *Islands* over Nations on the Continent 187
Corruption, recommended by the

THE INDEX

the Court-Writers 29, 270
Courant (daily) some Remarks
 on a Letter publish'd in that
 Paper 35 — Remarks on an-
 other Letter, publish'd in
 that Paper, against Mr. Old-
 castle 41

Danes, conquer England 53
D'Avers (Caleb) a De-
 fence of his Writings 6 —
 Further defended 18 —
 Charged with Jacobitism in
 the *Daily Courant* 35 —
 Some Remarks on that Pa-
 per, *ibid* — Some Remarks
 on the Writers against Him
 41 — Mr. Oldcastle's con-
 cluding Letter to Him, in
 Vindication of his Writings
 against the Writings of his
Adversaries 311
 Dependency (of the Parliament
 on the Crown) recommend-
 ed by the Court Writers 30
 — The Danger of it 249,
 263, 270
Dudley; some Remarks on his
 Actions and Punishment 111

Edward (the 2d, King of
 England) by what ruin'd
 63
Edward (the 3d, King of
 England) — Remarks on his
 Reign 58
Edward (the 4th, King of Eng-
 land) Remarks on his Reign
 88 — Upon what Terms
 and in what Manner he
 ascended the Throne 99
Edward (the 6th, King of Eng-
 land) some Remarks on his
 Reign 127
Elections (of Members of Par-
 liament) regulated 79 —
 The Liberty of them at-
 tempted by King James 248

Elizabeth (Queen of England)
 some Remarks on her Reign,
 130 — Farther Remarks on
 her Reign 135, 145, 156,
 171, 187 — The Wisdom
 of her Conduct, with Re-
 gard to the Reformation 216
Empson; some Account of his
 Actions and Punishment 111
England (Church of) the Ex-
 cellency of her Institution
 218

Factions; their Conduct oc-
 casion'd the Invasion of
 the Gauls 45
Faction; the Spirit of it contra-
 distinguish'd from the Spirit
 of Liberty 121 — The same
 Subject farther explain'd 29
 — How the Spirit of Fac-
 tion destroy'd the Roman
 Government 24 — Farther
 defined and apply'd to Men
 in Power 38 — How impre-
 vail'd at Court, in the
 Reign of Richard the 2d,
 68 — The Subject of Fac-
 tion and Liberty farther ex-
 plain'd 77 — How encour-
 aged by Edward the 4th's
 Queen 89 — And by Henry
 the 7th, 101 — Farther Re-
 marks upon *Faction* 103 —
 How encouraged in Queen
 Mary the 1st's Reign 128 —
 Farther Remarks on Liberty
 and *Faction* 142 — How
 Queen Elizabeth managed
Factions 161 — Farther Re-
 marks on Liberty and Fac-
 tion 202, 205, 231, 310
Ferdinand (Emperor of Ger-
 many) how supported against
 the Elector Palatine 286,
 297
Flee

The INDEX

Plot (of *England*) how improved by *Q. Elizabeth* 168
Fog (Mr.) some Reflections on his Paper of the 6th of June 1730 31
Franklin (*Richard*) taken up for publishing 67
France : Remarks on *Queen Elizabeth's* Conduct towards that Crown 181, 198 —
 Remarks on the Marriage of *King Charles the 1st*, and a Daughter of that Crown 303
Frederick (*Elector Palatine*) — how his Cause affected *England* 226 — Farther Remarks on that Affair 286
 G
Gaul : what occasion'd their Invasion of *Rome* 45
Government : what Care all Governments have taken to preserve their Constitution 10 — Some Remarks on the *British* Constitution of Government 11 — What are the best Kind of Governments, according to *Machiavel* 21 — Some Reflections on the *Roman* Government, and how it was destroy'd 22 — Remarks on the original Freedom of the *English* Government 50 — How settled, after the *Norman* Conquest 55 — The Nature of the *English* Government explain'd 82 — Some Remarks on the present Constitution of our Government 134, 316
Grievances, of the Nation, under *King James the 1st* 260

H

Hampton-Court : some Account of the Conference there, in *King James the 1st's* Time 278

Hanover : how the present Case of those People differs from That of the People of the *Palatinate* in *King James the 1st's* Time 291
Henry (the 3d, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Reign 55
Henry (the 4th, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Reign 75
Henry (the 5th, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Reign 77
Henry (the 6th, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Reign 117
Henry (the 7th, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Reign 103 — Farther Remarks upon it 135
Henry (the 8th, King of *England*) some Remarks on his Reign 109 — Farther Remarks upon it 118
Heretoges (*Saxon*) some Account of them 52
High-Commission (*Court*) some Remarks upon it 157
History (*English*) some brief Remarks upon it from the earliest Accounts to the *Norman* Conquest 50 — From the Conquest to the Reign of *Edward the 3d*, 53 — Remarks on that Reign 58 — On the Reign of *Richard the 2d* 67 — On the Reign of *Henry the 4th* 75 — Remarks on the Reigns of *Henry the 5th*, and *Henry the 6th* 77 — And *Edward the 4th* 88 — Remarks on the Reign of *Henry the 7th* 103 — Remarks on the Reign of *Henry the 8th* 109 — Farther Remarks on the Reign of *Henry the 8th* 110 of

The INDEX

of that Prince 118 — Remarks on the Reign of Queen Elizabeth 131 — Further Remarks on her Reign 145, 156, 171 — Remarks, on the Reign of King James the 1st 204, 212, 228, 241, 258 — Further Remarks on the Reign of King James the 1st 276, 293 — Justification of these Remarks 311
Holland; the Conduct of King James the 1st towards that State 284

I

Jacobites; the Vanity of their Expectations at this Time 33
James (the 1st, King of England) some Account of his Conduct in Scotland 195 — Remarks on his Conduct in England 204 — Further Remarks on his Reign 212, 228, 241, 258, 276, 293
Independency (of the Parliament on the Crown) asserted and explain'd 80
John (King of England) some Remarks on his Reign 64
Journal (London) some Remarks upon it 80
Islands; the Advantages of their Situation over Nations on the Continent 187

L

Lancaster (House of) some Remarks on the civil Wars between Them and the House of York 78, 95, 101
Land, (Archbishop) the Consequence of his rash Conduct 309
Leti; some Reflections on a Speech attributed to General Monk, in his History of Oliver Cromwel 31

Liberty; the old English Spirit of it recommended 6 — Contradistilled from the Spirit of Faction 12 — Further explain'd and enforced 18 — This Doctrine of Liberty apply'd to the Roman Government 22, 23 — Further defined 38 — Apply'd to the English Government 50 — How it prevail'd under the Danish, Saxon and Norman Governments 51 — How Liberty flourish'd under Edward the 3^d 58 — Further Reflections on Liberty and Faction 71 — How the British Liberties must be destroy'd 80 — The Subject of Liberty and Faction farther examined 94, 129 — How our Liberty was secured by the great Alteration in the Balance of Property 134 — What are the most dangerous Attacks upon Liberty 158 — Further Remarks on Liberty and Faction 205, 231 — The British Liberties attempted by King James the 1st 247 — How Liberty ought to be defended 271 — How attempted by King Charles the 1st 307 — Further Reflections on the Subject of Liberty and Faction 310, 312

319

Liby, misrepresented 55

M

Machiavel; his Observations on Government 21 — Cavil'd at by a Scribbler 43
Mary (the 1st, Queen of England) some Remarks on her Reign 128
Mary

The INDEX

Mary (Queen of Scotland) how supported 150
Marbasts (British) how Q. Elizabeth protected them 189 — How neglected by King James the 1st 238
Mickleton (Savage) the Power of that Assembly 52
Ministers; Some Account of Richard the 2d's Ministers 69 — The King's Command no Justification of Ministers 77 — How a Prince ought to give his Ministers up to national Justice 111 — The Character of a bad Minister exemplify'd in the Conduct of Cardinal Walscy 113 — Mr. Oldcastle's Defiance to a certain great Minister 123 — The Character of Queen Elizabeth's Ministers 163 — The Character of a bad Minister, set forth in the Conduct of Villars, Duke of Buckingham 299
Moderation (political) what 273
Monarchy; the Dangers, which attend Liberty in limited Monarchies 13 — The Advantages of a limited Monarchy 139 — The Excellency of it 202
Munk (General) some Reflections on a Speech, attributed to Him 31

N

Normans; how far They conquer'd England 53

O

Observator (cursory a Paper so call'd) some Remarks upon it 41
Osborne (the Journalist) some Remarks upon his Writings 80, 81

P

Palatine (Elector) how his Cause affected England 225 — Further Remarks on that Affair 286, 296
Parliament, their Dependence on the Crown recommended by the Court Writers 29, 30 — King Richard the 2d packs a Parliament 72 — The Temper of the Parliament, during the civil Wars, between the Houses of York and Lancaster 78 — Laws made to prevent the Influence of the Crown, on the Freedom of Elections 79 — How managed by Henry the 8th 122 — Corrupted by Mary the 1st, 128 — How our Parliaments have gain'd Strength since Henry the 7th 136 — The Liberty of Parliament attempted by King James 248 — They represent their Grievances under that Prince 260 — The Mischiefs of a dependent Parliament 263 — The Conduct of the Parliaments in the Reign of King James the 1st, vindicated 290, &c.
Parties, how managed by Q. Elizabeth 160 — And by King James the 1st 276 — The great Influence of Party Prejudices 306
Philip (the 2d King of Spain) some Remarks on his Conduct in England 172 — How Q. Elizabeth behaved towards Him 177, 194
Papery, encouraged by King James the 1st 254 — How first establish'd 260
Presb., the Liberty of it asserted 3. 4
Pretender,

The INDEX.

Pretender, the Vanity of his Hopes at this Time 33
Parliaments, (the Party so call'd) how King *James the 1st* increased their Numbers, and gave them Strength 278

R

R *Reformation* (of Religion in *England*) how carry'd on 214

Revolution (in the Year 1688) what Principles it hath introduced into this Nation 34

Richard (the 2d, King of *England*) Remarks on his Reign 67

Richard the 3d, King of (*England*) — Remarks on his Reign 101

Richmond (Earl of) advanced to the Throne of *England* 102

Right (hereditary to the Crown of *England*) the Folly of that Pretension 241

Rome, some Reflections on the wise Institutions of that Government 22 — How destroy'd, 23, &c. — Farther Reflections upon this Subject 43

S

S *Saxons*, some Account of their Government 51

Scotland, how *Q. Elizabeth* behaved towards that Kingdom 194

Scots, the Reason of their rising in Rebellion against King *Charles the 1st* 307

Sea, the Advantage of it to *Islands* 188

Somerset, (Duke of, Protector of *England*, in *Edward the 6th's* Reign) some Remarks on his Administration 127

Spain, how *Queen Elizabeth* behaved towards that Crown 178, 198 — How King

James acted towards them 283 — Why the *English* Parliament press'd that Prince to break with *Spain* 293

Star-Chamber, some Remarks upon that Court 157

Stephen (King of *England*) to what He owed his Crown 54

T

T *Taxes*; how granted to *Queen Elizabeth* and apply'd by Her 165

Trade; how encouraged by *Q. Elizabeth* 168 — And protected 185, 186. — How neglected by King *James the 1st* 238

Treaties; The Difference between *Islands* and *Nations* on the *Continent*, with Regard to them 189, 190, 191

U

U *Union* (of *England* and *Scotland*) why King *James the 1st*, could not accomplish it 253, 254

W

W *Wickliffe*, the first Reformer 61

William (the Conqueror) some Remarks on his Reign 53

Whitgift (Archbishop) his Flattery of King *James the 1st* 278

Wittagenmote (*Saxon*) the Power of that Assembly 52

Wolsey (Cardinal) Remarks on his Conduct 184

Writers (Court) some Remarks upon them 36, 41, 85, 132

270

Y

Y *York* (House of) some Remarks on the Civil Wars between them and the House of *Lancaster* 78, 95.

101



